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Algorithmic trading, market quality and information: a dual-process account 
Abstract 
 
One of the primary challenges encountered when conducting theoretical research on the subject 
of algorithmic trading is the wide array of strategies employed by practitioners. Current 
theoretical models treat algorithmic traders as a homogenous trader group, resulting in a gap 
between theoretical discourse and empirical evidence on algorithmic trading practices. In order 
to address this, the current study introduces an organisational framework from which to 
conceptualise and synthesise the vast amount of algorithmic trading strategies. More precisely, 
using the principles of contemporary cognitive science, it is argued that the dual process 
paradigm - the most prevalent contemporary interpretation of the nature and function of human 
decision making - lends itself well to a novel taxonomy of algorithmic trading.  
 
This taxonomy serves primarily as a heuristic to inform a theoretical market microstructure 
model of algorithmic trading. Accordingly, this thesis presents the first unified, all-inclusive 
theoretical model of algorithmic trading; the overall aim of which is to determine the evolving 
nature of financial market quality as a consequence of this practice. In accordance with the 
literature on both cognitive science and algorithmic trading, this thesis espouses that there exists 
two distinct types of algorithmic trader; one (System 1) having fast processing characteristics, 
and the other (System 2) having slower, more analytic or reflective processing characteristics. 
 
Concomitantly, the current microstructure literature suggests that a trader can be superiorly 
informed as a result of either (1) their superior speed in accessing or exploiting information, or 
(2) their superior ability to more accurately forecast future variables. To date, microstructure 
models focus on either one aspect but not both. This common modelling assumption is also 
evident in theoretical models of algorithmic trading. Theoretical papers on the topic have 
coalesced around the idea that algorithmic traders possess a comparative advantage relative to 
their human counterparts. However, the literature is yet to reach consensus as to what this 
advantage entails, nor its subsequent effects on financial market quality. Notably, the key 
assumptions underlying the dual-process taxonomy of algorithmic trading suggest that two 
distinct informational advantages underlie algorithmic trading. The possibility then follows that 
System 1 algorithmic traders possess an inherent speed advantage and System 2 algorithmic 
traders, an inherent accuracy advantage. Inevitably, the various strategies associated with 
algorithmic trading correspond to their own respective system, and by implication, informational 
advantage. A model that incorporates both types of informational advantage is a challenging 
problem in the context of a microstructure model of trade. Models typically eschew this issue 
entirely by restricting themselves to the analysis of one type of information variable in isolation. 
This is done solely for the sake of tractability and simplicity (models can in theory include both 
variables). Thus, including both types of private information within a single microstructure 
model serves to enhance the novel contribution of this work.  
 
To prepare for the final theoretical model of this thesis, the present study will first conjecture 
and verify a benchmark model with only one type/system of algorithmic trader. More formally, 
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a System 2 algorithmic trader will be introduced into Kyle’s (1985) static Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium (BNE) model. The behavioral and informational characteristics of this agent 
emanate from the key assumptions reflected in the taxonomy. The final dual-process 
microstructure model, presented in the concluding chapter of this thesis, extends the benchmark 
model (which builds on Kyle (1985)) by introducing the System 1 algorithmic trader; thereby, 
incorporating both algorithmic trader systems.  
 
As said above: the benchmark model nests the Kyle (1985) model. In a limiting case of the 
benchmark model, where the System 2 algorithmic trader does not have access to this particular 
form of private information, the equilibrium reduces to the equilibrium of the static model of 
Kyle (1985). Likewise, in the final model, when the System 1 algorithmic trader’s information 
is negligible, the model collapses to the benchmark model.  
 
Interestingly, this thesis was able to determine how the strategic interplay between two 
differentially informed algorithmic traders impact market quality over time. The results indicate 
that a disparity exists between each distinctive algorithmic trading system and its relative impact 
on financial market quality. The unique findings of this thesis are addressed in the concluding 
chapter. Empirical implications of the final model will also be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 FOREWORD 
This paper will propose a theoretical model of algorithmic trading that will draw on the dual-
process theory of human cognition to inform an organisational framework in which to 
conceptualise and synthesize the vast amount of algorithmic trading strategies. The overall aim of 
this study is to determine the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality.1 Building on 
previous knowledge in the area, which studies aspects of algorithmic trading strategies in isolation 
-  a theoretical model is put forward that looks at the effects of mechanisms/processes individually 
and concurrently (that is, their constituent elements and dynamic interactions), within the same 
framework. It is hoped that this integrative model may shed light on contradictory findings and on 
previously unknown market variables i.e., the theoretical model may clarify existing empirical 
puzzles.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Market quality refers to a market’s ability to meet its central function of price discovery. Price discovery refers to the process by 
which a market incorporates new information about an asset’s value into the asset’s price (Brogaard, 2010; Hendershott & Riordan, 
2009; O’Hara, 2014). These terms will be substantiated as we continue. 
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1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
1.2.1. Algorithmic Trading 
For hundreds of years, stock markets have operated as physical locations where market participants 
could meet to exchange their trading interests. These interactions were supported by floor-based 
mechanisms like the infamous open outcry system, whereby market participants gathered, and 
competed for transactions using verbal signals and hand gestures to indicate the quantity and price 
they were willing to buy or sell a specific financial instrument (Melamed, 2009).  
The contemporary securities trading landscape is fundamentally different; the forces of 
technology, speed, and computer-based trading have facilitated an extraordinary evolution in the 
manner that current markets function (Jain, 2005).  
A particularly intriguing aspect of this revolution remains the extent to which people are being 
removed from the direct decision making process and being replaced by automated trading 
systems. The emergence of algorithmic trading (AT) represents such a shift. Indeed, with over 
78% of all U.S. equity traded ‘volume’2 originating from computer algorithms, algorithmic trading 
has asserted itself as the dominant force in financial markets (Johnson, Wang & Zhang, 2014). 
Inevitably, there are myriad of questions on the topic of algorithmic trading attracting the attention 
of researchers (O’Hara, 2014). These issues run the gamut from the conceptual – how and what 
activities to regulate, to the more general – how to measure the activity of algorithmic trading? 
However, some of the more fundamental questions seem to concern the evolving nature of market 
quality (defined below) as a consequence of this activity.  
                                                          
2 Here, algorithmic trading volume is measured as a percentage of total market volume. However, it is important to note that there 
are widely varying estimates of algorithmic trading volume in the academic literature (O’Hara, 2014). 
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The dimensions of market quality, as they appear in the literature, include: trading activity, prices, 
volume, liquidity, volatility and profits (Brogaard, 2010; Hendershott & Riordan, 2009; O’Hara, 
2014). Accordingly, the aforementioned market quality metrics are all indicative of the markets 
primary role of price-discovery.  
Concomitantly, price discovery can be defined as the process by which a market incorporates new 
information about an asset’s value into the asset’s price - a central function of financial markets.3 
Given that algorithmic trading has profoundly influenced the price-discovery process, it seems that 
elucidating the effects of algorithmic trading on market quality has become vital to our 
understanding of financial market performance (Gomber, Arndt, Lutat & Uhle, 2011).4 
1.2.2 Judging the Impact of Algorithmic Trading 
 
Algorithmic trading is broadly defined as the “use of computer algorithms to automatically make 
trading decisions, submit orders, and manage those orders after submission” (Hendershott & 
Riordan, 2009, p. 2).5 
                                                          
3 If we consider that asset prices are determined by the outcome of supply and demand, then in a competitive market, traders are 
expected to rapidly assimilate any new information that is relevant to the determination of asset prices, and prices should adjusting 
accordingly. The manner in which markets “discover” this new information is aptly named the price “discovery” process. 
(Alagidede, 2008). Fama (1970) asserts that the price-discovery process is the central function of a financial market, whereby 
prices offer accurate signals for resource allocation and the efficient distribution of an economy's capital stock. Contextually, market 
quality is more general than price discovery.  
4 Financial market performance can be defined as how well (or poorly) a market is performing its vital economic function of price 
discovery (SEC, 2010). That is, a well-functioning securities market is a market in which firms can make production -investment 
decisions, and investors can choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms’ activities under the assumption that 
security prices reflect all available information (Fama, 1970). Given that the price discovery process typifies the manner by which 
prices reflect available information, price discovery and financial market performance are inexorably linked. 
5 Defining algorithmic trading is difficult and there is no single agreed definition. Gomber et al, (2001) assert that algorithmic 
trading is in fact a misnomer, a seemingly precise term used to describe and diverse set of activities and behaviours. Appendix IV 
lists the relevant academic and regulatory definitions on algorithmic trading, noting the diversity.  
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Estimates of algorithmic trading typically exceeded 50% of total volume traded in U.S. listed 
equities (Goldstein, Kumar, & Graves, 2014; Kissell, 2013). A precise assessment of its impact on 
market quality is, however, challenging. This is partly a reflection of the complexity of defining 
the term itself. There has not, to date, been a consistent academic or regulatory definition of the 
term algorithmic trading – it is used in a variety of contexts and for various purposes. Invariably, 
Automated Trading, Flash Trading, Program Trading, Low Latency Trading, Black Box Trading, 
Electronic Trading and High Frequency Trading are just some of the labels ascribed to it in the 
literature (Kissell, 2013). An additional complexity in seeking to define algorithmic trading is that 
it encompasses many players, different infrastructural arrangements and, most importantly, a wide 
number of diverse strategies (Gomber et al., 2011). 
There are two separate approaches to judging the impact of algorithmic trading. The first is 
empirical in that it draws on data from stock exchanges in order to infer impact. The second is 
theoretical in that it makes use of microstructure theory in order to model the behaviour of an 
algorithmic trader in a hypothetical, mathematically constructed market (Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 
2010; Biais, Foucault & Moinas, 2011; Jovanovic & Menkveld, 2014; Menkveld 2016). Both 
approaches emphasise market quality as an important standard by which to judge the impact of 
algorithmic trading. Again, this is because market quality is indicative of the markets central 
function of price-discovery.6  
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Typical market quality parameters include: trading activity, prices, volume, liquidity, volatility and profits (Brogaard, 2010; 
Hendershott & Riordan, 2009; O’Hara, 2014). 
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1.2.2.1. Empirical Approaches 
 
The academic discourse on the topic of algorithmic trading has been largely empirical in nature. 
Yet this literature comes with well documented limitations (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), 2014).  Obtaining useful data that can identify algorithmic trading activity is 
a formidable challenge. Much of the empirical evidence on the direct impact of algorithmic trading 
on the U.S. equity markets has relied heavily on either limited samples of proprietary data or 
publicly available information. Proprietary datasets are not publicly available, have been limited 
to particular products, are discretionary in nature and show only a small amount of algorithmic 
trading activity (Biais & Foucault, 2014). 
Alternatively, publicly available data on orders and trades does not reveal the identity of buyers 
and sellers. As a result, at this time, it is not possible to identify orders and trades as originating 
from an algorithmic trader account when relying solely on publicly available information. 
Therefore, a variety of different metrics are used by researchers to estimate algorithmic trading. 
Analysing actual algorithmic trading is based on empirical proxies,7 and results thus rely heavily 
on the quality of the proxy (SEC, 2014). 
Empirical proxies for algorithmic trading are discretionary in nature and are often specific to a 
certain researcher i.e., research-specific. No standard proxy exists. As discussed further below, 
empirical proxies can greatly affect findings regarding the key factual characteristics of 
algorithmic trading activity. Additionally, the diversity of algorithmic trading strategies highlights 
the importance of exercising care when using metrics to define algorithmic trading (Conrad, 
                                                          
7 A proxy can be defined as a figure that can be used to represent the value of something in a calculation. 
6 
 
  
Wahal, & Xiang, 2015). Ultimately, results in the academic literature are as diverse as the trading 
strategies themselves. (See the literature review for an in depth analysis) 
1.2.2.2. Theoretical Approaches 
If there are not any a priori ideas about the nature, the inner working, and the theoretical 
underpinnings of algorithmic trading, empirical studies may be limited. In turn, this may lead to 
the accumulation of a vast amount of data without any apparent hope of arriving at a succinct, 
precise, and meaningful understanding (LeBaron, 2006). By contrast, the theoretical literature 
attempts to provide a framework for understanding the key behavioural characteristics of an 
algorithmic trader. The theoretical approach embodies an explicit representation of an algorithmic 
trader in a mathematically generated hypothetical financial market. The foundations of these 
models are located in the market microstructure and behavioural finance literature (Madhavan, 
2000; O’Hara, 1995).  
Typically, microstructure models focus on the distributions of certain informational characteristics 
among agents. Given the agents’ information set, the market’s equilibrium condition can be 
determined analytically. Crucially, this information set depends solely on an agents underlying 
trading strategy (Francioni, Hazarika, Reck, & Schwartz, 2008).8  
As discussed further below, algorithmic trading is not a single strategy phenomenon; rather it 
encompasses a diverse array of trading strategies each with its own distinct informational 
character. In terms of strategies, both numerous and diverse trading approaches currently exist. 
Amongst these are; Spread Capturing, Rebate Trading, Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP), 
Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP), Implementation Shortfall, Adaptive Execution, 
                                                          
8 Potential algorithmic trading strategies are discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4). 
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Liquidity Detection, Data\Text Mining, Neural Network and Support Vector Machine Strategies. 
(See Section 2.4 for a review of the relevant strategies). 
However, to date, theoretical models of algorithmic trading have been largely strategy specific, 
simplified, analytically tractable models with a single representative algorithmic trader. Indeed, 
current theoretical models of algorithmic trading tend to focus on a specific algorithmic trading 
strategy, often conflating that strategy with algorithmic trading in its entirety (Cvitanic & 
Kirilenko, 2010). Given that algorithmic trading is a dominant component of current market 
structure and likely to affect nearly all aspects of its performance, it seems that a model that 
accounts for the multifaceted nature of algorithmic trading has become vital to our understanding 
of financial market performance. 
This research will put forward a theoretical model of algorithmic trading that will draw on the 
dual-process theory of human cognition to inform an organisational framework in which to 
conceptualise and synthesise the vast amount of algorithmic trading strategies. More precisely, 
using the principles of contemporary cognitive science, it will be argued that the dual-process 
paradigm – the most prevalent contemporary interpretation of the nature and function of human 
decision making – lends itself well to a novel taxonomy of algorithmic trading. 
Thus, this taxonomy serves primarily as a heuristic to inform a theoretical model of algorithmic 
trading; with the view of explaining the evolving nature of market quality as a consequence of this 
practice. Arguably, a model that synthesises the dynamic aspects of algorithmic trading within a 
single overarching framework has the virtue of great verisimilitude, and may enable us to bridge 
a current research lacuna: that is, contention surrounding the impact of algorithmic trading on 
market quality. Moreover, this integrative model may shed light on contradictory findings and on 
previously unknown market variables.   
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1.2.3. Theoretical Framework 
The dual-process paradigm has emerged as the most prevalent contemporary interpretation of the 
nature and function of human decision making (Sloman, 1996). Invariably, this construct is 
predicated on an assumption that cognitive decision making can be divided into two distinct 
processes or systems. More precisely, the dual-process paradigm maintains that all cognitive 
activity comprises two multi-purpose behavioral systems, for which Stanovich and West (2000, 
p.658) proposed the labels of System 1 and System 2.9 One (System 1) having fast-process 
characteristics (impulsive, automatic, reflexive and fast, etc.), and the other (System 2) having 
relatively slower, more analytic or reflective processing characteristics (controlled, effortful and 
reflective etc.) (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999).  
As noted, this research presents the dual-process cognitive theory as a possible means by which to 
conceptualise and synthesise multiple algorithmic trading strategies under a single framework. 
More precisely, following the theoretical and empirical literature on both cognitive science and 
algorithmic trading, this research espouses that there exists two distinct types of algorithmic 
trading; one (System 1) having fast process characteristics, and the other (System 2) having 
relatively slower, more analytic or reflective processing characteristics. The intuition for this 
assertion will be developed in proceeding chapters.  
As noted previously, this taxonomy serves to guide the construction of a single theoretical model; 
whereby the key characteristics of these traders reflected in the taxonomy will translate into key 
                                                          
9 It should be noted that small terminological discrepancies do exist between the different theories. However, a critical evaluation 
of the various terms identified in the literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, we will emphasize the most neutral terms 
available, namely; the distinction between System 1 and System 2 processes (Kahneman & Frederick 2002; Stanovich 1999; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). 
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behavioural and informational assumptions of the agents in this model. Moreover, the study will 
attempt to support the above mentioned taxonomy with recent empirical evidence on algorithmic 
trading activities. Indeed, it will be asserted that a ‘functional division’10 of algorithmic trading 
strategies – predicated on infrastructural characteristics of algorithmic trading – provides robust 
empirical support for this unique taxonomy (See Appendix I). 
 
1.2.3.1. Rationale for Focusing on the Dual Process Theory 
 
The dual process theory was drawn on for two overarching reasons, namely a) The typical 
cognitive process in both human beings and digital computers rely on the same fundamental 
principles - the proof of this concept is provided below - and b) A functional division of actual 
algorithmic trading strategies by their requisite infrastructure reveals real non-trivial parallels 
between the dual process account of cognition and algorithmic trading.  
a) Computation and Cognition 
 
Naturally, one might have expected that in an environment dominated by computers, human 
cognition becomes irrelevant – the opposite is actually the case. In fact, a recent proliferation of 
empirical evidence suggests that the typical cognitive process in both human beings and computers 
rely on the same fundamental principles (Pylyshyn, 1980, 1984).11 
Digital computers showed cognitive scientists that it was possible to explain the intelligent 
behaviour of a complex system without presupposing the intelligent behaviour of its components 
by employing the idea of computation - a set of rules to be followed in calculations or other 
                                                          
10 By functional division we mean a difference in the functional architecture of algorithmic trading and not merely a difference in 
how it functions. 
11 Accordingly, computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behaviour is correctly described as being 
governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. 
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problem-solving operations (Fodor, 1975, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1995; Pylyshyn, 1980, 1984). 
Computation has since emerged as a hypothesis about the literal nature of cognition; as opposed 
to a mere metaphor for its operation. Both the mind and the digital computer receive information 
from the environment, process it, and use it to perform an action.  
Computation and cognition have become almost inseparable, and often indistinguishable, in much 
literature on the mind and brain (Pylyshyn, 1980). It can be said that humans and computers are 
just two species in the genus of information processing systems. Overall, both cognition and 
computation operate on symbolic representations that can be physically instantiated in the form 
of internal rules and manipulated by some kind of processing element.  
In order to understand the statement above, it is important to understand the meaning behind 
symbols. On the one hand symbols are physical – like the ink on this page, the electrical impulses 
in a human brain or the magnetic records in a computer. On the other hand, symbols are 
representative of something else - for instance, the symbol $ is used to stand for money. That is 
not to say that the symbol $ is actual currency, rather, the symbol is a surrogate that refers to its 
referent, which is actual currency (Friedenberg & Silverman, 2011). In the case of representation, 
we say there is some symbolic entity ‘in the head’ or ‘in the computer’ that stands for real currency. 
In this view, both computers and minds are formal symbol manipulators.  
A system is formal if it is rule governed. The rules of language and mathematics are formal systems 
since they stipulate which types of allowable changes can be made to symbols. Manipulations on 
the other hand, are actions which occur physically in some type of device or processing construct, 
e.g., a computer or the brain (Friedenberg & Silverman, 2011; Stillings, Weisler, Chase, Feinstein, 
Garfield & Rissland, 1995). Concurrently, this reinforces the aforementioned statement, namely, 
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that both cognition and computation operate on symbolic representations that can be physically 
instantiated in the form of internal rules and manipulated by some kind of processing element.  
These nontrivial commonalities (between cognition and computation) imply that the mechanisms 
of human decision making are analogous with the decision making processes of an automatic 
economic decision making technology such as algorithmic trading – a fundamental doctrine of this 
thesis. 
b) Infrastructure 
 
The ideas behind this thesis are shaped by many dialogues in cognitive science regarding the 
architecture of the mind, particularly the computational processes underlying decision making. 
The present research is concerned with the dual emergent properties of types of cognitive (sub) 
systems, dubbed 'System l' (fast, superficial, reflexive, etc.) and 'System 2' (controlled, accurate, 
reflective, etc.).  
This research considers the principle that deep functional differences (i.e., difference in the 
functional architecture of the system and not merely a difference in how it functions) exist between 
the two systems, and that this distinction can be expressed physically/anatomically. Lieberman 
(2007; 2009), provides the rationale for this position. Using the tools provided by neurological 
sciences, Lieberman (2007) infers, from the activation of a specific brain region, the 
phenomenological and representational characteristics of System 1 and System 2 information 
processing. Although of secondary importance to the information processing distinction 
emphasised in the cognitive literature, Lieberman (2007; 2009) highlights that the structural 
aspects of the processes’ have clear descriptive relevance.  
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Such structural considerations are also relevant to our dual process decomposition of algorithmic 
trading. As mentioned previously, the dual process position on human cognition effectively 
synthesises the diverse computational process in the mind into functional sub-systems; with 
alternate brain regions responsible for each system. We argue that the diverse algorithmic trading 
computational processes are subject to a similar architectural distinction or functional distribution.  
In light of the above, the current study will evaluate existing empirical research on the 
infrastructural aspects of actual algorithmic trading practices in order to determine the extent to 
which empirical research supports our dual process supposition of algorithmic trading (See 
Appendix I).  
As evidenced in Appendix I, one can distinguish between two independent forms of infrastructure 
when it comes to algorithmic trading: that is, between co-location infrastructure and high-end 
capability computing infrastructure. In fact, empirical evidence seems to suggest that although 
ostensibly distinct, the array of different strategies associated with algorithmic trading require 
either co-location or high-end capability infrastructure to be performed (See, for example, 
Johnson, 2010; Gomber et al., 2011; Kissell, 2013; Frino, Mollica & Webb, 2014 and O’Hara, 
2014).  
These two disparate forms of infrastructure serve two distinct functions.  Co-location allows firms 
to locate their ‘servers’12 next to the exchanges’. Placing ones server adjacent to the exchanges 
matching engine means that real-time market information can reach the algorithmic traders 
platform instantaneously. It therefore significantly reduces the time it takes to access the central 
                                                          
12. Strictly speaking, a server is a computational device which is dedicated to the running of a certain program. With regards to 
algorithmic trading, a server functions as an electronic communication device or electronic infrastructure that manages access to a 
centralized resource.  
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order book (where electronic information on quotes and prices are warehoused). It also decreases 
the time it takes to transmit trade instructions and execute matched trades. In exchange for a fee, 
those who subscribe to co-location services receive the infrastructure from the exchange itself. 
The package includes everything from the actual connection to the matching engine, to server 
cages, electricity, maintenance, and safety installations. The SEC (2010) notes that due to co-
location facilities: “the speed of trading has increased to the point that the fastest traders now 
measure their latencies in microseconds”13 (p.3605). In the past, those on the trading floor had 
faster access to the market than others; today, those co-located with the exchange market have 
faster access. 
Co-location has emerged as a necessity and not merely a luxury or curiosity for those traders 
wishing to be fast. Given that latency or speed is the raison d'être for this type of infrastructure 
(co-location infrastructure) it seems reasonable to suggest that speed typifies those strategies that 
are conducted via co-location infrastructure.  
High-end capability computing infrastructure on the other hand, serves as a lever to pry new insight 
from a mass of data or complicated mathematical formula. As such, capability computing is 
measured in terms of its complex, analytical, logical and deductive reasoning capabilities. Overall, 
those strategies that are performed on high-capability computer infrastructure exploit their superior 
ability to interpret public information in an attempt to make forecasts that are superior to the 
forecasts of other traders. In other words, these traders filter public information through an 
                                                          
13 Where 1 microsecond is an IS (International System) unit of time equal to 1000000th of a second. 
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advanced platform (high-end capability computer infrastructure), in order to detect ‘private’14 
patterns from public information – patterns that signal a firms future performance. Therefore, it 
seems natural to assume that several algorithmic trading strategies (those not reliant on colocation 
infrastructure) are simply predicated on an ability to make forecasts/analyses that are superior – in 
terms of accuracy – to those of other traders.  
Overall, it is becoming increasingly clear that speed typifies one portion of algorithmic trading 
strategies – those reliant on co-location infrastructure – whilst accuracy epitomises the other 
portion of algorithmic trading strategies – those strategies reliant on high-capability infrastructure. 
This speed/accuracy distribution appears analogous with the dual system distinction of cognitive 
processing discussed above.15 
In addition to providing robust empirical support for our dual system distinction of algorithmic 
trading, an infrastructural decomposition of algorithmic trading may also have descriptive 
relevance. As such, the structural decomposition of algorithmic trading will be used as a 
descriptive heuristic device that contributes to our taxonomy and modelling methodology.  
Contextually, the dual process theory of human cognition will be used as the intellectual 
foundation for the unique theory of this thesis; this dual process theoretic precept, however, will 
be supported (and perhaps clarified) by actual phenomena discussed in the proceeding chapters.  
                                                          
14 In financial market research, informed investors are seen to be those investors that have “private” information about the future 
states of the world (Grossman, 1976). This seems to imply that some investors are better than others when it comes to interpreting 
financial information and are, as a consequence, better at forecasting future market movements. Unlike public information which 
can be observed directly by all from the firms’ accounting statements, private information relates to the more abstruse information 
about growth opportunities judged or interpreted privately by owners. This information reflects the more “decrypted” information 
- signalling the firm’s future performance (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3, for a formal definition of private information). 
15 Thus, a functional division of algorithmic trading strategies by their requisite infrastructure reveals actual non-trivial parallels 
between the dual process account of cognition and algorithmic trading (this remains one of the overarching reasons why dual 
process theories were drawn on as a heuristic for our dual process taxonomy of algorithmic trading, see Section 1.2.3.1 – above). 
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In the following subsections we expand on the theoretical implications and conceptual foundations 
of our novel dual process taxonomy of algorithmic trading. See Appendix I for further information 
on the infrastructural characteristics of algorithmic trading. 
 
1.2.4. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Implications of the Taxonomy 
 
Following key insights from cognitive science, this thesis advocates a taxonomy that classifies 
algorithmic trading with respect to the manner in which it processes information. The distribution 
and processing of information is a central consideration in market microstructure modelling, and 
thus appears to be a natural place to start in constructing the model. Two types of information 
processing are distinguished in the current set-up: (1) a type of processing that is fast, reflexive 
and superficial (2) a type of processing that is controlled, precise and reflective. From a theoretical 
microstructural modelling perspective, this supposition implies that two informational advantages 
underlie algorithmic trading.16 That is, one portion of algorithmic traders possess’ an inherent 
speed advantage, and another portion, an inherent accuracy advantage (relative to both each other 
and the rest of the market). This construct is largely consistent with the theoretical literature on 
algorithmic trading. Consider the following: 
The view that algorithmic traders possess a comparative informational advantage relative to 
‘regular’17 traders has emerged as somewhat a theoretical regularity in the algorithmic trading 
literature. However, evidence is anecdotal and suggests either a speed advantage or an accuracy 
advantage in isolation (Biais, Foucault & Moinis, 2011; Cartea & Penalva, 2010; Cvitanic & 
                                                          
16 Arguably, some existing models are special cases of this general framework. Therefore, Table 4.1 in Chapter 4, provides some 
clarity on where exactly existing models fit in light of the abovementioned dual process regime. Concurrently, in Sections 2.5 and 
4.9, it is suggested that this taxonomy is exclusive to algorithmic traders. 
17 The term ‘regular’ alludes to traditional (non-algorithmic) financial market participants vis-a-vis noise traders’ market makers 
and any other human traders.   
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Kirilenko, 2010; Das, Hanson, Kaphart & Tesauro, 2001; Easley, Lopez De-Prado & O’Hara, 
2012; Foucault, Hombert & Rosu, 2016; Gamzo, 2014; Johnson, 2010; Martinez & Rosu, 2011). 
By advocating that dual advantages underlie algorithmic trading, our dual process supposition 
reconciles existing and competing notions of algorithmic trading. An infrastructural 
decomposition of algorithmic trading with respect to asymmetric/private information seems only 
to reinforce this assertion.  
Moreover, given that algorithmic traders are almost certainly the fastest and the most accurately 
informed participants in the market, it seems reasonable to suggest that our taxonomy is exclusive 
to algorithmic traders (This statement is clearly justified in Chapter 4, Section 4.9). The 
prominence of this practice – accounting for a much larger proportion of trades relative to 
traditional human traders – underscores the relevance of our supposition.  
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
According to Jain (2005), ‘algorithmic trading’18 represents one of the most interesting and 
significant developments in the history of financial markets. With over half of all equity trading 
volume originating from automated computer algorithms, algorithmic trading has fundamentally 
altered the way stock markets function (Gomber et al., 2011). Understanding this practice has 
become vital to our understanding of financial markets.  
The academic discourse on the topic of algorithmic trading has been largely empirical in nature. 
However, this literature comes with well documented limitations (Biais & Foucault, 2014). 
                                                          
18 Appendix IV lists the variety of academic and regulatory definitions on algorithmic trading. For now, a broad definition of 
algorithmic trading should suffice i.e.: “Algorithmic trading refers to the use of computer algorithms to automatically make trading 
decisions, submit orders, and manage those orders after submission” (Hendershott & Riordan, 2009, p. 2). A more elaborate 
definition can also be found in Section 2.3.1 of the literature review.  
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Obtaining useful data that can identify algorithmic trading activity is a formidable challenge. At 
this time, it is not possible to identify orders and trades as originating from an algorithmic trader 
account when relying solely on publicly available information. Consequently, researchers have 
devised different methods to ‘proxy’19 for algorithmic trading activities within traditionally-
available datasets. Research-specific proxies for algorithmic trading can greatly affect findings 
about the key characteristics of algorithmic trading activity and its impact on financial market 
quality (Biais & Foucault, 2014).20   In perhaps the greatest indictment of existing empirical studies 
to date, the SEC (2014) warns that interpreting the results of empirical studies should be done with 
caution; “an assessment of empirical papers must deal with the various metrics researchers used 
to define algorithmic trading, and how their definitions may affect their conclusions about 
algorithmic trading activity… Particularly, the different metrics (proxies) used to classify 
algorithmic trading can greatly affect findings about key characteristics of algorithmic trading and 
its impact on financial market quality” (p.5).21 Ultimately, the lack of precise data is a sufficient 
enough reason to believe that the goal of understanding algorithmic trading strictly from empirical 
observations is unattainable.  
                                                          
19 A proxy is simply a figure used to represent the value of something in a calculation. With regards to these proxies, examples are 
here barred. The introductory nature of this chapter (together with the theoretical focus of this thesis) precludes any detailed 
exposition of these proxies here. Readers who would prefer clarification at this stage are directed to Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2, where 
we delineate the variety of different proxies underlying empirical research on the topic of algorithmic trading, noting the diversity 
of conclusions reached. 
20 Proxies are discretionary in nature (highly subjective) and are often specific to a certain researcher i.e., proxies are research 
specific. Refer to the literature review in Chapter 2 for further insight. 
21 Other examples of such AT proxies derived from market-wide data include high message rates, bursts of order cancellations and 
modifications, high order-to-trade ratios, small trade sizes, and increases in trading speed. Note that a critical evaluation of the 
various proxies identified in the literature is consigned to Chapter 2. We emphasise here, only, that the diversity proxies for 
algorithmic trading can greatly affect findings about the key factual characteristics of algorithmic trading activity.  
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The theoretical literature offers little respite in the way of an accurate assessment of algorithmic 
trading. One of the primary challenges encountered when conducting theoretical research on the 
subject of algorithmic trading is the wide array of strategies employed by practitioners (Gomber 
et al., 2011). Disconcertingly, current theoretical literature (as exemplified by the work of e.g., 
Biais et al., 2014; Cartea & Penalva, 2010; Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 2010; Das et al., 2001; Easley et 
al., 2012; Foucault et al., 2016; Gamzo, 2014; Johnson, 2010; Martinez & Rosu, 2011) treat 
algorithmic traders as a homogenous trader group, forming a gap between academic discussions. 
Existing theoretical models on the topic (i.e., Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 2010; Foucault, Hombert & 
Rosu, 2016; Martinez and Rosu, 2011) have been largely strategy specific, simplified, analytically 
tractable models with a single representative algorithmic trader. Indeed, current theoretical models 
of algorithmic trading tend to focus on a specific algorithmic trading strategy, and often conflate 
that strategy with algorithmic trading in its entirety (Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 2010). Given that 
algorithmic trading is a dominant component of current market structure and likely to affect nearly 
all aspects of its performance, it seems that a model that accounts for the ‘multifaceted’22 nature 
of algorithmic trading strategies has become vital to our understanding of financial market 
performance (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2014).  
In order to address this, the current study introduces an organisational framework from which to 
conceptualise and synthesise the vast amount of algorithmic trading strategies. More precisely, 
using the principles of contemporary cognitive science, it is argued that the dual process paradigm 
–  the most prevalent contemporary interpretation of the nature and function of human decision 
making – lends itself well to a novel taxonomy of algorithmic trading.  
                                                          
22 Algorithmic trading is multidimensional concept, encompassing a diverse array of trading strategies. Inevitably, these strategies 
differ with regards to their market impact and informational characteristics. 
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This taxonomy serves primarily as a heuristic to inform a theoretical market microstructure model 
of algorithmic trading. Therefore, this study proposes a model that integrates and synthesises the 
multitude of algorithmic trading strategies within a single modelling framework. It is hoped that 
this consolidated model will reconcile competing and existing notions – both theoretical and 
empirical – on the practice of algorithmic trading and its impact on market quality. This integrative 
theoretical model may also shed light on existing empirical puzzles.23   
 
1.4 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
 
The central aim of this thesis can be described concisely, namely; designing and executing a 
theoretical enquiry into algorithmic trading with the view of explaining the evolving nature of 
market quality as a consequence of this activity. To elaborate on the above, some reflection on an 
important tenet of this thesis is necessary. Specifically, the overarching objective of this thesis is 
to present the first unified, ‘all-inclusive’ theoretical model of algorithmic trading (all-inclusive in 
that it accounts for the multitude of algorithmic trading strategies within a single theoretical 
framework).  
In accordance with the literature on both cognitive science and algorithmic trading, this thesis 
espouses that there exists two distinct types of algorithmic trader; one (System 1) having fast 
processing characteristics, and the other (System 2) having slower, more analytic or reflective 
                                                          
23 The model has microstructural foundations. Thus, in order to understand the extent to which the model integrates existing models, 
an in-depth knowledge of market microstructure theory is required. Given that research within market microstructure is so 
extensive, some form of injustice in the form of neglecting otherwise important microstructure-theoretic issues would arise with 
further substantiation here. Therefore a precise assessment of the nexus between existing models and those of this thesis can only 
be accomplished following a detailed review of market microstructure theory – assigned to Chapter 4. Following the overview of 
theoretical market microstructure in Chapter 4, a comparative summary of the literature is presented in Table 4.1.  Table 4.1 allows 
the reader to gauge - visually - how our model integrates existing theoretical models. It also highlights which existing models are 
special cases of our more general framework.  
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processing characteristics. Thus, from a theoretical level, this work explicates the interaction 
between two distinct systems of algorithmic trading, in contrast to the tendency of studying a single 
type in isolation. A theoretical model is put forward that looks at the effects of these 
mechanisms/processes individually and concurrently (that is, their constituent elements and 
dynamic interactions), within the same framework. The main motivation for developing this 
theoretical framework is that it may clarify the existence of a disparity between each distinctive 
algorithmic trading system and its relative impact on financial market quality.  
Moreover, it is hoped that this integrative model may shed light on contradictory findings and on 
previously unknown market variables i.e., the theoretical model may clarify existing empirical 
puzzles. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Algorithmic trading has become a key aspect of modern financial systems and has been gaining 
market share for the past decade or so. Despite this, the academic literature is not yet fully 
developed and many important questions remain unanswered. Does algorithmic trading enhance 
or impede financial market quality? Does it lead to an increase in volatility and crowding out of 
human traders? Or, does the speed of computers help incorporate information quicker, thereby 
aiding in the price discovery process? Do algorithmic traders make markets more liquid, such that 
it is easier and less costly to trade, or do they in fact take liquidity out of the market?  
Absent draconian regulations, algorithmic trading will likely remain an important feature of 
modern financial markets. Understanding its impact and behaviour is therefore crucial in forming 
an understanding of modern market functioning. 
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1.6 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The SEC’s (2014) Concept Release on Equity Market Structure recognized that algorithmic 
trading is one of the most significant equity market structure developments in recent years. It noted, 
for example, that estimates of algorithmic trading typically exceeded 50% of total volume in U.S. 
listed equities and concluded that, by any measure, algorithmic trading is a dominant component 
of the current market structure and likely to affect nearly all aspects of stock market performance.24 
Understanding the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality has been the subject of 
considerable interest in microstructure analysis.  
Price-discovery is a central function of financial markets (Fama, 1970). On a micro level, 
algorithmic trading can be seen to have profoundly influenced the price-discovery process 
(Gomber et al., 2011). It follows that elucidating the effects of algorithmic trading on market 
quality – the typical standard by which to account for the price discovery process – is vital to our 
understanding of financial market performance. On a macro level, there are wider implications for 
the economy as a whole. The link between a well-functioning securities market and economic 
growth is well established in the literature (see e.g., Bencivenga & Smith, 1991; Obstfeld, 1992; 
Saint-Paul, 1992; Boyd & Smith, 1996; Rajan & Zingales, 1996). For these reasons, conducting 
microstructure analysis on the impact of algorithmic trading on financial market quality has 
important applications with respect to market regulation, market design and is of great importance 
to academics, exchanges and regulators.  
The overall aim of this study is to determine the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality 
in a theoretical framework. As will be clarified in the proceeding literature review below, current 
                                                          
24 Financial market performance can be defined as how well (or poorly) a market is performing its vital economic functions, 
including, price discovery (SEC, 2010). Readers are referred to footnote 4 for substantiation. 
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models of algorithmic trading are flawed because they fail to take into account the 
multidimensional aspects of its underlying strategies. For now, consider the following narrative 
that highlights, broadly, the limits of existing theoretical research: 
Algorithmic trading is a multidimensional concept, encompassing a diverse array of trading 
strategies. Inevitably, these strategies differ with regards to their market impact and informational 
characteristics. The diverse nature of this practice means that research on the subject is often 
limited in scope. Existing theoretical models tend to focus on a specific algorithmic trading 
strategy and often conflate that specific strategy with algorithmic trading in its entirety. In fact, the 
SEC (2014) notes the many instances in which researchers attempt to determine the impact of 
algorithmic trading as a whole, but follow almost immediately by an emphasis on a specific 
isolated strategy – without an explicit indication or explanation for such a strategy specific 
approach. Therefore, an alternative method of inquiry that captures the diversity of algorithmic 
trading practices in a systematic and orderly fashion seems pertinent.  
Accordingly, this thesis will present, what is arguably the first ‘all-inclusive’25 model of 
algorithmic trading; one that draws on the dual-process theory of human cognition in order to 
inform an organisational framework in which to conceptualise and synthesise the vast amount of 
algorithmic trading strategies in a systematic way. A model more representative of algorithmic 
trading in its entirety has the virtue of great verisimilitude, and may enable us to begin bridging a 
current research lacuna – i.e., questions’ surrounding algorithmic trading’s impact on financial 
market quality.26  
                                                          
25 All-inclusive in that it accounts for the multitude of algorithmic trading strategies within a single theoretical framework. 
26 The model will allow us to explore, explicitly, financial market quality metrics (i.e. trading activity, prices, volume, liquidity, 
volatility and profits) as these are theoretical concepts in the model.  
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As reported in Goldstein et al., (2012) and Johnson (2010), algorithmic trading is also rapidly 
gaining popularity in Europe and Asia, accounting for approximately 45% of stock trading volume 
in the European Union, 40% in Japan, and 12% in the rest of Asia as of late 2012. In South Africa, 
algorithmic trading is estimated to account for as much as 76% of equity market volume on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Algorithmic trading is thus a worldwide phenomenon and 
as such, the results of this study may have broad implications, not just on U.S. equity markets, but 
also stock markets around the world. 
 
1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This thesis develops a theoretical model of algorithmic trading. While some empirical applications 
are discussed in the concluding chapter of this thesis, the contribution of this thesis remains purely 
theoretical. Arguably, the current study would have been enhanced had we been able to empirically 
verify the model. However, our exploration of the empirical applications of the developed model 
has been severely restricted. This is largely on account of the fact that the main immediate 
prerequisite for empirically examining algorithmic trading relies, primarily, on the access to high 
quality data.  
With regards to algorithmic trading, currently available data sets make it difficult to carry out any 
methodologically consistent empirical analysis. Indeed, obtaining useful data that can identify 
algorithmic trading activity is a formidable challenge. Much of the empirical evidence on the direct 
impact of algorithmic trading has relied heavily on either limited samples of proprietary data, or 
publically available information. Furthermore, the strategies employed by algorithmic trading 
firms are marred by secrecy. This secrecy, coupled with the competitive nature of the industry, 
means that rich proprietary data is scarcely available.  
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Alternatively, analysing actual algorithmic trading activities using publically available data 
requires the use of empirical proxies. Unfortunately, these proxies are discretionary; and so may 
render the empirical literature meaningless for deriving useful conclusions.  
In summation, the above mentioned data challenges have severely limited our ability to empirically 
verify the model, which could have brought further insights into the dynamic and evolving nexus 
between algorithmic trading and financial market quality. Nonetheless, we argue that the work 
here represents an important step in modelling algorithmic trading behaviour and opens up the 
door for empirical research as more data becomes available. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
CONTEMPORARY COGNITIVE SCIENCE, DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES AND 
ALGORITHMIC TRADING: EXTANT EVIDENCE 
  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The present chapter will begin by examining the available literature on contemporary cognitive 
science in order to provide a premise from which to discuss and evaluate the critical links between 
the modern cognitive approaches (dual process construct) and algorithmic trading. 
2.2. THE FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
 
One of the most interesting intellectual developments of the past few decades has been the 
emergence of a novel interdisciplinary field named cognitive science. Researchers in psychology, 
philosophy, neurological science and computer science soon realised that they were attending to 
many of the same issues and had developed complementary and potentially synergistic methods 
of investigation (Boden, 2008).  
Over the last six decades or so, cognitive science has overcome disciplinary boundaries, leading 
to the revolutionary reorientation in the science of the mind. Cognitive scientists seek to understand 
the mechanisms underlying important mental phenomena such as reasoning, learning and decision 
making (Boden, 2008). Their research is remarkably diverse. It includes, for example, analysing 
the nature of thought, studying the principals of neural circuitry in the brain, and programing 
computers to do complex problem solving. 
26 
 
  
Like all intellectual disciplines, cognitive science takes a definite perspective. Cognitive scientists 
view the human mind as a complex system that receives stores, retrieves, transforms, and transmits 
information (Stillings et al., 1995). The literature refers to these operations as computations (e.g., 
Pylyshyn 1980; Stillings et al., 1995).  
This computational reference is particularly insightful and rests on certain academic doctrines 
surrounding the fundamental similarity between digital computation and human cognition. Human 
beings and digital computers are seen in the literature as two species in the genus of information 
processing systems (Stillings et al., 1995). In other words, both the mind and the digital computer 
receive information from the environment, process it, and use it to perform an action.  
Computation and cognition have become almost inseparable, and often indistinguishable, in much 
literature on the mind and brain. In fact, a recent proliferation of empirical evidence suggests that 
the typical cognitive process in both human beings and computers rely on the same fundamental 
principles (Pylyshyn, 1980, 1984).27  
Fodor (1975, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1995) and Pylyshyn (1980, 1984) advance a strong case for this 
empirical regularity, suggesting that the term computation exists as a literal translation of mental 
activity. To paraphrase Pylyshyn (1980): “There is no reason why computation ought to be treated 
as merely a metaphor for cognition, as opposed to a hypothesis about the literal nature of 
cognition”(p.114). 
                                                          
27 Computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules 
acting on symbolic representations (See Section 1.2.3.1 (a)). 
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In roughly equivalent terms, both cognition and computation operate on symbolic representations 
that can be physically instantiated in the form of internal codes and manipulated by some kind of 
processing element (Pylyshyn, 1984) (See Section 1.2.3.1 (a)). 
Originally, this computational philosophy was predicated on the assumption that a single 
computational process motivates cognition. Yet, more recently, this entirely domain-general 
account has come under some scrutiny (Beaulac, 2010). Some of these more recent discussions, 
suggest that a growing number of cognitive scientists are adopting a more pragmatic outlook, one 
involving hybrid systems with different sorts of architectures for different sorts of sub-processes 
or tasks. For example, Stillings et al., (1995) posit that an intelligent system ought to “consist of a 
number of functional subsystems, or modules, that cooperate to achieve intelligent information 
processing and behavior” (p.16). Indeed, close inspection of recent research trends discloses a set 
of recurrent illustrations of computational theories in their conceptual, observational and 
instrumental applications that support a largely heterogeneous and functional computational 
system approach to cognition (Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack 
& Deutch, 2004).28 
More recently, attention has been directed to the dual-nature of computation and cognition.29 These 
so called ‘dual-process theories’ (e.g., Epstein, 2003; Evans, 2008; Evans & Frankish, 2009; 
Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Lieberman, 2007; Stanovich, 2011; Stanovich & 
West, 2000) are becoming increasingly relevant in explaining a wide variety of cognitive 
                                                          
28 They share many common features both with each other and earlier theoretical accounts (e.g. Epstein, 1973; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983). 
29 See also, Evans, 1989, 2008; Frankish, 2007; Samuels, 2009; Sloman, 1996, 2002; Stanovich, 1999, 2009.  
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phenomena.30 In fact, empirical evidence that is congruent with dual-processing accounts of 
cognition have become so vast in the literature that Evans (2008) considered the task of drawing 
up a synoptic overview of the topic to be too complex and demanding. Despite the multiplicity, all 
the various theoretical adaptions share a single fundamental link. That is to say, all dual-process 
theories are predicated on the assumption that cognitive activity can be divided into two distinct 
computational processes or systems (Barrouillet, 2011). More specifically, two types of processing 
exist in the mind, with different evolutionary histories, different functioning, and possibly distinct 
‘cerebral substrates’31 (Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2006; Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; 
Stanovich, 1999, Stanovich, 2009).  
Although the aforementioned is a necessary simplification of dual-process theories; the basic 
assumptions of the models, as well as the domains in which they have been applied and tested, can 
be described concisely. Precisely, two distinct types of computational information processing exist 
within a single mind: (1) a type of processing that is fast, reflexive and superficial (2) a type of 
processing that is controlled, precise and reflective.  
The discussions to follow are aligned on the assumption of a generic dual-process theory. It should 
be noted that slight terminological discrepancies do exist between these theories. As a critical 
evaluation of the various terms identified in the literature is beyond the scope of this research, we 
will instead emphasize the most objective terms available.32  Such a construct implies that 
                                                          
30 According to Evans and Frankish (2009), such theories can account for a wide range of phenomena in the reasoning, judgment, 
and decision-making literatures that have been the subject of several recent books (Evans, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 
2011). 
31 The term ‘cerebral substrates’ emanates from neurobiological nomenclature. The aforementioned cerebral reference suggests 
that dual process theories have foundations in neuroscience. 
32 Namely; the distinction between System 1 and System 2 processes (Kahneman & Frederick 2002; Stanovich 1999; Stanovich & 
West, 2000). 
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cognition is composed of two multi-purpose behavioral systems, for which Stanovich and West 
(2000) proposed the neutral labels of System 1 and System 2.33  
The terms ‘process’ and ‘system’ are defined as follows: a 'system' refers to any interconnected 
set of components, from which interaction emerges a property or capacity (the systemic property 
or capacity). Systems have a specified structure (their parts and the way they are interconnected) 
and certain behaviour (way(s) of processing information) (Wimsatt, 1986).  
The term 'process' is meant as a general term that refers to any casual sequence that produces a 
certain output. The processes of concern here will be cognitive/computational processes, vis-à-vis 
processes that manipulate, store and transform information in order to help agents behave 
adaptively or intelligently in their environment (Beaulac, 2010). 
 
2.2.1 Overview of Generic Dual Process Theories 
 
Dual-process theories are ubiquitous in the recent literature in cognitive science. A central 
principle of these theories is that cognitive behaviour is determined by the interplay of two distinct 
systems of information processing. In other words, the mind is composed of two groups of 
computational processes, or two distinct systems having predetermined characteristics. Dual-
process theorists usually speak in terms of System 1 (S1) and System 2 (S2). 
Accordingly, System 2 is claimed to be the source of our capacity for complex, analytical and 
deductive reasoning.  
                                                          
33 Unfortunately, these all-encompassing theories can result in terminological inflation and confusion and are sometimes referred 
to as dual-system theories, as opposed to dual-process ones. However, in order to elucidate the distinction between the two, I will 
henceforth follow Nobel laureate, D. Kahneman (2011) and use the prototypical dual-process axiom, whilst still maintaining the 
System 1, System 2, distinction. I borrow this construct from Kahneman (2011), who has greatly influenced my thinking. 
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System 1, in contrast, is often thought to be evolutionary primitive and largely applicable to 
situations demanding a so called urgent ‘fight or flight’ default response. It is also thought to be 
responsible for heuristic processing, such as those described in the heuristic and biases’ literature.34 
(See also, Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, 1996; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983).  
For further clarity, the term heuristic is used to describe a method for problem solving, whereby a 
result is not guaranteed to be optimal, but is sufficient given a set of objectives (Ballard, 1999). 
Heuristic techniques speed up the process of finding a satisfactory solution via mental shortcuts in 
order to ease the cognitive load of making a decision. Invariably, this terminology (heuristic) 
seems to be reserved specifically for System 1 processing. 
(Given the obvious nexus between heuristics and System 1 processing, one should expect heuristic 
techniques to feature quite prominently in our taxonomy, in the context of System 1 algorithmic 
traders. However, at this early stage of the thesis, we eschew consigning explicit traits to the agents 
in our taxonomy here. More specifically, we will avoid making restrictive inferences before 
exhausting the literature on both algorithmic trading and cognitive science).35  
It should also be noted that heuristics are simple, efficient processes that people follow when facing 
complex problems or incomplete information. However, the faster speeds associated with 
heuristics are a result of mental shortcuts; shortcuts that often lead to systematic errors or cognitive 
biases. A cognitive bias refers to a person’s propensity to think in a certain way that can lead to 
                                                          
34 As Kahneman (2000) notes: “Tversky and I always thought of the heuristics and biases approach as part of a two-process theory” 
(p.682). 
35 Notwithstanding the above caveat, we do note that the intuition for relating heuristics to System 1 algorithmic trading appears to 
be quite reasonable. Hence, there is a strong chance that heuristics will feature prominently in our System 1 formulation for 
algorithmic trading.    
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systematic deviations from a standard of rationality or good judgment. Prominent cognitive biases, 
amongst a host of many others include: the gamblers fallacy and the anchoring effect. The 
gamblers fallacy refers to a judgment bias, whereby a person believes that past events alter future 
probabilities.36 Alternatively, the anchoring effect refers to the tendency to ‘anchor’ or depend too 
much on a single piece of information when making a decision. Of course there are many other 
related errors and biases that exist in the plethora of literature on the subject (e.g. Jordan, Miller & 
Dolvin, 2012; Kahneman, 2000; Carmo and Luis, 2005). 
Some of these limits are studied by the heuristics and biases research program in psychology, and 
these heuristic psychologists offer a great deal of evidence in favour of dual process theories of 
cognition (Evans, 2003). Accordingly, the tasks in this literature were specifically designed to pit 
a heuristically triggered response (S1) against an analytic (S2) response (Stanovich et al., 2008, 
254).  
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), the initial proponents of this research program, discovered that 
cognitive biases are not random: they follow a pattern because the mind relies on specific 'innate 
rules of thumb' (S1 processes).   
                                                          
36Notably, people are subject to the gambler’s fallacy when they assume that a departure from what occurs on average, or in the 
long run, will be corrected in the short run. Namely, people often believe that because an event has not happened recently, it has 
become ‘overdue’ and is more likely to occur. People sometimes refer (wrongly) to the ‘laws of averages’ in such cases. Consider 
the following example: Roulette is a random gambling game where gamblers can make various bets on the spin of the wheel. There 
are thirty-eight numbers on a typical roulette table, two green ones, eighteen red ones, and eighteen black ones. One possible bet is 
to bet whether the spin will result in a red number or in a black number. Suppose a red number has appeared five times in a row. 
Gamblers will often become confident that that the next spin will be black, when the true chance remains at about fifty percent. Of 
course, it is exactly eighteen in thirty-eight (Jordan, Miller & Dolvin, p.270). 
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However, we also have deliberate and slow System 2 processes (S2) allowing us to find the right 
answer. This is, according to Stanovich et al., (2008), an important source of evidence in favour 
of dual-process accounts of the mind. Kahneman and Frederick (2008) agree and state:  
The persistence of such systematic errors in the intuitions of experts implied that their 
intuitive judgments may be governed by fundamentally different processes than the 
slower, more deliberate computations they had been trained to execute (p. 267). 
Overall, dual process theories – specifically, the distinction between System 1 and System 2 
processing – have generated fruitful explanations for a broad array of cognitive phenomena 
(Samuels, 2009). For some authors, like Carruthers (2006), the S1 / S2 distinction is a good way 
to think about the processes of the mind, although it does not pick up any deep functional difference 
between the two systems.  
On the other hand, Lieberman (2007; 2009) asserts that there are deep functional differences 
between S1 and S2. The author notes that S1 and S2 are well-defined sub-systems that correlate to 
specific neuronal activation patterns, and goes as far as to attribute some cognitive capacities to 
specific brain regions. In fact, Lieberman (2007; 2009) suggests that there are two computational 
systems at work in the mind, c1early divided between what he calls the ref1exive X-system, or 
System 1, and the ref1ective C-system, or System 2.  
It should be noted that our approach is aligned with, and builds on, Lieberman (2007; 2009). Thus, 
in the interest of objectivity, we use Lieberman’s terminology throughout, specifically, the labels 
‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’. 
Although Lieberman’s account is consistent with dual process theories in general, he provides 
additional insight into cognitive processes, mostly stemming from his field of inquiry - cognitive 
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neuroscience. His research shows that each system is associated with precise processing 
characteristics. Lieberman clarifies that a clear trade-off exists between fast and accurate 
information processing and this trade-off has neurological or structural relevance. Using the tools 
provided by neurological sciences, Lieberman can infer, from the activation of a specific brain 
region, the phenomenological and representational characteristics of System 1 and System 2 
information processing. Stanovich and West (2008) espouse this view, confirming that domain 
general processes can account for much of cognition.37 
In most of the literature, the two systems are seen to interact directly with one another. They are 
also competitive in nature.38 Consider the following narrative that highlights the interactive 
conditions underlying the two systems: As suggested by Carmo and Luis (2005, p.136), human 
behaviour is not the product of a single process, but rather reflects the interaction of different 
specialised subsystems. These systems, the idea goes, usually interact seamlessly to determine 
behaviour, but at times they may compete. The end result is that the brain sometimes argues with 
itself, as these distinct systems come to different conclusions about what we should do (Kahneman, 
2011). 
As noted, the major distinction responsible for these internal disagreements is the one between 
System 1 and System 2 processes. System 1 is generally reflexive and heuristic-based, which 
means that it relies on mental shortcuts. It proposes fast heuristic answers to problems as they arise. 
System 2, which corresponds closely with controlled processes, is slow, effortful, precise and 
                                                          
37 According to Beaulac (2010), Stanovich's framework (Stanovich and West, 2008) can also account for a shift in neuronal 
activation. In fact, as articulated by Beaulac (2010, p.46), “Stanovich's account is really close to Lieberman's, as he agrees there 
are domain general processes that can account for much of higher cognition”. 
38 These interactive conditions often result in their own distinct cognitive phenomena (Evans & Frankish, 2009). Therefore, 
analyses’- that look at the effects of these processes both individually and concurrently - that is, their constituent elements and 
dynamic interactions - have become the focus of much of recent cognitive exploration. 
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reflective and can also be employed to monitor the quality of the answer provided by System 1. 
Notably, if System 2 is convinced that the heuristic answer is wrong, then it is capable of correcting 
or overriding the automatic judgment.  
However there are instances when System 2 processes cannot (or do not) override System 1 
processes (such is the case with many observed behavioural biases). A major cause of these 
observed idiosyncrasies of decision-making may be that controlled processing accounts for only 
part of our overall behavioural repertoire, and in some circumstances can face stiff competition 
from reflexive processes that are part of System 1. Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre (2007) 
provide a compelling demonstration of this phenomenon. Alter et al., (2007) examine how subtle 
changes in contextual cues, such as altering the legibility of a font, can facilitate switching between 
System 1 and System 2 processing. 
In a series of experiments, the authors manipulated the ‘perceptual fluency’ of various sets of 
stimuli i.e., they made it harder for people to understand or decipher the scenarios they were asked 
to judge. In one experiment participants were asked a series of questions designed to assess the 
degree to which System 1 intuitive processes are engaged in decision-making. In this test the gut 
(System 1) reaction answer is fast, but invariably incorrect. (An example: if a bat and a ball 
together cost $1.10, and the bat costs $1 more than the ball, how much does the ball cost? If you 
answer ‘10 cents’, then you are in the majority, but unfortunately also wrong).39 Alter et al., (2007) 
found that by making the problem  more difficult to read (by using greyed-out, reduced-size font), 
                                                          
39 The correct answer is 5 cents. Think about it this way: the problem doesn’t say that the bat costs exactly $1…just that it costs an 
additional $1. So if the ball costs 10 cents, you’d be paying $1.10 for the bat alone. Instead, the ball has to cost five cents so that 
you’re only paying $1.05 for the bat (Alter et al., 2007). 
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participants seemed to shift to more considered, System 2 responses, and as a result answered more 
of the questions correctly. 
In a similar vein, a recent movement in behavioural economics seeks to acknowledge the 
limitations of everyday decision-making (such as the apparent reluctance of workers to contribute 
to 401K plans) and therefore design institutions in such a way as to ‘encourage’ better choices 
(such as introducing default options for retirement savings). Benartzi and Thaler (2007) have 
demonstrated that, when people are asked to commit to saving money in the distant future (as 
opposed to right now), they end up making much more economically rational decisions. This is 
because System 2 seems to be in charge of making decisions that concern the future, while System 
1 is more interested in the present moment.   
Overall, dual process theories –  specifically, the ‘distinction’40 between System 1 and System 2 
processing –  has provided a very rich and interesting organisational framework from which to 
conceptualise and synthesize the vast amount of computational processes underlying human 
decision making. This research follows a similar approach by presenting a dual-process taxonomy  
(as pioneered by Lieberman (2007; 2009)) as a possible means by which to conceptualize and 
synthesize the variety of computational processes underlying algorithmic trading – another 
decision making construct.  
                                                          
40 To summarise, distinction between the two systems can be described concisely: System 2 is a high-level processor, abstracting 
information and expressing knowledge as production rules. The representations in this system are symbolic and unbounded, in that 
they are based on propositions that can be combined to form larger and more complex sets of propositions (Sloman, 1996). 
Conversely, the representations within System 1 are characterized as associative and are automatically generalizable, allowing for 
a fast inferential process. Thus, unlike System 2, the representations of System 1 cannot be combined in novel ways, so that 
reasoning in System 1 is limited to what has already been represented. 
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In conclusion, the ideas behind this thesis are shaped by the narrative in cognitive science 
concerning the architecture of mind, particularly the computational processes underlying decision 
making. Remarkably, the cognitive approach allows one to consider human decision making and 
digital computation in parallel. Using the principals of contemporary cognitive science, this thesis 
will argue that the dual-process paradigm – the most prevalent contemporary interpretation of the 
nature and function of human decision making – lends itself to a novel taxonomy of algorithmic 
trading. This taxonomy will be used to inform several theoretical models of algorithmic trading; 
with the view of explaining the evolving nature of market quality as a consequence of this practice.  
Current theoretical models of algorithmic trading (such as Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 2010; Foucault, 
Hombert & Rosu, 2016; Martinez and Rosu, 2011) are flawed as they fail to take into account the 
multidimensional aspects of its underlying trading strategies (see Section 2.6). By integrating and 
synthesising the multitude of algorithmic trading strategies within a single framework, it is hoped 
that our models may shed light on contradictory findings and on previously unknown market 
variables, thus providing new empirical insight. 
As mentioned previously, the dual process view of the mind rests on certain intuitions regarding 
the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. Arguably, such an advanced 
interpretation could not have come to fruition without the recent developments in computer 
hardware and software technologies. Inevitably, information technology has played a vital role in 
the emergence of the cognitive studies of science (Friedenberg & Silverman, 2011). 
Concomitantly, financial market transactions have been radically transformed by the information 
technology revolution over the course of the past decade or so. 
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2.3 THE CHANGING TRADING ENVIRONMENT 
 
Over the last few years, technology has revolutionized the way in which financial markets operate 
(Jain, 2005). From the way trader’s trade, to the way markets are structured, to the process of price 
discovery – all are now different in today’s technologically advanced financial markets. Indeed, in 
the last decade or so, the forces of technology, speed, and computer-based trading have facilitated 
an extraordinary evolution in capital market structure, as well profoundly influenced the price-
discovery process – the course by which prices reflect new relevant information (Gomber et al., 
2011).  
In 2001 a major structural event in North America - known as the ‘decimalization of the price 
quotes on US stocks’ - saw both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) migrate from a system of 
quoting stocks in fractions (e.g., 1/16th of 1$) to a system of quoting stocks in decimals (e.g., cents 
per share). This ‘decimalization’ resulted in minimum quote increments decreasing from $0.0625 
per share to $0.01 per share.  
Another structural event in the USA that had dramatic effects on trading was Regulation National 
Market System. Regulation NMS (henceforth Reg NMS) consists of Exchange Act Rules 600-
612. The key provisions of Reg NMS were promulgated in 2005, and include: Rule 611 (the Order 
Protection Rule), Rule 610 (the Access Rule), Rule 612 (the Sub-Penny Rule), and amendments 
to Rules 601 and 603 (the Market Data Rules).  
The literature ubiquitously confirm that Regulation NMS is located at the centre of the 
constellation of factors leading to the advent of algorithmic trading in the US (e.g., McNamara, 
2016; Morelli, 2016). However, Reg NMS is a highly advanced piece of legislative material and 
thus the introductory nature of the current section precludes a thorough discussion on the 
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aforementioned regulatory framework. A concrete elucidation of Regulation NMS is consigned to 
Appendix I, where the nexus between Reg NMS and algorithmic trading can be addressed more 
explicitly. 41 
2.3.1 The Origins of Algorithmic Trading 
 
While Reg NMS was instrumental in the development of algorithmic trading, recent technological 
advances in computer technology have also acted as a catalyst in the proliferation (and now 
dominance of) algorithmic trading. In recent years, information technology (IT) has successively 
assuaged the use of physical trading floors, allowing automated trading systems to dominate. 
Indeed, algorithmic trading exemplifies the narrative that technology has conquered the trading 
process. While the origins of algorithmic trading remain a topic of debate, Kirilenko and Lo (2013) 
suggest that the use of algorithms in trading emerged out of the desire to eliminate the need for 
human judgment. Accordingly, algorithmic trading represents a technique to overcome the 
computational limitations of the human mind and our limited human rationality (Biais & Woolley, 
2011). Since our cognitive abilities are relatively limited, computerised trading programs function 
as a sort of ‘mental prosthetic’ for the failings of human rationality.42 An individual human 
operator can only incorporate a small amount of data into his or her decision-making process, and 
so investment strategies requiring the processing of hundreds of thousands of variables necessarily 
                                                          
41 The current study evaluated existing empirical research on the infrastructural aspects of algorithmic trading in order to determine 
the extent to which empirical research supports our dual process supposition. Essentially, one can distinguish between two 
independent forms of infrastructure when it comes to algorithmic trading (co-location infrastructure and high-end capability 
computing infrastructure). As clarified in Appendix I, algorithmic trading infrastructure and Reg NMS are inexorably linked. 
Therefore, the concrete elucidation of Regulation NMS is consigned to Appendix I, where the nexus between Reg NMS and 
algorithmic trading can be addressed more explicitly vis-à-vis, co-location and high-end capability computer infrastructure. 
42 See e.g., Salmon and Stokes (2010), particularly the description of areas where algorithmic trading excels over human operators. 
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require computer technology. Likewise, human traders find it increasingly challenging to monitor 
prices on more than a very small number of financial markets simultaneously, so they require 
computer assistance (McNamara, 2016). 
With that said, it is important to note that algorithmic trading is a relatively new phenomenon and 
has not yet been clearly defined. Thus, unsurprisingly, the definitions of algorithmic trading range 
from the very general - “the use of computer algorithms to automatically make trading decisions, 
submit orders, and manage those orders after submission” (Hendershott & Riordan, 2009, p. 2) to 
the specific: 
Algorithmic trading is computer-determined trading whereby super computers and 
complex algorithms directly interface with trading platforms at high speed, placing 
orders without immediate human intervention. It (algorithmic trading) employs cutting 
edge mathematical models, adept computational techniques and extraordinary 
processing power via advanced computer and communication systems and is capable 
of anticipating and interpreting market signals in order to implement profitable trading 
strategies (Gamzo, 2014, p.45). 
While the above definitions capture most activities referred to as algorithmic trading, it should be 
emphasised that algorithmic trading is not one thing. Algorithmic trading, like many other financial 
market activities, is complex, and encompasses an array of specific practices. In terms of strategies, 
both numerous and diverse trading approaches currently exist. Both the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO, 2011) and the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC, 2014) have emphasised that distinguishing such strategies is pivotal in any research design: 
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 “Algorithmic trading is not a single strategy but it is rather a set of technological arrangements 
and tools employed in a wide number of strategies, each one having a different market impact” 
(IOSCO, 2011, p.24). 
Effectively, when attempting to assess algorithmic trading, it is necessary to study the individual 
strategies that make up this practice closely (Gomber et al., 2011). While the universe of 
algorithmic trading strategies is too diverse and opaque to name them all, we attempt to delineate 
some of the most prominent strategies identified in the literature below. This is based on the work 
of Almgren (2009) and includes information from Gomber et al., (2011), Gamzo (2014), as well 
as Johnson (2010).  
In line with the above, the following subsections shed light on some of the best known and 
probably most prominent algorithmic trading based strategies. Appendix I concludes with a 
functional organisation of algorithmic trading strategies. The comparative summary in Appendix 
I assigns each individual algorithmic trading strategy to its respective system.  
2.4 AN OVERVIEW OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING STRATEGIES  
 
Spread Capturing Algorithms 
 
These algorithms profit from the spread - between the bid and ask prices - by continuously buying 
and selling securities by computers (Gomber, Arndt, Lutat & Uhle, 2011). With each trade, they 
reap the spread between the (higher) price at which market participants can buy securities and the 
(lower) price at which they can sell securities. 
As emphasised above, we do not categorise the individual strategies vis-a-vis their respective 
system here (before exhausting the necessary literature) - this task is assigned to Appendix I. The 
same holds for the discussions to follow. 
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Rebate Trading Algorithms 
 
Rebate trading concerns incentive scheme revenue capturing. In order to attract liquidity providers, 
some trading venues have adopted asymmetric pricing: members removing liquidity from the 
market (taker; aggressive trading) are charged a higher fee while traders who submit liquidity to 
the market (maker; passive trading) are charged a lower fee or are even provided a rebate. An 
asymmetric fee structure is supposed to incentivize liquidity provision (Gomber, et al., 2011). 
Upon execution of bids, offers are immediately posted on the inside market with the intent of 
capturing rebates regardless of whether or not capital gains have been achieved. 
The rationale for applying maker-taker pricing is as follows: traders supplying liquidity on both 
sides (buy and sell) of the order book earn their profits from the market spread. Fee reductions or 
even rebates for makers shall stimulate a market‘s liquidity by firstly attracting more traders to 
post passive order flow in form of limit orders. Secondly, those traders submitting limit orders 
shall be incentivized and enabled to quote more aggressively, thus narrowing the spread. The 
respective loss of profits from doing so is thus compensated by a rebate. If this holds true, those 
markets appear favourable over their rivals and market orders are attracted enhancing the 
probability for the makers to have their orders executed (Lutat 2010). 
 
Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) Algorithms 
 
This strategy involves the realization of a specific pre-determined benchmark, or the Time 
Weighted Average Price (TWAP). TWAP algorithms divide a large order into slices that are sent 
to the market in equally distributed time intervals. Before the execution begins, the size of the 
slices as well as the execution period is defined. For example, the algorithm could be set to buy 
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12,000 shares within one hour in blocks of 2,000 shares, resulting in 6 orders for 2,000 shares 
which are sent to the market every 10 minutes. TWAP algorithms can vary their order sizes and 
time intervals to prevent detection by other market participants (Gomber et al., 2011). 
 
Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) Algorithms 
 
VWAP algorithms try to match or beat the volume weighted average price (their benchmark) over 
a specified period of time. VWAP can be calculated applying the following formula for n trades, 
each with an execution price pn and size vn (Johnson 2010): 
 
Since trades are being weighted according to their size, large trades have a greater impact on the 
VWAP than smaller ones. VWAP algorithms are based on historical volume profiles of the 
respective equity in the relevant market to estimate the intraday/target period volume patterns. 
 
Implementation Shortfall Algorithms 
 
More multifarious than both TWAP and VWAP strategies, implementation shortfall algorithms 
seek to manage the trade-off between market impact and timing risk. In order to reduce the market 
impact of large orders, implementation shortfall algorithms consider timing risk - the possibility 
of adverse price reactions during the execution process. Consequently, these algorithms pre-
determine an execution plan based on historical data, and split an order into as many as necessary 
but as few as possible sub-orders. (Gomber et al., 2011). In contrast to TWAP or VWAP, these 
orders will be scattered over a period which is just long enough to dampen the market impact of 
the overall order (Johnson 2010).  
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Adaptive Execution Algorithms 
 
Adaptive execution algorithms follow a similar approach to TWAP and VWAP, except they are 
more adaptive in nature. Instead of following a pre-determined schedule, they are able to re-
evaluate and change their execution schedule with changing market conditions (Johnson 2010; 
Gamzo 2014).  
 
Liquidity Detection Algorithms 
 
Liquidity detection algorithms attempt to decipher patterns made by other investors with the aim 
of making a profit. They generally concentrate on detecting large orders, so that an automated 
version of ‘quote matching’ can be employed. When the algorithm detects large orders, it 
immediately places its own buy order with a minimally higher limit, believing that the large orders 
will increase the price of the asset. This type of activity profits from a rise in share price. However 
should the price fall, the algorithm is able to use the large order as a hedge against which it can 
sell its shares.  
 
Data\Text Mining Algorithms 
 
Data mining can be defined as the practice of isolating legitimate, unidentified, coherent and 
actionable information from large databases and using it to make critical business decisions 
(Brusilovsky & Brusilovskiy, 2008). This type of information may be inferred from correlations 
between assets, both in the same market, across different markets or even different asset classes 
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(Johnson, 2010).43 Data mining can assist in the process of discovering these relations, allowing 
one to generate forecasting models based on wide ranges of data. On the other hand, text mining 
concerns the automated classification of textual information by transforming unstructured 
information into machine readable format and using it to make astute transactional decisions 
(Gamzo 2014). 
 
Neural Network Algorithms 
 
Neural network algorithms have gained prominence recently including plotting input-output 
vectors for cases where traditional models fail to hold. Neural networks are information processing 
paradigms with a remarkable tolerance for noise, ambiguity and uncertainty. Suhas and Patil 
(2011) explain neural networks as “a collection of mathematical processing units that emulate 
some of the observed properties of biological nervous systems and draw on the analogies of 
adaptive biological learning” (p.2). Neural network algorithms are especially useful for 
recognizing relationships in convoluted and complicated data sets and are only limited by the 
power of their relative platform or infrastructure. Their remarkable ability to derive meaning from 
vast, complicated and imprecise data allows them to detect patterns and identify trends that are too 
intricate to be noticed by humans alone. In fact, research has documented their ability to accurately 
forecast future market movements for a variety of different instruments and markets.44 Therefore 
by combining the search capabilities with the modelling power of the neural networks, a useful 
predictive tool can be created (Foster, 2002). 
                                                          
43 For example, lead/lag relationships may be found between different assets across different markets and classes (see e.g. Johnson, 
2010). 
44 For instance, Walczak (2001) observes that a neural network was able to forecast foreign exchange rates for a variety of 
currencies. Hutchinson, Lo and Poggio (1994) compose a neural network for predicting Standard & Poor’s 500 futures options 
prices. Whereas, Castiglione (2001) construct neural network models to predict a variety of financial time series. 
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Support Vector Machine Algorithms 
 
In many ways, support vector machine algorithms share many of the same characteristics as neural 
network algorithms, although their training is very different. Essentially, a support vector machine 
model is an alternative training method for polynomial, radial basis function and multi-layer 
perceptron classifiers in which the weights of the network are found by solving a quadratic 
programming problem with linear constraints. This is done instead of solving a non-convex, 
unconstrained minimization problem like those in standard neural network training.45 Importantly, 
their ability to cope with problems spanning multiple dimensions makes them an excellent 
prediction tool for algorithmic traders in today’s convoluted financial markets.46  
 
2.5 ALGORITHMIC TRADING: EXTANT LITERATURE 
 
Algorithmic trading remains one of the most controversial and actively discussed topics in the 
financial world. Inevitably, there are myriad of questions on the topic of algorithmic trading 
attracting the attention of researchers (O’Hara, 2014). Some of the more fundamental questions 
seem to concern the evolving nature of market quality as a consequence of algorithmic trading. 
Traditional literature considers market quality parameters (i.e., trading activity, prices, liquidity, 
volume, volatility and profits) as representative measures of the price discovery process – the 
process by which a market incorporates new fundamental information about an asset’s value into 
the asset’s price (e.g., Fama, 1970; Hayek, 1945). The price-discovery process is a central function 
                                                          
45 For a more detailed view of support vector machines see Bennett and Campbell (2000). 
46 For example, Van Gestel et al., (2001) used a support vector machine to forecast time series and associated volatility for US 
short-term interest rates along with German DAX stock index. Regarding the sign of forthcoming returns, support vector machines 
proved to have around 5% greater predictive accuracy when compared to traditional methods. In addition, Mills (1991) found that 
support vector machines are a superior forecasting method when it came to predicting the weekly direction of NIKKEI 225 Index. 
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of a financial market, whereby prices offer accurate signals for resource allocation and the efficient 
distribution of an economy's capital stock (Fama, 1970). Accordingly, elucidating the effects of 
algorithmic trading on financial market quality is vital to our understanding of financial market 
performance (Gomber et al., 2011). 
So what effect is algorithmic trading having on financial market quality? 
Unfortunately, this question, however pertinent, remains the most controversial and open question 
in both theoretical as well as empirical financial market research. Indeed, a remarkable gap 
between the results of academic literature can be observed. This section of Chapter 2 will review 
the often-contradictory empirical literature on algorithmic trading. We follow with a discussion on 
the developing theoretical work in this field. 
2.5.1 Algorithmic Trading: Empirical Approach 
The academic discourse on the topic of algorithmic trading has been largely empirical in nature. 
However, this literature comes with well documented limitations (Biais & Foucault, 2014).  
Obtaining useful data that can identify algorithmic trading activity is a formidable challenge. Much 
of the empirical evidence on the direct impact of algorithmic trading on the U.S. equity markets 
has relied heavily on either limited samples of proprietary data or publicly available information 
(SEC, 2014). By definition, proprietary datasets are not publicly available, have been limited to 
particular products, are discretionary in nature and show only a small amount of algorithmic 
trading activity (SEC, 2014). 
Alternately, publicly available data on orders and trades does not reveal the identity of buyers and 
sellers. As a result, at this time, it is not possible to identify orders and trades as originating from 
an algorithmic trader when relying solely on publicly available information. Therefore, a variety 
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of different metrics are used by researchers to estimate algorithmic trading. Indeed, analysing 
actual algorithmic trading is based on empirical proxies,47 and results thus rely heavily on the 
quality of the proxy (Chung & Lee, 2016).  
2.5.2 Empirical Proxies for Algorithmic Trading 
As noted, a precise empirical assessment of algorithmic trading and its impact on market quality 
is quite challenging. This is partly a reflection of the complexity of inferring algorithmic trading 
from the data (Chung & Lee, 2016; SEC, 2014). Moreover, since algorithmic trading is not clearly 
defined in the literature,48 researchers are bound to use datasets with different definitions of 
algorithmic trading. Perhaps quite naturally, researchers have proposed different methods to proxy 
for algorithmic trading activities within traditionally-available datasets. For example, Zhang 
(2010) defines algorithmic trading broadly as all short-term trading activities of institutional 
investors that are not covered in Form 13f - the quarterly holdings report of large institutional 
investors in the United States.49 Jones (2013, p.32) however, expresses concerns over this proxy 
because it is difficult to attribute the ensuing result purely to algorithmic trading activities.50  
                                                          
47 A proxy can be defined as a figure that can be used to represent the value of something in a calculation. 
48 There has not, to date, been a consistent academic or regulatory definition of the term algorithmic trading. The term has been 
used in different ways and for various purposes. Invariably, Automated Trading, Flash Trading, Program Trading, Low Latency 
Trading, Black Box Trading, Electronic Trading and High Frequency Trading are just some of the labels ascribed to it in the 
literature (Kissell, 2013). 
49 Zhang’s (2010) proposed proxy relies on elimination rather than identification. Zhang’s (2010) intuition is as follows: In the 
United States, institutions with over $100 million in Assets under Management (AUM) are required to report their long term 
holdings in the 13f quarterly report of equity holdings. However, short positions are not required to be disclosed and are excluded 
from the report. Thus, by measuring trading volume relative to institutional portfolio changes in quarterly 13f filings, Zhang (2010) 
argues that his definition effectively proxies for algorithmic trading; that is because it captures trading frequencies greater than 
those of long term traditional/non algorithmic investors. 
50  Such a proxy demands two assumptions to facilitate an estimate of algorithmic trading. First, no algorithmic trading is assumed 
to have existed prior to the beginning of 1995. His second assumption is that algorithmic traders do not hold positions at the end 
of any quarter and thus do not file 13f reports with the SEC. 
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Kirilenko et al., (2011) define algorithmic traders as market participants with extremely high 
trading volume and well-balanced inventory. The SEC (2014) however, suggests that this proxy is 
extremely narrow and therefore fails to identify a large block of algorithmic trading activities.  
Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) develop an algorithmic trading proxy called ‘strategic run’, which they 
describe as a “series of submissions, cancellations, and executions that are linked by direction, 
size, and timing, and which are likely to arise from a single algorithm” (p. 660). Conversely, Chung 
and Lee (2016) argue that broad inferences are difficult from Hasbrouck and Saar’s (2013) limited 
sample. 
In perhaps the greatest indictment of existing empirical studies to date, the SEC (2014) warns that 
interpreting the results of empirical studies should be done with caution; “ an assessment of 
empirical papers must deal with the various metrics (proxies) researchers used to define 
algorithmic trading, and how their definitions may affect their conclusions about algorithmic 
trading activity… Particularly, the different metrics used to classify algorithmic trading can greatly 
affect findings about key characteristics of algorithmic trading and its impact on financial market 
quality” (p.5).51 
2.5.3 Empirical Evidence: Market Quality and Algorithmic Trading 
As qualified above, the bulk of the empirical academic literature regarding algorithmic trading 
thus far has emphasised market quality as an important standard by which to judge the impact of 
algorithmic trading (e.g., Zhang, 2010). Although the effects in those areas have dominated the 
                                                          
51 Other examples of such AT proxies derived from market-wide data include high message rates, bursts of order cancellations and 
modifications, high order-to-trade ratios, small trade sizes, and increases in trading speed. Note that a critical evaluation of the 
various proxies identified in the literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. We simply note that the diversity proxies for algorithmic 
trading can greatly affect findings about the key factual characteristics of algorithmic trading activity.  
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literature, little consensus exists in the empirical literature regarding the overall impact of 
algorithmic trading on financial market quality.  
One consistent refrain from supporters and practitioners of algorithmic trading is that algorithmic 
trading makes prices more informative.52 Indeed, a number of empirical studies suggest price 
discovery gains from algorithmic trading. Hendershott and Riordan (2011) look at all NASDAQ 
trades in 2008 and 2009 and conclude that algorithmic traders reduce temporary pricing errors and 
quickly incorporate information into prices. According to Hendershott and Riordan (2011), 
algorithmic trades were positively correlated with permanent price changes and negatively 
correlated with transitory price changes, suggesting that algorithmic trading improves price 
discovery.  
Concomitantly, Hendershott and Moulton (2011) report that the algorithmic trading reduced 
market noise; thereby aiding in the price discovery process. Algorithmic traders also place tighter 
quotes in the German stock market in a sign of increased price discovery due to price agreement 
(Hendershott & Riordan, 2013). Chung and Hrazdil (2012) show, using data for more than 2,000 
firms in 2008, that algorithmic traders improve price discovery by increasing the speed of 
adjustments for all firms.53 Humphery-Jenner (2011) demonstrates that algorithmic trading activity 
increases before important events such as takeovers. Accordingly algorithmic traders incorporate 
their prior knowledge into prices, even before events occur.  
                                                          
52 The notion that prices in financial markets reflect and convey information is axiomatic within the realm of finance and is 
enshrined in the theory of market efficiency (Fama, 1970). Hayek (1945) wrote eloquently on this function of prices in sharing 
information among economic participants. He described prices as a form of telecommunication, enabling producers and consumers, 
in general all decision makers, to alter their behavior due to the essential information contained in one measure, price.  
53 The improvements for large firms are even more substantial, suggesting that algorithmic trading is useful across the market but 
that activity is greater for larger, more liquid stocks. 
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Zhang (2012), in contrast, suggests that algorithmic traders improve price discovery for only 
certain kinds of news; mostly numerical and short-run data. Contextually, Zhang (2012) divides 
news into ‘hard’ (numerical data or machine readable news) and ‘soft’ (text-based or informal 
sources). She finds that algorithmic traders are able to process hard data quickly and earn short-
term profits, while non-algorithmic traders focus their efforts on soft data and take longer to trade 
so that prices reflect such information. 
Though much of the empirical literature shows improvements in pricing discovery, there are 
detractors. Zhang (2010) examined the impact of algorithmic trading over the period 1985-2009. 
By using dividend surprises and analysts forecast revisions as proxies for firm fundamental 
information news, Zhang (2010) suggests that algorithmic trading is negatively associated with the 
market’s ability to incorporate news about fundamentals into asset prices. Specifically, his paper 
showed that prices seemed to deviate systematically from their ‘fundamental values’54 when 
algorithmic trading was more evident. Finally, Zhang and Powell (2011) surmise that algorithmic 
traders have no intrinsic interest in a company’s fundamentals and have a negative impact on the 
price discovery process. 
It should be noted that the preceding discussion considers the empirical literature vis-à-vis the 
impact of algorithmic trading on the price discovery process. Market quality itself, however, is 
more inclusive than price discovery and consists of a variety of interrelated concepts or 
parameters.55  
                                                          
54 The term fundamental value is formally defined in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
55 As noted throughout, market quality refers to a market’s ability to meet its central function of price discovery.  Market quality is 
thus more general than price discovery itself. Note however, that a variety of different variables are relevant here including, but not 
limited to trading activity, prices, volume, liquidity, volatility and profits. 
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The discussion to follow provides an overview of the empirical literature on algorithmic trading; 
focussing on the nexus between algorithmic trading and existing market quality metrics i.e., 
liquidity, volume, trading activity and volatility. Section 2.6 reviews the growing theoretical 
literature. (For easy reference, Table 2, at the conclusion of the current chapter will present a 
combined summary of empirical and theoretical literature in the field of algorithmic trading). 
2.5.3.1. Liquidity and Algorithmic Trading 
  
There is a contentious argument in the academic literature regarding the relationship between 
liquidity and algorithmic trading, and its resolution depends to a large extent on the chosen 
definition of liquidity. Liquidity is a complex construct and a precise and consistent definition 
remains elusive.  Kyle (1985) suggests that liquidity encompasses three different components: 
tightness, depth, and resiliency. Since then, researchers have expanded on Kyle (1985) and utilised 
such varied measures as average dollar volume (Pastor & Stambaugh, 2003), quoted and effective 
spreads (Chalmers & Kadlec, 1998), share turnover (Chan & Faff, 2003), market depth (Chordia, 
Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 2001), number of zero volume days (Lesmond, Ogden, & Trzcinka, 1999; 
with an opposing view expressed by Mazza, 2015), and resiliency or price impact (Amihud, 2002).  
Against the basic concerns reflected in different aspects of liquidity, researchers generally report 
improvements in market liquidity parameters (such as those discussed above) following the advent 
of algorithmic trading. For instance, Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) document narrower 
spreads among U.S. stocks after the introduction of the NYSE’s automated quote dissemination in 
2003. They further claim this is evidence of improved liquidity due to algorithmic trading.56 
Similar findings are provided by Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), who measure algorithmic trading by 
                                                          
56 Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) measure algorithmic trading as electronic message traffic and report liquidity 
improvements for NYSE stocks from 2001 to 2005 based on the evidence of narrower spreads. 
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strategic patterns of order submission and cancellation. The authors report decreased spreads for 
NASDAQ stocks in 2007 and 2008 and suggest that this is a result of algorithmic trading. Chaboud, 
Hjalmarsson, Vega and Chiquoine (2009) study algorithmic trading in foreign exchange markets. 
They identify algorithmic trading as orders that are submitted using the electronic brokering 
systems (EBS) offered by Reuters. Consequently, these researchers posit that automated trading 
tends to slightly increase liquidity provisions in the foreign exchange markets after exogenous 
market events (such as news announcements). 
However, not all studies report improvements in all aspects of liquidity. Brogaard (2010) uses 
trade and quote (TAQ) data for 2009 and 2010 to examine the liquidity effects of algorithmic 
trading. He documents an increase in volume and frequent quotes at the inside spread, though the 
provided depth is less than other traders. Jarnecic and Snape (2014) report similar findings of 
tighter spreads but less depth for the London Stock Exchange in 2009. Gai, Yao, and Ye (2012) 
also suggest algorithmic trading has a detrimental effect on market liquidity. Using data for 
NASDAQ stocks in 2009 and 2010, they observe a decrease in market depth due to algorithmic 
trading.  
We conclude the present discussion by noting another important caveat. If liquidity and volume 
were identical, then the debate over the effect of algorithmic trading on liquidity would be moot, 
since the increase in volume is obvious even to casual observation (Chordia, Roll, & 
Subrahmanyam, 2008). Indeed, by nearly every empirical measure, algorithmic trading increases 
market volume (Hanson, 2014).   
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Concurrently, most studies report a reliable and direct relation between trading volume and price 
volatility.57 
If we go by the above suggestion that algorithmic trading almost certainly increases trading 
volume, then researchers are justified in raising concerns about the broad effects of algorithmic 
trading and volatility. The next subsection considers studies that have sought to establish whether 
a relationship exists between algorithmic trading and volatility specifically. 
2.5.3.2. Volatility Effects of Algorithmic Trading 
 
The debates surrounding the nexus between algorithmic trading and price volatility were likely the 
result of a single event known as the Flash Crash. Given the Flash Crash is often-cited as the most 
direct evidence for the case that algorithmic trading has increased volatility we consider it in more 
detail below.  
The ‘Flash Crash’ of May the 6th, 2010 resulted in the largest single-day point decline in the 
history of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (998.5). For about 5 minutes, approximately $1 
trillion in market value had disappeared, only to bounce back just as quickly. The two most affected 
markets appeared to be the E-Mini futures market and the equities market. Although the exact 
                                                          
57 Using daily individual security data, 1981-1983, Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) find a positive conditional volume-volatility 
relationship in models with Gaussian errors and GARCH-type volatility specifications. Using monthly measures, 1885-1987, 
Schwert (1989) finds a positive relationship in linear Koyck distributed lag regression of estimated volatility on current and lagged 
volume growth.Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1990) investigate the relation between price and volume using a semi-nonparametric 
method. In their time-series analysis, they find that daily trading volume is positively related to the magnitude of daily price changes 
and that high volume follows large price changes. Crucially, the relationship between trading volume and volatility is found to hold 
in U.S. stocks in the time series from 1928 to 1987. Their finding of an unconditional volume-volatility relationship is consistent 
with many other studies (see Karpoff, 1987; Tauchen & Pitts, 1983). 
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degree to which algorithmic trading was responsible for the ‘Crash’ remains unknown, it seems 
clear from the evidence below that it was a major contributing factor (Gamzo, 2014). 
The Flash Crash – 6th of May 2010 
According to a report published by the SEC (2010), two separate incidents occurred on that day: 
(1) a liquidity crisis in broad index level in the E-Mini futures market and (2) a liquidity crisis in 
individual stocks. The SEC (2010) provides a detailed report of the events that led to the ‘Flash 
Crash’ of May, 2010 and should be consulted for further clarity. A summary of the SEC’s (2010) 
findings are provided below: 
On the 6th of May 2010 a large sell order (set to 9% of the trading volume calculated over one 
minute earlier) was initiated by a trader via an automated trading algorithm, programed to feed 
orders into the E-Mini futures market. This ‘sell algorithm’ was set to ignore market price and 
market timing and only focus on quantity. The sell pressure was initially absorbed by 3 distinct 
market participants:  
1. Other algorithmic traders seeking to profit from the subsequent price increases.  
2. Traditional buyers in the futures market. 
3. Cross-market arbitragers.58 
The above net buyers subsequently accumulated temporary long-term positions. However, about 
60% of algorithmic traders net long positions were sold. The resulting growth in volume prompted 
the initial ‘sell algorithm’ to feed more orders into the market, even though the previous orders 
                                                          
58 Who transferred this sell pressure to the equities markets by opportunistically buying E-Mini contracts and simultaneously selling 
individual equities in the S&P 500 Index. 
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had not yet been fully absorbed by the other participants. The result was a drop in E-Mini prices 
by about 3% in just 240 seconds.  
By 2:45 pm the ‘Stop Logic Function’ saw a pause in trading for about 5 seconds, resulting in a 
decrease in sell side pressure and an increase in buy side pressure. This was followed, almost 
immediately, by price stabilization and recovery. Overall in just the four and a half minutes from 
2:41pm prices on the E-Mini had sunk by more than 5%, only to recover moments later (Gamzo 
2014). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2- E-MINI VOLUME AND PRICE. SOURCE: SEC (2010). FINDINGS REGARDING THE 
MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010. P. 19 
 
56 
 
  
The other liquidity crisis occurred in the equities market approximately 30 seconds before trading 
resumed in the E-Mini market at about 2:45 pm. Around 8000 individual stocks were traded, with 
the majority displaying similar price declines and reversals as those in the E-Mini futures market. 
“Over 20,000 trades across more than 300 securities were executed at prices more than 60% away 
from their values just moments before”( SEC , 2010, p.1) By the end of the day, major futures and 
equities indices recovered to close at losses of about 3% from the prior day.  
Although an intra-day event, the ‘Flash Crash’ of 2010 cannot be considered inconsequential. On 
the contrary, it has been argued that the ‘Flash Crash’ of May the 6th 2010 represents the strongest 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that algorithmic trading has a destabilizing effect on the 
market (Gamzo 2014). 
Perhaps the rarity of officially commissioned studies further emphasises the importance of 
understanding the relative impact of algorithmic trading. The SEC provided a short summary of 
the lessons to be learnt from the ‘Flash Crash’ of 2010: 
One key lesson is that under stressed market conditions, the automated execution of a 
large sell order can trigger extreme price movements, especially if the automated 
execution algorithm does not take prices into account. Moreover, the interaction 
between automated execution programs and algorithmic trading strategies can quickly 
erode liquidity and result in disorderly markets. As the events of May 6 demonstrate, 
especially in times of significant volatility, high trading volume is not necessarily a 
reliable indicator of market liquidity (SEC, 2010, p.6). 
The ‘Flash Crash’ brought to light algorithmic trading’s ability to exacerbate price movements in 
times of financial stress. Zhang (2010) examined the impact of algorithmic trading in a broader 
economic context using the period 1985-2009. Using data from the Centre for Research in Security 
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Prices (CRSP) and the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings databases in the U.S, Zhang (2010) 
found a positive correlation between algorithmic trading and stock price volatility. He revealed 
that even after controlling for fundamental firm-specific volatility, as well as other exogenous 
volatility variables, a single standard deviation increase in algorithmic trading activity is associated 
with a 5.6% rise in volatility.  
In stark contrast to the above cited studies relating algorithmic trading to increased volatility; 
several other papers have reported no significant volatility effects of this practice. Hasbrouck and 
Saar (2013) analyse NASDAQ stocks from October 2007 and June 2008 and report that 
algorithmic trading does not lead to an increase in market volatility. On the contrary; the authors 
find that algorithmic trading activity lowers short-term volatility, reduces quoted spreads and the 
total price impact of trades, and increases depth in the limit order book. Moreover, Chaboud, et 
al., (2009) examine the foreign exchange market and find no relationship between algorithmic 
trading and volatility. A similar result is reported by Brogaard (2010) for 120 NASDAQ stocks in 
2008 and 2009. Finally, Groth (2011) finds no relationship to volatility in the German DAX30 
stocks in 2007, while Gsell (2008) takes a simulation approach and finds no significant increase 
in volatility. 
To summarise, researchers have shown in various contexts that algorithmic trading both decreases 
(Hasbrouck & Saar, 2013) and increases measures of volatility (Zhang, 2010). Contextually, 
empirical literature on the topic of algorithmic trading has also not been able to identify 
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(concretely) the existence of a ‘trade-off’59 between liquidity and volatility – a recurring 
phenomenon in non-algorithmic related empirical research (Chordia et al., 2008; Hanson 2014). 
2.5.4 Empirical Studies: Concluding Remarks. 
The review above considered the extant empirical literature on algorithmic trading. Our discussion 
was prefaced by a broad summary of the inherent limitations associated with empirical studies to 
date.  
Ultimately, the lack of precise data is sufficient enough reason to believe that the goal of better 
understanding algorithmic trading strictly from empirical observations is unattainable. Further 
difficulty is then encountered when one considers that algorithmic traders employ a diverse 
number of trading strategies. Indeed, we are not aware of any empirical studies that have been able 
to distinguish different algorithmic trading strategies. 
Overall, given the data challenges facing researchers, and the variety of strategies and motivations 
for engaging in this practice, it is not surprising that little consensus exists in the empirical 
literature regarding the overall impact of algorithmic trading on financial market quality. 
In the remaining subsections of this chapter we analyse the growing theoretical literature on 
algorithmic trading. 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 Mike and Farmer (2008) argue that understanding liquidity is the first and principal step to understanding volatility. Previous 
work has shown that liquidity is typically the dominant determinant of volatility, at least for short time scales. Crucially, periods 
of high volatility correspond to low liquidity and vice versa (Farmer & Lillo, 2004; Gillemot, Farmer & Lillo, 2006; Weber & 
Rosenow, 2006). 
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2.6 THEORETICAL LITERATURE: ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
 
The theoretical literature on the topic of algorithmic trading has its foundations in market 
microstructure theory (reviewed in Chapter 4). Given that the distribution of information is a 
central consideration in market microstructure modelling, the theoretical literature attempts to 
address related issues of information differentials between algorithmic traders and non-algorithmic 
traders and its subsequent market quality effects (Grossman, 1976). 
The vast majority of papers have coalesced around the idea that algorithmic traders possess a 
comparative informational advantage relative to regular traders. However, research is divided as 
to what type of informational advantage algorithmic traders possess (e.g., Biais et al., 2011; Cartea 
& Penalva, 2012; Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 2010; Das et al., 2001; Easley et al., 2012; Foucault et al., 
2016; Gamzo, 2014; Johnson, 2010; Martinez & Rosu, 2011). 
Crucially, there remains a huge disconnect between available theoretical models of algorithmic 
trading and recent empirical research on the characteristics of algorithmic trading - purporting that 
algorithmic trading is a diverse phenomenon. Indeed, the developing empirical literature on the 
topic of algorithmic trading suggests that algorithmic trading constitutes several different trading 
strategies, each with its own distinct character and market impact. Unfortunately, theoretical 
models on the topic have been largely strategy specific, simplified, analytically tractable models 
with a single representative algorithmic trader. Researchers tend to focus on a specific algorithmic 
trading strategy and often conflate that specific strategy with algorithmic trading in its entirety.  
Indeed, the SEC (2014) notes the many instances in which researchers attempt to determine the 
impact of algorithmic trading as a whole, followed almost immediately by an emphasis on a 
specific isolated strategy - without an explicit indication or explanation for such a strategy specific 
approach.  
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Insofar as the literature is concerned, Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) provide the first ever 
theoretical model of algorithmic trading, in an attempt to address the theoretical impact of 
algorithmic trading on market quality. The authors construct a theoretical model that adds 
algorithmic traders (machines) into a market populated by non-algorithmic traders. However, they 
make an extremely restrictive assumption by assuming that algorithmic traders collectively follow 
a single strategy known as sniping.60 This sweeping supposition is in stark contrast with the 
growing empirical evidence that supports the multiplicity of algorithmic trading strategies 
(Johnson 2010).  
Unfortunately, by likening algorithmic trading to a single activity, Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) 
restrict themselves to the analysis of an isolated portion of algorithmic trading.61 They do not 
provide an explanation for such a strategy specific approach. Inevitably, in their model, the only 
                                                          
60 Sniping is a strategy designed to discover liquidity in the limit order book, or to ‘pick-off’ orders already in the book (Cvitanic 
& Kirilenko, 2010). 
61 Most importantly perhaps, Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) expose a commonly articulated flaw in existing theoretical models. As 
referenced throughout: Current theoretical models of algorithmic trading tend to focus on a specific algorithmic trading strategy, 
and often conflate that strategy with algorithmic trading in its entirety. In perhaps the most notable reflection of this (limiting) 
strategy specific approach, Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) admit that their model relates only to a specific strategy employed by 
algorithmic traders. Contextually, they state: “This is only one of the strategies used by actual algorithmic traders in real markets, 
and the only one we focus on” (p.2). 
61 
 
  
difference between normal and algorithmic traders – ‘machines’ – is that the latter have an inherent 
speed advantage relative to the rest of the market.62  
Again, this common informational assumption is based exclusively on a speed advantage and is at 
odds with recent evidence on algorithmic trading that suggests that a number of different strategies 
underlie algorithmic trading (with different strategies having different informational 
characteristics and market impact). In addition to being less rich as a description of real markets, 
models based exclusively on one type of information are often empirically misspecified. 
Nevertheless, Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) find that the presence of the algorithmic trader is 
likely to affect trading volume and intertrade duration, i.e. the time span between trades. Their 
research implicates an increase in market liquidity measures based on trading volume and 
intertrade duration. Specifically, they find that the introduction of an algorithmic trader reduced 
the average trade value and resulted in lower volatility.  
                                                          
62 In their paper Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) study the distribution of transaction prices generated in an electronic limit order 
market populated by orders from algorithmic traders (machines) and non-algorithmic traders (humans). They focus on the period 
between two human transactions – a very short period of time in a liquid market. The authors posit that during such a short horizon, 
the impact of changes in the fundamentals is negligible. Therefore, they model the incoming human buy order prices and sell order 
prices during the period as two iid sequences, arriving according to exogenous Poisson processes. For tractability, they also assume 
that the submitted orders are of unit size and at infinitely divisible prices. In the actual limit order book environment, traders submit 
orders of different quantities at discrete price intervals - ticks. At each tick, quantities get stacked up in accordance with a priority 
rule, e.g., time priority or order size and then time priority. Their idealized model, with the order prices coming from a continuous 
distribution and for one order only, can be thought of as taking the actual orders for multiple units stacked up at each tick and 
‘spreading’ them between ticks. Thus, the algorithmic trader’s speed advantage means that they can submit and cancel orders faster 
than human traders. Because of this advantage, machines dominate the trading within each period by undercutting slow humans at 
the front of the book. The timing protocol that exemplifies the algorithmic trader’s speed advantage in the model is highly complex 
and mathematically intensive and replicating it goes beyond the scope of our discussion – we would be performing an injustice by 
trying to synthesise their methodology here. Instead we refer interested readers to Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) for a detailed 
analysis. 
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Cartea and Penalva (2012) provide an analogous example of Cvitanic and Kirilenko’s (2010) 
(subsumed) speed advantage. These researchers, however, posit that algorithmic traders do not 
lower volatility; rather, they double trading volume and increase price volatility. Similarly, 
Foucault, Hombert and Rosu (2016) find that with a speed advantage, the algorithmic trader’s 
order flow is much more volatile, accounts for a much larger proportion of trading volume (relative 
to other non-algorithmic traders), and forecasts very short-run price changes. 
In contrast to the informational assumptions, where algorithmic traders are thought to be imbued 
with an inherent speed advantage (e.g., Cartea & Penalva, 2012; Cvitanic & Kirilenko 2010; 
Foucault et al., 2016), others argue that an algorithmic traders’ relative informational advantage 
relates to their ability to more accurately forecast future market variables. Das, Hanson, Kaphart 
and Tesauro (2001) provide the intuition for this suggestion: 
In order to determine whether computer traders can be considered superiorly informed relative to 
their human counterparts, Das et al., (2001) designed a simulated human versus machine 
experiment consisting of six challenges. By dividing the simulated population into human traders, 
fast computer agents and slow computer agents, these authors found that the computerized agents 
outperformed their human counterparts in all six challenges. Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, their result held for both fast and slow computerized agent populations. Crucially, 
this seemed to indicate that speed was not the sole factor accounting for the agents’ edge in 
performance.  
A plethora of subsequent studies show that advances in the capabilities and processes of computers 
has fundamentally influenced the accuracy of forecasting (Johnson, 2010). This is supported by 
Easley, Lopez De Prado and O’Hara (2012) who hypothesize that, contrary to popular perception, 
speed is not the defining characteristic that sets algorithmic trading apart. In their evaluation, 
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algorithmic trading is distinguished by an ability to make superior strategic decisions via the use 
of advanced computational techniques and processing power. Consistent with this assumption, 
Martinez and Rosu (2011) theorise that algorithmic traders have an accuracy advantage over their 
human counterparts.63 They demonstrate this principle by postulating a theoretical model in which 
algorithmic traders’ are superiorly informed about the fundamental value of the asset.64 They show 
that algorithmic traders generate most of the trading activity and volatility in the market.  
Moreover, the model yields interesting patterns in volatility, volume and liquidity. In particular 
(according to their respective definitions for volatility, volume and liquidity), Martinez and Rosu 
(2011) show that a higher precision of information generates more price volatility and trading 
activity, but only marginally effects market liquidity.65 
A combined visual summary of empirical and theoretical literature in this field (Table 2) is 
presented here. As emphasised in the introduction to this chapter, Table 2 applies to later 
discussions where we categorise and link existing results to those of our own study. Following 
this, a chapter conclusion and summary will be provided.  
                                                          
63 This assumption is supported by previous empirical studies on algorithmic trading, which show that algorithmic traders are better 
informed than other market participants (see, e.g., Hendershott and Riordan, 2010; Brogaard, 2010; Kirilenko et al., 2011).  
64 Similar assumptions have been used in theoretical models by Foucault et al., (2012), and Gamzo (2014). 
65 For specificity, see e.g. Martinez and Rosu, 2011, High frequency traders, news and volatility, Discussion paper, HEC Paris. The 
model provides an explanation for why trading volume and volatility increase after news announcements. 
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Table 2: Synthesizing The Diverse Literature on Algorithmic Trading (Gamzo, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           (-) Volume (+)                                          
                        . Empirical regularity                          . Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010)      . Das et al. (2001)               
                                                                                                                                   .  Cartea and Penalva (2012)         .  Johnson (2010) 
                                                                                       .  Foucault et al (2016)                    . Martinez and Rosu (2011) 
                                               
                                                                                         
                          (-)  Liquidity (+)                                           (-) Volume (+)                        (-) Volume (+)                                               
  . Brogaard (2011)                 . Chaboud et al. (2009)                                              Theoretical regularity                 Theoretical regularity 
 . Gai et al. (2012)                      . Hendershott et al. (2011)                                                    
  . Jarnecic and Snape (2014)                                                   
 
                          (-) Volatility (+)                                            (-) Liquidity (+)                                    (-) Liquidity (+) 
. Hasbrouck and Saar (2009)     . SEC (2010)                                 Cvitanic et al. (2010)   Martinez et al. (2011) 
. Chaboud et al. (2009)               . Zhang (2010) 
. Brogaard (2011)                                                                                                      (-) Volatility (+)                       (-) Volatility (+) 
. Groth (2011)                                                                                                      Cvitanic (2010)   Cartea (2012)                  Martinez et al. (2011) 
                                                                                                                   Foucault(2016) 
                (-) Price Informativeness (+) 
. Zhang (2010)                               . Hendershott and Riordan (2011) 
. Zhang and Powell (2011)          . Hendershott and Moulton (2010) 
                                                          . Humphery - Jenner (2011) 
Empirical Literature Theoretical Literature 
Information Asymmetry 
Speed Advantage Accuracy Advantage 
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2.7 LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
 
According to Jain (2005), we are in the midst of a trading revolution. People are being taken out 
of the direct decision-making process in financial markets around the world,66 and being replaced 
by automated trading systems. According to ASIC (2013), an automated order processing program 
was responsible for at least 99.6% of all trading ‘messages’67 on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) in 2013. Moreover, Johnson, Wang, and Zhang, (2014) estimate that, as of 2012, as much 
as 78% of all U.S. equity trading volume originated from computer algorithms. A precise 
assessment of its impact on market quality is, however, challenging - a remarkable gap between 
the results of academic literature can be observed.   
Briefly, regarding the nexus between market quality and algorithmic trading, some empirical 
studies have linked the presence of algorithmic trading to increased trading activity, volume and/or 
improved market liquidity,68 in both foreign exchange and equity markets (Hendershott, Jones & 
Menkveld, 2011; Chaboud, Hjalmarsson, Vega & Chiquoine, 2009; Brogaard, 2010, and 
Hendershott & Riordan, 2011). Other empirical studies assert that algorithmic trading creates an 
                                                          
66 As reported in Popper (2012), algorithmic trading is also rapidly growing in Europe and Asia, accounting for approximately 45% 
of stock trading volume in the European Union, 40% in Japan, and 12% in the rest of Asia as of late 2012 (Goldstein, Kumar, & 
Graves, 2014). 
67 Trading messages are seen to constitute orders, quotes or cancellations. 
68 The bid-ask spread is often used as an indicator of liquidity; whereby, the narrower the spread, the greater the liquidity of a stock. 
However, as emphasized above, different samples, different markets, and different definitions of liquidity (abound in the literature) 
can change the findings significantly. 
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atmosphere of instability - increased risk of market crashes - and price volatility (Smith, 2010; 
Zhang, 2010).69  
The theoretical literature offers little respite in the way of an accurate assessment of algorithmic 
trading. Disconcertingly, current theoretical literature treats algorithmic traders as a homogenous 
trader group, forming a gap between theoretical discourse and empirical evidence on algorithmic 
trading practices - supporting the multiplicity of algorithmic trading strategies. Therefore, one of 
the main contributions of this thesis is to bridge that gap by characterizing algorithmic trader 
subgroups and investigating their respective influence on market quality. This approach allows us 
to study the effects of mechanisms/processes individually and concurrently (that is, their 
constituent strategic elements and dynamic interactions), but within the same overarching 
framework.  
A model that incorporates both types of informational advantage is a challenging problem in the 
context of a microstructure model of trade. Models typically eschew this issue entirely by 
restricting themselves to the analysis of one type of information variable in isolation. That being 
said, we must state unequivocally, that models can in theory possess both types of information 
variables within the same framework. It is hoped that this consolidated model will reconcile 
competing and existing notions on the practice of algorithmic trading and its impact on market 
quality. 
To the previous caveats of this thesis, another must be added: naturally, some existing models are 
special cases of our general framework. We suggest however, that in order to understand the extent 
                                                          
69 Contextually, empirical literature on the topic of algorithmic trading has also not been able to identify (concretely) the existence 
of a trade-off between liquidity and volatility – a recurring phenomenon in non-algorithmic related empirical research (Chordia et 
al., 2008; Hanson 2014). 
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to which the model(s) of this thesis integrate existing models, an in-depth knowledge of this market 
microstructure theory is required. Given that research within market microstructure is so extensive, 
a precise assessment of the nexus between existing models and those of this thesis can only be 
accomplished following a detailed review of market microstructure theory (Chapter 4). 
Thus, following the overview of theoretical market microstructure in Chapter 4, a comparative 
summary of the literature is provided (Table 4.1).  Table 4.1 allows the reader to gauge how our 
model integrates existing models. It also highlights which existing market microstructure models 
are special cases of our more general framework.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the methodology proposed to investigate the subjects addressed by this 
thesis. The chapter highlights, and explains the rationale of an appropriate paradigm on which the 
methods of inquiry rests; provides an instantiation of the concept; and proposes an appropriate 
scientific model of algorithmic trading.  
3.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM AND DESIGN 
 
Algorithmic trading is one of the most controversial and actively discussed topics in the financial 
world. Understanding the relative impact of algorithmic trading has been the subject of 
considerable interest in microstructure analysis. On a micro level, algorithmic trading can be seen 
to have profoundly influenced the price-discovery process - the process by which a market 
incorporates new information about an asset’s value into the asset’s price. It follows that 
elucidating the effects of algorithmic trading on market quality – the typical standard by which to 
account for the price discovery process – has become vital to our understanding of financial market 
performance (Gomber et al., 2011). 
However, a precise assessment of algorithmic trading is extremely challenging. This is partly a 
reflection of the complexity of defining the term itself. Invariably, automated trading, flash trading, 
program trading, low latency trading, black box trading, electronic trading and high frequency 
trading are just some of the labels ascribed to it in the literature (e.g., Frino, Mollica & Webb, 
2014; Gomber et al., 2011; Johnson, 2010; Kissell, 2013; O’Hara, 2014).  
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Adding to the complexity of the issue it appears that, regardless of terminology, algorithmic 
trading is a highly diverse activity. Both numerous and diverse trading approaches currently exist. 
Amongst these are; spread capturing, rebate trading, time weighted average price, volume 
weighted average price, implementation shortfall, adaptive execution, liquidity detection, data\text 
mining, neural network and support vector machine strategies.  
An alternative method of inquiry that captures the diversity of algorithmic trading practices in a 
systematic and orderly fashion is suggested here.  
Using the principles of contemporary cognitive science, this thesis will argue that the dual-process 
paradigm – the most prevalent contemporary interpretation of the nature and function of human 
decision making – lends itself well to a novel taxonomy of algorithmic trading. This taxonomy 
serves primarily as a heuristic to inform a theoretical model of algorithmic trading, with the view 
of explaining the evolving nature of market quality as a consequence of this practice.70 The 
foundations of this model are located in the market microstructure and behavioural finance 
literatures. We should emphasise however, that the aforementioned ‘agent-based model’ 
methodology will only be addressed in Chapter 4.  
In this chapter we highlight only the important assumptions that lie at the heart of our dual process 
taxonomy of algorithmic trading. To maintain focus on essentials, Chapter 3 then proceeds to 
discuss the conceptual foundations of our taxonomy, provides an instantiation of the concept, and 
highlights an appropriate classification scheme on which our taxonomic system rests. 
 
 
                                                          
70 Additionally the taxonomy may enable us to organise both the theoretical and empirical literature on the topic. 
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3.3 KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Traditionally,71 in the market microstructure literature, a trader can be superiorly informed as a 
result of either (1) their superior speed in accessing or exploiting information, or (2) their ability 
to more accurately forecast future variables. To date microstructure models focus on either one 
aspect but not both (see Section 4.3). This common modelling assumption is also evident in 
theoretical models of algorithmic trading. Theoretical papers on the topic of algorithmic trading 
have coalesced around the idea that algorithmic traders possess a comparative informational 
advantage relative to regular traders. However, the literature is yet to reach consensus as to what 
this advantage entails, nor its subsequent effects on market quality. 
Crucially, we assert that the key assumptions underlying our dual-process taxonomy of algorithmic 
trading implies that both of these informational advantages underlie algorithmic trading as a whole, 
with each advantage attributed to a different subgroup of algorithmic trader type. More formally, 
we suggest that algorithmic trading can be divided into two separate processes or systems; each 
with its own associated informational advantage.72 Inherently, all the various strategies associated 
with algorithmic trading (as presented in Chapter 2) correspond to their own respective ‘System’ 
and thus, informational advantage. That is, System 1 algorithmic traders possess an inherent speed 
advantage and System 2 algorithmic traders, an inherent accuracy advantage. The functional 
                                                          
71 Refer to Table 4.1, in Chapter 4, for an overview of traditional microstructure models. Table 4.1 organises the theoretical literature 
on both market microstructure and algorithmic trading vis-a-vis private information. 
72 A model that incorporates both types of informational advantage is a challenging problem in the context of a microstructure 
model of trade. Again, models typically eschew this issue entirely by restricting themselves to the analysis one type of information 
variable in isolation. That being said, we must state unequivocally that models can in theory possess both types of information 
variables within the same framework. 
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division of algorithmic trading strategies by their respective infrastructure, as seen in Appendix I, 
seems only to reinforce the above dual-process supposition.73 
Our model will look at the effects of these two algorithmic trading systems individually and 
concurrently (that is, their constituent elements and dynamic interactions), but within the same 
framework. It is hoped that this integrative model – a model that integrates and synthesises the 
multitude of algorithmic trading strategies in a single workable framework – may shed some light 
on contradictory findings and on previously unknown market variables.  
Next, we discuss the conceptual foundations of our taxonomy, provide an instantiation of the 
concept, and highlight an appropriate classification scheme on which the taxonomy rests. The 
presentation of the formal taxonomy is consigned to Chapter 5 (see e.g. Section 5.2). 
 
3.4 ALGORITHMIC TRADING: TAXONOMY DEVELOPMENT 
 
McKelvey (1978) gives a comprehensive coverage of the subject of taxonomies and classification 
for organizations under the heading of systematics. He sees this kind of science as “the science of 
diversity” (p. 12). The author points out the importance of systematics as a prerequisite to good 
scientific method, in providing clear delineation of the uniformities of classes of phenomena to be 
studied. The benefits of classifying objects of interest in a taxonomy is that like (as in similar) 
properties of a class of phenomena can be identified and a means is provided for comparing and 
contrasting classes. Following key insights from cognitive science, the taxonomy proposed 
classifies algorithmic trading with respect to the manner in which they process information.  
                                                          
73 In Appendix I, it is argued that speed typifies one portion of algorithmic trading strategies – those reliant on co-location 
infrastructure - whilst accuracy epitomizes the other portion of algorithmic trading strategies –those strategies reliant on high 
capability infrastructure.  
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Two types of information processing are distinguished: (1) a type of processing that is fast, 
reflexive and superficial (2) a type of processing that is controlled, precise and reflective. The 
distribution of information is a central consideration in market microstructure modelling, and thus 
appears to be a natural place to start in constructing our model.  
The only other characteristic identified in the literature as a possible candidate for distinguishing 
among classes are the functional attributes of the phenomena itself (by functional attributes we 
mean the functional architecture of a system and not merely how it functions). There are often 
deep functional differences between classes or systems. However, functional architecture is only 
indicative of a systems material/physical attributes and does not necessarily capture the 
behavioural aspects of that class or system (Gregor, 2006). Consequently, McKelvey, (1978) 
argues that the functional/architectural aspects of a system should be seen only as a supportive 
mechanism for the primary classifier – information processing in our case. 
Thus, like Lieberman (2007, 2009), we use the functional attributes of the phenomena – 
algorithmic trading – as a secondary classifier for our dual process decomposition. Although of 
secondary importance to information processing, the architectural aspects of algorithmic trading 
will be used as a descriptive empirical device that contributes to our modelling methodology (this 
will become clearer as the research proceeds).We have identified technological infrastructure as a 
possible architectural/functional candidate for this task. See below. 
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3.4.1 The Functional Aspects of Algorithmic Trading: Technological Infrastructure 
We sought to re-evaluate empirical research on algorithmic trading infrastructure in light of our 
cognitive dual process construct of information processing. This was done in order to determine 
the extent to which empirical research supports our proposed theoretical dual process 
decomposition of algorithmic trading. This empirical review will also have prescriptive relevance 
to our modelling methodology. 
Using the dual process distinction of information processing as a guiding principle, we conducted 
our investigation into the infrastructural aspects of algorithmic trading (see Appendix I). Evidently, 
an infrastructural decomposition of algorithmic trading appeared to be analogous with our dual 
system distinction of algorithmic trading. 
As evidenced in appendix I, trading infrastructure is seen as a key determinant in the trading 
process. In other words, financial markets rely on electronic information and communication 
technology (ICT) to support the exchange processes. Shapiro and Varian (2013) define ICT as: 
“the infrastructure that makes it possible to store, search, retrieve, copy, filter, manipulate, view, 
transmit and receive information” (p.8).  
With regards to algorithmic trading, we can distinguish between two independent forms of 
infrastructure. That is, between co-location infrastructure and high-end capability computing 
infrastructure (Johnson, 2010; Gomber et al., 2011; Kissell, 2013; Frino et al., 2014 and O’Hara, 
2014). Co-location is a latency specific mechanism – trading speed its ultimate condition. High-
end capability computing on the other hand is an advanced trading platform that can be measured 
by its inherent complex, analytical, logical and deductive reasoning capabilities and intrinsic 
predictive abilities. Recall that from a theoretical perspective, our dual process categorisation of 
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algorithmic trading implies that one portion of algorithmic traders possesses and inherent speed 
advantage whiles the other, an inherent accuracy advantage. It follows that the functional division 
of algorithmic trading by their respective infrastructure reflects the mechanisms behind these 
advantages. In other words, System 1 algorithmic traders speed advantage relates to their access 
to latency specific mechanisms, e.g. colocation facilities: whilst high-end capability computing 
subsists as the mechanism by which System 2 algorithmic traders attain their accuracy advantage. 
Below we provide an instantiation of System 1 and System 2 algorithmic trading. According to 
Gregor (2006), an instantiation refers to the creation of a real instance or particular realization of 
an abstraction or class of objects and processes. Again, this is intended to serve as a descriptive 
device that contributes to our modelling methodology. 
 
3.5 INSTANTIATION OF SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2 ALGORITHMIC TRADING  
 
3.5.1 The Instantiation of System 1 Algorithmic Trader’s: The Speed Advantage 
 
According to O’Hara (2014), all algorithmic trading is strategic because its goal is to maximize a 
particular strategy against a market’s matching engine (notable examples are given in Chapter 6). 
Effectively, the matching engine determines how orders are processed, and thus controls the 
automation of trades and establishes a channel of communication between the market – the 
matching engine – and the trading algorithm. This is where System 1 algorithmic traders’ speed 
advantage comes to the fore. In practical terms, speed or latency refers to the time it takes to access 
and respond to market information. It follows, that System 1’s speed advantage relates to their 
faster access to the exchanges matching engine.  
System 1 algorithmic traders leverage high speed connections to the market, locating their servers 
adjacent to exchanges matching engine. Placing one’s server adjacent to the exchanges matching 
75 
 
  
engine means that real-time market information (such as market orders) can reach the algorithmic 
traders platform almost instantaneously. It therefore significantly reduces the time it takes to access 
the central order book (where electronic information on quotes to buy and sell as well as current 
market prices are warehoused). It also decreases the time it takes to transmit trade instructions and 
execute matched trades. As previously noted, in exchange for a fee, those who subscribe to co-
location services get the infrastructure from the exchange itself. The package includes everything 
from the actual connection to the matching engine, to server cages, electricity, maintenance, and 
safety installations. The SEC (2010) notes that due to co-location facilities: “the speed of trading 
has increased to the point that the fastest traders now measure their latencies in microseconds” (p. 
3605). 1 microsecond is an IS (International System) unit of time equal to 1000000th of a second. 
In the past, those on the trading floor had faster access to the market than others; today, those co-
located with the exchange market have faster access. 
Faster speeds also imply that these traders can trade more frequently, have smaller inventories and 
shorter holding horizons. The short holding horizon has important implications for our 
assumptions regarding the System 1 algorithmic trader’s behaviour and choice of information. 
Consider the following: in the short-term, the resale value of a risky security is more likely driven 
by the order flow rather than the fundamental values. Hence, consistent with the insight of Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1992), System 1 algorithmic traders in our taxonomy, will most likely focus 
on short-term order flow. It follows that, when establishing a position, the System 1 trader must 
have a plan to exit within a short time window. Therefore, the System 1 algorithmic trader’s profit 
is not determined by the difference between his entry price and the fundamental value, but by the 
difference between his entry and exit prices.  
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To summarise, we will assume that System 1 algorithmic traders can effectively anticipate 
incoming market orders and trade rapidly to exploit normal-speed traders’ latencies (details 
provided in Chapter 6). Their speed advantage is predicated on latency specific mechanisms e.g. 
co-location facilities and applies to information about incoming order flow and not about the 
fundamental value of the asset.  
In order to fully appreciate our instantiation of System 1 algorithmic trading above, some terms 
require clarification (i.e., the terms public information, private information, information 
asymmetry and fundamental value). For the sake of brevity, we cannot define these terms 
effectively in the current section. Those who would prefer clarification at this stage are directed to 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.3), where we address these terms in detail. The instantiation above provides 
a sufficient introduction to the theoretic issues that arise later in this thesis. 
 
3.5.2 The Instantiation of System 2 Algorithmic Trader’s: The Accuracy Advantage 
 
Crucially, System 1 algorithmic traders’ speed advantage relates to information about incoming 
order flow. This is particularly pertinent given that order book information travels fast within the 
exchange. However, information on the macro-economy or firm fundamentals – which in general 
are larger and more complex than order book information – travels slower and is more complex to 
interpret than order book information. This is where System 2 algorithmic trader’s accuracy 
advantage comes to the fore. In practical terms, accuracy relates to the precision of a long-run, 
firm specific, forecast. It is predicated on the extent to which an agent is informed about the 
intrinsic worth of a firm.  
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The following crucial assumption is thus made in our taxonomy: the System 2 algorithmic trader’s 
accuracy advantage is linked to their ability to predict key, fundamental, value relevant, firm 
specific variables.  
Therefore, unlike our assumptions for System 1 algorithmic trading, System 2 algorithmic trading 
is not characterized by a speed dimension; but rather an ability to make superior strategic decisions 
via the use of advanced computational infrastructure and techniques. Essentially, System 2 
algorithmic trading would exploit information beyond the traditional order book data. This 
includes news, pre-news and other forms of textual, as well as numerical, information (Leinweber, 
2009). Indeed, major news providers have started offering algorithmic traders access to 
electronically processable news feeds – providing these traders with valuable and actionable 
numerical and textual information.  
By leveraging high-end capability computing infrastructure, these traders can apply advanced 
forecasting techniques – such as time series analysis, machine learning, neural networks, support 
vector machines tools, as well as text mining, in order to make accurate long term predictions of a 
firm’s value. Thus, from a researcher’s perspective, System 2 algorithmic trading can be measured 
by its inherent complex, analytical, logical and deductive reasoning capabilities and intrinsic 
predictive abilities. 
Essentially, an assumption of System 2 algorithmic traders made in our taxonomy is that they 
exploit their superior ability to interpret public fundamental information in an attempt to make 
forecasts that are superior to the forecasts of other traders. In other words, these traders filter public 
fundamental information through an advanced platform (high-capability computer infrastructure), 
in order to detect private patterns from public information – patterns that signal a firms future 
performance.  
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This in turn rests on the principle of information filtration. Effectively, the concept of information 
filtration is aligned with the assumption that some traders are able to filter public information into 
private information signals. The terms public information and private information require some 
clarification. Again, given the inherent complexities involved in defining these terms, we devote 
an entire section to this task (refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.3). Only a broad overview is presented 
here.  
According to Lyons (2001), at its most basic level, the term public information refers to any 
publicly available information flows. This includes, but is not limited to; earnings announcements, 
management and analysts’ forecasts, and other summaries of detailed financial accounting 
statistics. Again, as the term suggests, this information is public knowledge and is available to all 
market participants. Conversely, private information can be defined as any information that is not 
known by all trading parties (Brunnermeier, 2001). Although this is the most natural definition, it 
is also extremely general. For example, under this definition, if a trader has any privileged 
information about a firms performance, and that information helps him or her in forecasting prices 
then this constitutes private information. However, a precise categorisation on what constitutes 
private information does not concern us at this stage. What matters here, is the assumption that 
some traders are able to utilise public information in a manner that reflects private valuations of a 
firms performance. This suggests that certain traders make judgments about a firm’s performance 
that are superior to the judgments of other traders (Lyons, 2001).    
The aforementioned serves to clarify the assumption made for System 2 algorithmic traders in our 
taxonomy (i.e. that these traders filter public information through an advanced platform such as 
high-capability computer infrastructure, in order to detect private patterns from public 
information – patterns that signal a firm’s future performance more accurately). 
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CHAPTER 4 
MICROSTRUCTURE BACKGROUND 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 6 we present the first ‘all-inclusive’ theoretical model of algorithmic trading (all-
inclusive in that it accounts for the multitude of algorithmic trading strategies within a single 
theoretical framework.) 
As the model has microstructural foundations, market microstructure theory is reviewed in this 
chapter. It must, however, be pointed out from the outset that the work within market 
microstructure is so voluminous that in a single chapter, there is simply not enough room to present 
the main models in depth. Instead, our objective can be accomplished by presenting a coherent 
picture, or road map that readers can use for navigating further sections. For ease of reference, we 
present each model with its most valuable insights. Additionally, we present simple (less 
generalised) versions of each model in order to communicate the underlying economics as 
efficiently as possible. Clarity on the underlying economics is crucial for understanding the later 
sections applications.  
The current chapter will begin by highlighting the important assumptions that underlie market 
microstructure theory. The terms private, public and fundamental information are then defined and 
discussed. For conceptual clarity, we present a few models/examples that speak directly to these 
definitions; however, briefly.  
This chapter then proceeds to survey two influential models of market microstructure: 1) the 
rational expectations auction model and 2) the Kyle auction model.  
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4.2 HALLMARKS OF THE MICROSTRUCTURE APPROACH  
The previous section introduces market microstructure in the context of trading but does not define 
the term clearly. Maureen O’Hara (1995, p1) defines market microstructure as “the process and 
outcomes of exchanging assets under explicit trading rules”. We adopt a similar definition. 
However, because this definition is so broad, it may be helpful to clarify further.  
Three important assumptions lie at the heart of the microstructure approach to financial markets. 
Indeed, Lyons (2001, p4) uses a three-point characterisation of market microstructure in order to 
differentiate it from traditional approaches (i.e., neoclassical asset pricing models). The focus is 
information, players and institutions: 
1. Information: microstructure models recognise that some information relevant to securities is not 
publicly available. 
2. Players: microstructure models recognise that market participants differ in ways that affect 
prices. 
3. Institutions: microstructure models recognise that trading mechanisms differ in the ways that 
affect prices. 
These three assumptions are the hallmarks of the microstructure approach. In particular, the 
richness of microstructure models come from (1) information structure: determining what market 
participants know; (2) heterogeneity: ascertaining what type of market participants are active in 
the market and identifying their motives for trading; and (3) institutions: examining the roles that 
each participant plays in the trading process and defining what trading information each trader has 
available. 
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The aforementioned hallmarks of the microstructure approach suggest that market microstructure 
rests resolutely on the dynamics of information i.e., the information economics of financial 
markets. In keeping with this focus, we move immediately to the economics of financial 
information; information heterogeneity, public, private and fundamental information are defined 
and discussed below. Section 4.4 of this chapter considers microstructure models in more detail. 
4.2.1 Information Economics 
By and large, the interplay between market participants and information has proven to be an 
important trend in market microstructure research. Apropos market information, a large amount of 
literature has begun to address issues of information differentials between traders and its 
subsequent market effects (Grossman, 1976). This information differential, commonly referred to 
as information asymmetry, arises when information is known to some, but not all market 
participants. The current approach emphasizes the distinction between informed and uninformed 
market participants.  
Regarding this ‘informed/uninformed’ investor phenomenon, informed investors are seen to be 
those investors that have ‘private’ information about the future states of the world, while the 
uninformed investors are those that do not (Grossman, 1976). According to Brown, Richardson 
and Schwager (1987), this superiority or advantage is mostly driven by an informed investor’s 
access to either more timely information or more accurate/precise information on which to base 
forecasts.74  
 
                                                          
74 Information asymmetry is closely related to the problem of adverse selection. According to Grossman (1979): “The problem of 
adverse selection arises as a manifestation of asymmetrical information in any market in which buyers and sellers are not equally 
informed about the characteristics of the heterogeneous commodities they exchange”(p.336). 
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4.3 DEFINING PRIVATE INFORMATION 
Although there are a host of definitions for private information available in the literature, a 
common and simplifying thread exists; that is, private information is information that is not known 
by all trading parties. This is a natural definition. We should say, though, that it is a bit broader 
than some people have in mind. For example, under this definition, if a trader has any privileged 
information about a firm’s performance, and that information helps him or her in forecasting prices 
then this constitutes private information (Brunnermeier 2001; Lyons, 2001). 
In order to add clarity and concreteness to the definition, let us discuss two sub-categories of 
private information as they appear in the microstructure literature (e.g. Foucault, Hombert, & 
Rosu, 2012, 2016). Accordingly, informed trading can be seen to can take one of two forms: (i) 
trading on more accurate information or (ii) trading on information faster than other investors. 
More precisely, private information consists of an accuracy dimension (advantage)75 or a speed 
dimension (advantage). The following subsection extends this two category breakdown of private 
information by adding some granularity. Specifically, we begin by addressing the accuracy 
component of private information (i) before referencing the timing aspects of private information 
(ii). 
 
 
 
                 FIGURE 4.1: CATAGORIES OF PRIVATE INFORMATION. 
                                                          
75 The term advantage is intended to communicate a superior ability relative to others. 
Private 
Information
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(i) The Accuracy Advantage 
What does it mean to have more precise/accurate information?  We explore the components, and 
the formation process of information accuracy below.  
Some caveats, however, are in order before we continue. Like microstructure theory in general, 
we view information accuracy as a fundamental component of private information. At its most 
basic level, the accuracy dimension of private information rests on the principal of information 
filtration. A single statement is suggestive of the narrative to follow: the accuracy component of 
private information is aligned on an assumption that some traders filter public information into 
private, and perhaps more accurate signals of a firm’s fundamental value.  
In order to understand this statement, the terms ‘fundamental value’ and ‘public information’ 
require clarification. 
The term fundamental value is used to define the long-term or intrinsic value of a security. It is 
often presented as the discounted present value of a firms future cash flows (Vives, 2010).76 A 
variety of other measures have emerged in recent works to account for a firm’s fundamental value. 
We do not discuss these different measures here. We do note however, that public information 
appears to be a key variable in this process – the process of ascertaining a firm’s fundamental 
value.  
A comment on the term public information:  it is well established that trading on financial markets 
is strongly influenced by public information (i.e., firm-specific, macroeconomic and other related 
information flows). The link between public information and a firm’s fundamental value is 
                                                          
76 This is not a proven theorem or validated theory, but a general assumption. Moreover, for different financial instruments, the 
methodology may differ. 
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somewhat of a theoretical regularity in the literature (e.g., Kim & Verrecchia, 1994). Markets react 
sensitively to this so called ‘news’ which is announced on a recurrent and intermittent basis.  
A precise categorisation on what constitutes public information does not concern us at this stage.77 
What matters here, is the assumption that some traders are able to utilise public information in a 
manner that reflects private valuations of a firm’s performance. Indeed, this is a central theme in 
the discourse on private information accuracy.  
We are now in a position to clarify the statement used at the start of this subsection (i.e., that the 
accuracy component of private information is aligned on an assumption that some traders filter 
public information into private, and perhaps more precise valuations of a firm’s fundamental 
value).  
Accordingly, the accuracy advantage (a term used interchangeably with the accuracy dimension) 
suggests that certain traders make judgments about a firm’s performance that are superior to the 
judgments of other traders. Next, we delineate two possible mechanisms behind this advantage. 
Two related mechanisms are referenced in the literature to explain the accuracy phenomenon. The 
first position holds that, although agents observe the same public information, they interpret this 
public information differently. This idea was first introduced over a century ago by Bachelier 
(1900) and later developed by Holthausen and Verrechia (1990). The second proposition argues 
that agents use public announcements to infer new private information from the public information 
itself (e.g. Kim & Verrecchia, 1997). These mechanisms are defined as the interpretation 
mechanism (a) and the inference mechanism (b) of private information accuracy respectively. 
                                                          
77 Our characterization of public information is sufficiently broad to include earnings announcements, management and analysts’ 
forecasts, 10-K filings, and other summaries of detailed financial accounting statistics. 
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Consider a simple diagram (Figure 4.2) that illustrates the relationship between the mechanisms 
of private information accuracy.  
             
FIGURE 4.2: THE MECHANISMS OF PRIVATE INFORMATION ACCURACY, GAMZO (2017). 
 
 
a) The Interpretation Mechanism of Private Information Accuracy 
The interpretation mechanism suggests that while all investors may observe the same public 
information, their interpretation of that information for the value of the firm need not be 
homogeneous. What is relevant is not that each investor sees the same public information for 
example, but that investors reach varying conclusions about the fundamental value of the firm 
following this information. This is akin to all agents observing the same reported earnings per 
share figure, and then determining the implication of the reported earnings for the value of the 
firm. 
Holthausen and Verrechia (1990) validate this differential interpretation principle by postulating a 
theoretical model in which agents become differentially informed following a public information 
release. In order to facilitate the discussion to follow, we highlight only the key variables 
Holthausen and Verrechia (1990) use to model this phenomenon. The model is detailed extensively 
Private Information
(i) Accuracy
(a) Interpretation 
Mechanism 
(b) Inference 
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in Appendix II (see (a) in Appendix II). For the purpose of continuity in the current section, a 
broad summary on this model should suffice:  
Holthausen and Verrechia (1990) assess the extent to which heterogeneous interpretations of a 
public information release result in price and volume reactions. In their model, agents exchange a 
single risky asset and a single riskless asset over one period. The notation 𝑣  represents the 
liquidating dividend of the risky asset and, thus, represents the risky asset’s true, economic cash 
flow or fundamental value. During the trading period each agent receives a signal 𝑠 and interprets 
what the signal implies about the liquidating value 𝑣, such that each investor’s interpretation of 
the signal is given by: 
                                                       𝐴 = 𝑣 + 𝑒 + 𝛿                                                     (4.3.1) 
    
 
The variable 𝛿 is an ‘idiosyncratic’78 noise term and the variable 𝑒 is a common noise term. By 
modelling information with both common and idiosyncratic noise terms,79 Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1990) demonstrate that agents can be differentially informed following a commonly-
observed signal. Here, each agent observes the same public signal (e.g. an earnings announcement) 
but each agent's interpretation of what the signal implies about the value of the liquidating dividend 
varies because of the agent-specific noise term (idiosyncratic noise term 𝛿). A striking implication 
of the above is that some agents may have access to more accurate information than others (i.e., 
have less idiosyncratic noise in their signal). We refer to Appendix II (a) for a comprehensive 
review of the results of the model.  
                                                          
78 The term ‘idiosyncratic’ is used to convey the message that something is specific to a certain individual alone. 
79 Indjejikian (1988) also models information with both a common and idiosyncratic component. 
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As alluded to above, we wish to avoid making restrictive inferences before exhausting the 
necessary literature. However, we do note that the intuition for relating the interpretation 
mechanism (above) to System 2 algorithmic trading appears to be quite reasonable. Hence, there 
is a strong chance that this informational dimension will feature prominently in our formulation 
for System 2 algorithmic trading. (Further information to follow in Chapters 4 and 5)  
 
b) The Inference Mechanism of Private Information Accuracy 
 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) model private information by assuming that an earnings 
announcement provides each agent with a single signal (𝐴 = 𝑣 + 𝑒 + 𝛿). An alternative way to 
model private information with regards to information accuracy is discussed below. This 
alternative modelling methodology explicates the role of an agent’s ability to infer new private 
information from public information itself. In other words, the inference mechanism of private 
information accuracy suggests that some agents are able to utilise information gathered in 
anticipation of public announcement in order to infer new private, and perhaps more accurate 
information from the information release.80 Although closely related to the differential 
interpretation principle, the inference principle suggests that the process of gathering private 
information is a cumulative process. Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) rational expectations model 
provides some insight into this concept. However, given that Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) model 
is explicitly addressed in appendix II (b), the discussion to follow highlights only the informational 
aspects of the model itself.  
                                                          
80 The characterization of information releases is sufficiently broad to include earnings announcements, management and analysts’ 
forecasts, 10-K filings, and other summaries of detailed financial accounting statistics. For convenience, however, the focus is 
primarily on earnings announcements. 
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In Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) model, agents exchange a single risky stock and a riskless bond. 
Like Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) an earnings announcement is set to occur during the 
trading period. Contextually, the earnings announcement communicates firm value with noise; that 
is: 
                                                                 𝐴 = 𝑣 + 𝛿                                                        (4.3.2) 
Here, 𝑣 denotes the liquidating value of the risky asset and thus, represents the risky asset’s true, 
economic cash flow or fundamental value. 
However, in contrast to Holthausen and Verrecchia’s (1990) set-up (where the informed receives 
a single signal concerning the announcement); the informed agents in Kim and Verrecchia (1994) 
actively collect private information in anticipation of the announcement itself. Namely, before 𝐴 
is announced, the informed trader (denoted 𝑖) observes an ‘anticipatory’ signal in the form of: 
                                                                   𝐾 = 𝛿 + 𝑒                                                     (4.3.3) 
Note that 𝐾 alone is not an informative signal about the firm’s liquidating value 𝑣 , since both  𝛿 
and 𝑒 are independent of  𝑣. However, combined with the announced itself (𝐴 = 𝑣 + 𝛿), 𝐾  
generates a new signal 𝐴 − 𝐾 = 𝑣 − 𝑒 and this provides more accurate information about the 
firm’s performance.  
Institutionally,  𝐾 can be thought of as the information a trader gleans about a random error in 
financial reports by studying the firm. For example, in the case of an earnings announcement 
(characterized by 𝐴 = 𝑣 + 𝛿) , the random error 𝛿  represents the discrepancy between (𝑣)  and 
the forecast of (𝑣) implicit in current accounting statement (𝑣 + 𝛿).81 Specifically, traders who 
                                                          
81 This discrepancy arises, perhaps, from the failure of accounting profits to recognize unrealized gains, use consistent accounting 
procedures, or avoid questionable levels of capitalization. See Appendix II for a detailed discussion. 
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possess 𝐾 are better prepared to translate current accounting figures into superior assessments of 
the firm. In the context of the model, when earnings are announced, the 𝐾 can be used to partially 
correct for this error in the earnings report. 
Intuitively, advanced agents would trade in the wake of an earnings announcement not just because 
of the information contained in the announcement itself, but also because their private anticipatory 
information (𝐾) leads them to infer new private, and possibly more accurate, information from the 
announcement itself. In fact, this information is often defined as “uniquely privately inferred 
information about future earnings” (Barron, Harris & Stanford, 2005. p.404).We refer to Appendix 
II for a comprehensive review of Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) model. 
Again it is too early to consign this type of information to System 1 or System 2 trading. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the inference mechanism seems to lend itself well to System 2 
information processing.82 Thus, it will likely feature in our formulation for System 2 algorithmic 
trading. The details will develop as we proceed to the models themselves. 
Summary - the Accuracy Dimension of Private Information 
Regarding the dimensions of private information accuracy, we have already mentioned that two 
notions exist to explain the mechanisms behind how some traders come to be more accurately 
informed. The first is to assume that agents interpret public information differently; and as a 
consequence some agents have more accurate information than others – this was demonstrated 
                                                          
82 As noted above (e.g. Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2), with regards to human cognition, System 2 is a high-level processor. The 
representations in this system are symbolic and unbounded, in that they are based on propositions that can be ‘combined’ to form 
larger and more complex sets of propositions. (Sloman, 1996). This ‘combination’ reference bears remarkable similarity to the 
explicit features of the inference principle (above), which suggests that the process of gathering private information is a cumulative 
process (Kim & Verrecchia, 1994). Such insight seems only to reinforce the intuition that the inference mechanism will feature in 
our formulation for System 2 algorithmic trading. 
90 
 
  
above in (a). The inference mechanism of private information accuracy, (b), also above, provides 
an alternative explanation for this information superiority - in terms of accuracy. It explicates the 
role of an agent’s ability to infer new private information from public announcement itself. 
What follows here is a discussion on the second category of private information; the speed 
dimension (ii). 
(ii) The Speed Advantage 
Earlier we alluded to a two-category breakdown of private information. According to this scheme, 
informed trading can take one of two forms: (i) trading on more accurate information or (ii) trading 
on information faster than other investors. We have already discussed (i) above. Here we follow 
with a discussion that draws on (ii), the speed dimension of private information. 
It is typical of market microstructure models to assume that all agents receive their information at 
the same time. While these models have provided many important insights, Hirshleifer, 
Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994), argue that in reality some investors, either fortuitously or 
owing to superior skill, acquire pertinent information before others.  
Motivated by the above, Hirshleifer et al., (1994) construct the first theoretical account of the speed 
dimension of private information. The model developed describes the investment choices of a set 
of investors who investigate the long-term prospects of firms. In order to assess the impact of speed 
differentials, some investors in the model uncover payoff-relevant information early, while other 
investors uncover this information later. Overall, the model demonstrates that the exact timing of 
when investors uncover relevant information may be as important, if not more important, than the 
accuracy of the information.  
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As Hirshleifer et al., (1994, p.1688) note: “since investors who receive information early, trade 
differently from investors who receive information late, the equilibrium in a securities market 
where investors receive their information before others can be fundamentally different from the 
equilibria in models of information acquisition in which investors receive their information 
simultaneously.” 
4.3.1 Summary of Private Information 
All models are simplifications of reality, and market microstructure models are certainly no 
exception. One facet of economic models in which simplification has been common is their 
treatment of information. This simplification is frequently tacit and takes the form of an idealised 
‘informed/uninformed’ investor paradigm. Accordingly, informed investors have ‘private 
information’ about future states of the world, while uninformed investors do not possess this 
information.  A review on the literature on private information suggests that informed trading can 
take one of two forms: (i) trading on more accurate information, or (ii) trading on information 
faster than other investors. We discussed the various facets of each dimension.83 However, this 
was done only to add some granularity to our discussion and ground it in theory. We emphasise 
here again that a simple appreciation of private information at its broadest level (i.e., the existence 
of a two-category breakdown of private information) provides sufficient introduction to the basic 
information-theoretic issues that arise in later sections. 
A visual summary of private information is presented in Figure 4.3 below: 
                                                          
83  For example, along with a description of private information accuracy, we also discussed two possible mechanisms for its 
formation (i.e., (a) the interpretation mechanism and (b) the inference mechanism of private information accuracy). 
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FIGURE 4.3: VISUAL SUMMARY OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN ITS ENTIRETY, GAMZO (2017). 
 
An important caveat needs to be noted here. In order to provide a coherent picture of private 
information, a condensation of the literature was necessary. Inevitably, the overview above may 
have suggested that research on the timing aspects of private information and research on the 
accuracy dimension of private information have evolved in unison. This is not actually the case. 
Although the literature does recognise the existence of a two category breakdown of private 
information, these dimensions are rarely, if ever discussed within the same theoretical framework. 
Indeed, characterising investors’ use of both types of private information is a challenging problem 
in the context of a microstructure model of trade. Again, models typically eschew this issue entirely 
by restricting themselves to the analysis one type of information variable in isolation. As will 
become clearer as we proceed, the final model of this thesis reconciles this obvious disconnect by 
including both types of private information within a single overarching framework. Thus, a 
particularly novel feature of our model is that it lies at the confluence of these two seemingly 
disparate literatures. 
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Below we consider microstructure models in more detail. Following this overview, we close 
Chapter 4 with a combined visual summary of the theoretical literature on both algorithmic trading 
and market microstructure (Table 4.1).  See Section 4.7. 
 
4.4 MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE MODELS: A FOCUSED OVERVIEW  
This subsection provides a focused overview of microstructure models. Given that research within 
market microstructure is so extensive, some form of literary injustice is inevitable when providing 
only an overview. However, the primary aim of this section will be accomplished by presenting a 
coherent framework that readers can use for navigating further sections.  
Two distinct models are discussed in this section: 
1. Rational expectations auction model 
2. Kyle auction model 
The rational expectations model of securities trading is a natural starting point for this section. 
Opening with this model clarifies how its shortcomings spurred the development of later 
microstructure models. Among these shortcomings is that the act of setting prices is not addressed 
in the model; there are no agents whose responsibility it is to set prices. When pressed about where 
these prices actually come from, researchers typically refer to a ‘Walrasian’ auctioneer, a 
hypothetical agent who collects orders, sets prices based on these orders and executes trades at the 
market-clearing price he or she sets (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). Interestingly, these hypothetical 
agents exist outside of the model itself. 
The Kyle (1985c) model (henceforth the Kyle 1985 model) is a natural follow-up to the rational 
expectations model. Both models are equilibrium models in the sense that they derive relationships 
between the prices of traded assets based on some strong assumptions about investors behaviour 
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in the market (Cvitanić & Zapatero, 2004). The key difference is that the Kyle model addresses 
the act of setting price explicitly. This is achieved by introducing an actual auctioneer (henceforth, 
‘market maker’)84 to replace the hypothetical auctioneer of the rational expectations model. Kyle’s 
market maker uses order flow information to determine the market clearing price. Also, because 
the protocol that governs trading is fully specified in the Kyle model (in contrast to the rational 
expectations model) his model produces an intimate link between trading protocol and price 
determination – a hallmark of microstructure modelling. 
 
4.5 THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL 
For contextual perspective, it may be helpful to distinguish between two types of rational 
expectations equilibria here. 
These equilibrium types are 
1. Fully revealing equilibrium 
2. Partially revealing equilibrium 
In a fully revealing equilibrium, all information, including private information, is embedded in 
price (so-called strong-form efficiency).  More precisely, the price provides a sufficient statistic 
for the underlying fundamental, making private information redundant in the context of trading. 
Conversely, in a partially-revealing equilibrium, price reflects a combination of private 
information, as well as, extraneous noise.  
                                                          
84 The Kyle model is not classified as dealership market because dealer quotes do not represent the best available price. The Kyle 
auctioneer (a term used interchangeably with market-maker) therefore does not share a characteristic that is true of dealers – that 
they first provide other individuals with a quote, and then orders are submitted conditional on that quote. Rather, orders are 
submitted to the Kyle auctioneer (market-maker) before price is determined, and the Kyle auctioneer then determines a market-
clearing price based on those orders (Lyons, 2001, p.65). 
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Although fully revealing equilibria were the focus in early rational expectations models, the 
literature is beginning to favour the partially revealing approach. Partially revealing equilibria are 
also closer to the reality of trading. To produce a partially revealing equilibrium, we add some 
sources of noise to the trading process to make it difficult to disentangle the causes of price 
movements.85 
The Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model is widely referenced in the literature and is a natural place 
to begin our rational expectations review. Given that it includes private information and noise in 
asset supply, the model provides insight into the partially revealing equilibria discussed above. 
Model specifics are provided below.  
4.5.1 The Model 
In the particular one-period version of Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) rational expectations auction 
model, one risky asset is exchanged for a riskless asset among two kinds of traders: an informed 
trader and an uninformed trader. Both traders are risk averse and non-strategic (non-strategic 
meaning that that they act as perfect competitors and take market prices as given)86 
The value of the risky assets end of period payoff is denoted as 𝑣. It is a normally distributed 
random variable with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝑣
2. Before 𝑣 is paid or observed, the risky asset is 
traded at price 𝑝.  
Before trading at price 𝑝, one of the traders is ‘informed’, meaning that he receives private 
information about 𝑣 in the form of signal 𝑠. Although the informed trader is the only one to receive 
                                                          
85 For example, when noise relating to an assets supply is added to a model with private information, price rises do not indicate 
whether the cause is more positive private information or a smaller asset supply. This is because both would elevate the price. 
86 This definition of non-strategic behavior is Lyons (2001). 
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the signal 𝑠, both traders know that 𝑠 is normally distributed, with mean 𝑣 and variance  𝜎𝑠
2. This 
signal is specified as 
𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒, 
𝑒 represents the noise in the signal. 
The other trader is ‘uninformed’, meaning that he has not observed 𝑠 and therefore does not have 
an information motive for trading. Specifically, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) assume that 
uninformed traders are non-strategic and trade for motives other that information (such as 
hedging).87 
Each trader initially receives a random endowment in units of the risky asset (in shares or currency) 
denoted 𝑋𝐼 and 𝑋𝑈 (𝐼 and 𝑈 denote the informed and uninformed trader, respectively). Each 
endowment is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝑋
2. We denote the aggregate 
supply of the risky asset by 𝑋, where 𝑋 = 𝑋𝐼 + 𝑋𝑈. (If 𝑋𝐼>𝑋𝑈, we would expect the informed 
trader to be selling to the uninformed trader, ceteris paribus). 𝑋𝐼 and 𝑋𝑈 are distributed 
independently of one another and independently of the signal 𝑠 and the payoff 𝑣. 
The exponential utility function used here is common in microstructure theory (O’Hara, 1995). It 
is defined over end-of-period dollar wealth 𝑊:88 
                                                          𝑈(𝑊) = −exp(−𝑊).                                           (4.5.1) 
                                                          
87 Uninformed traders are often recorded as noise traders in the literature. They are liquidity motivated, smoothing their inter-
temporal consumption stream through portfolio adjustment. Regardless of how one chooses to define uninformed traders, one can 
safely assume that they have a non-informational motive for trading. Bagehot (1971) provides a detailed discussion on the topic. 
88 In this framework, random variables are normally distributed and utility exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). 
Equation 4.5.1 introduces the negative exponential utility function, a concept that is standard in many models of trade. See O’Hara 
(1995) for more details - in particular the appendix to Chapter 3. 
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The properties of the utility function are as follows: first, the reallocation of wealth in the trading 
process does not affect equilibrium. This is because the risky asset demands do not depend on 
wealth (Lyons, 2001). Second, when coupled with the normally distributed assumption underlying 
returns, the exponential utility function produces a demand function for the risky asset that takes 
a simple linear form. 
A pricing rule rests at the centre of rational expectations models. This is because the pricing rule 
determines how the model’s random variables determine equilibrium price. The functional form 
of the pricing rule is common knowledge to all traders. Knowledge of the pricing rule together 
with the market price implies that the uninformed trader is able to glean some of the information 
about the informed traders signal. 
The pricing rule must meet two conditions: a rational expectations component, and an equilibrium 
component. The two conditions for rational expectations equilibrium are as follows: 
 1) Expectations of the payoff 𝑣 are consistent with the equilibrium pricing rule  
 2) Markets always clear (excess demand equals zero for all random variable realisations.) 
The solution to the equilibrium is given below. Here, we show that the proposed equilibrium 
conforms to the rational expectations conditions. 
4.5.2 Solving for Equilibrium 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) solve for this type of model ‘by construction’, that is, by conjecturing 
a pricing rule and then verifying that it meets the two conditions above.89 The basis for proposing 
a linear pricing rule rests on the assumptions concerning utility and normal distributions. However, 
                                                          
89 This is also known as the method of undetermined coefficients. 
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it is important to note that it is not a priori clear what the content of that linear rule should be (or 
that an equilibrium rule need even be linear).  According to Lyons (2001), this is a matter of trial 
and error. Although not ostensibly obvious, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that the following 
conjectured rule does in fact meet the two equilibrium conditions: 
                                                            𝑝 = 𝛼𝑠 − 𝛽𝑋                                                      (4.5.2) 
We see that 𝑠, the realized signal and 𝑋, the realized risky asset supply, are the key components in 
the equation above. These are natural choices for the proposed rule: they are the random variables 
on which asset demands are based. The remaining random variable 𝑣 is not a candidate because 
the payoff 𝑣 is not observable at the time of trading. 𝛼 and 𝛽 are constants and their values are 
determined at the end of the solution process in a manner that makes them consistent with the 
optimising behaviour of both traders. 
There are three more steps involved in solving for equilibrium. First we need expressions for each 
trader’s expectation of the payoff 𝑣; these must be consistent with with the equilibrium pricing 
rule. Second, based on these expectations of of 𝑣 from step one, we need expressions for each 
trader’s risky-asset demand. Finally, we use those demands to find a market-clearing price that 
matches the proposed pricing rule in equation (4.5.2). Then, we have the rational expectations 
equilibrium, because it conforms to the second equilibrium condition (2) above. In that 
equilibrium, expectations are formed using the correct pricing rule, conforming to condition (1). 
4.5.3 Expectations 
It is relatively straightforward to demonstrate traders’ expectations in this setting. This holds true 
especially in the informed trader’s case given that he learns only from his own signal – he knows 
the other trader is uninformed. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that we can write the informed 
99 
 
  
traders posterior beliefs about the payoff 𝑣 conditional on his signal 𝑠 as normally distributed 
with:90 
                             𝐸 [𝑣|𝑠] = (
𝜎𝑠
−2
𝜎𝑠
−2+𝜎𝑣
−2) 𝑠     and      𝑉𝑎𝑟 [𝑣|𝑠] = (
1
𝜎𝑠
−2+𝜎𝑣
−2). 
These expressions make intuitive sense. As 𝜎𝑠
2 – the variance of the signal 𝑠 about  𝑣 – goes to 
infinity (a weaker signal), 𝐸 [𝑣|𝑠] goes to the unconditional expectation of 𝑣, or 𝐸[𝑣] = 0, and 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣|𝑠) goes to the unconditional variance of 𝑣, or 𝜎𝑣
2. These are the unconditional mean and 
variance of 𝑣. As 𝜎𝑠
2 goes to zero (a stronger signal), 𝐸 [𝑣|𝑠] goes to 𝑠 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣|𝑠) goes to zero. 
The uninformed trader does not have any private signal. Therefore, by definition, his expectation 
is not based on private information. Rather the uninformed trader gathers all his information from 
price, which, in equilibrium, has imbedded in it, information from the informed trader’s trades. 
What the uninformed trader would like to know is the additional information afforded to the 
informed trader, the signal 𝑠. To utilize price to make inferences about the informed trader’s signal 
𝑠, the uninformed trader can use the proposed pricing rule – the parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 – to transform 
                                                          
90  Kyle’s (1985) model introduces many of the modelling concepts utilized in our own study. Insofar as the Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) model is concerned the review here functions only to highlight key intuition. Naturally, this obviates explicit exposition of 
their results. However, for the sake of comprehensiveness, we illustrate broadly, the procedure used to derive the above results. 
Herewith, note the following: With normally distributed random variables, conditional expectations are normally distributed and 
take a convenient form. Specifically, define the following: 
𝑦 = ?̅? + 𝜀0 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛, 
Where the variable y is the variable of interest and the variable 𝑥𝑖 are signals of y. Let each 𝜀𝑖,  𝑖 = 0, … , 𝑛, be independently and 
normally distributued 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑖
2). Then 𝐸[𝑦 |𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛] =
?̅?𝜎0
−2+𝑥1𝜎1
−2+⋯+𝑥𝑛𝜎𝑛
−2
𝜎0
−2+𝜎1
−2+⋯+𝜎𝑛
−2  and 𝑉[𝑦 |𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛] =
1
𝜎0
−2+𝜎1
−2+⋯+𝜎𝑛
−2
, and these two 
moments fully charecterise the conditional expectation because the conditional distribution is normal. Consider the simplicity: The 
mean of the posterior distribution is the sum of the prior and signals, each weighted by its own precision (the inverse of its own 
variance), divided by the sum of the precisions. The conditional variance is just one over the sum of the precisions. 
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price 𝑝 into information that is distributed about 𝑠. Specifically, using the pricing rule 𝑝 = 𝛼𝑠 −
𝛽𝑋, the uninformed trader divides the price 𝑝 that he observes by 𝛼, yielding: 
𝑝
𝛼
= 𝑠 − (
𝛽
𝛼
)𝑋. 
This variable 
𝑝
𝛼
 is distributed around a mean of 𝑠, which is the information the uninformed trader 
wants to ascertain. For notational convenience, we will use 𝐾 to denote this information: 
𝐾 =
𝑝
𝛼
= 𝑠 − (
𝛽
𝛼
)𝑋. 
 
Because 𝑠~𝑁(𝑣, 𝜎𝑠
2), 𝑋~𝑁(0,2𝜎𝑋
2), and 𝑠 and 𝑋 are independent, we can summise that 𝐾 is 
normally distributed about 𝑣 with variance 𝜎𝑘
2 = 𝜎𝑠
2 + 2(
𝛽
𝛼
)
2
𝜎𝑋
2. ("~" means distributed). With 
this value for 𝜎𝐾
2, the uninformed trader’s posterior distribution is normally distributed about 
𝑣 with  
𝐸 [𝑣|𝑝, 𝛼, 𝛽] = (
𝜎𝑘
−2
𝜎𝑘
−2 + 𝜎𝑣−2
)𝐾 
and,  
𝑉𝑎𝑟 [𝑣|𝑝, 𝛼, 𝛽] = (
1
𝜎𝑘
−2 + 𝜎𝑣−2
). 
Knowledge of 𝛼 and 𝛽 – the coeficients of the pricing rule – is crucial to the uninformed trader’s 
inference. Because both traders are assumed to be non-strategic (i.e., take prices as given), neither 
trader conditions on the realization of his own endowment – 𝑋𝐼 and 𝑋𝑈, respectively. We discuss 
the assumption of non-strategic behaviour in more detail below. 
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4.5.4 Demand 
From the analysis above, we know that both traders’ posterior distributions are normal. Thus, we 
can express each trader’s demand in a simple fashion. Given that expected returns conditional on 
available information are still normally distributed, and our exponential utility specification, the 
demand functions for the informed trader 𝐷𝐼 and the uninformed trader 𝐷𝑈 – in units of the risky 
asset, e.g., shares or currency – take the following form:91 
 
𝐷𝐼 =
𝐸 [𝑣|𝑠] − 𝑝
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣|𝑠)
 
                                                                                                                                           (4.5.3) 
𝐷𝑈 =
𝐸 [𝑣|𝑝, 𝛼, 𝛽] − 𝑝
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣|𝑝, 𝛼, 𝛽)
 
Note in equation (4.5.3) the information role that price plays in the demand of the uninformed 
trader (it enters in the conditional expectation and conditional variance). Inserting the values for 
𝐸 [𝑣|𝑠] and 𝑉𝑎𝑟 [𝑣|𝑠]  into this expression for 𝐷𝐼 and 𝐷𝑈 results in equation (4.5.4): 
 
𝐷𝐼 = (𝜎𝑠
−2)𝑠 − (𝜎𝑠
−2 + 𝜎𝑣
−2)𝑝 
                                                                                                                                (4.5.4) 
𝐷𝑈 = (𝜎𝐾
−2)𝐾 − (𝜎𝐾
−2 + 𝜎𝑣
−2)𝑝 
                                                          
91 With respect to the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), we consider only the key intuition underlying their model. Given that our own 
study is based on Kyle (1985), the explicit determination of equation (4.5.3) falls beyond the scope of this thesis.We refer interested 
readers to Lyons (2001), in particular the Appendix to Chapter 4, where he explicitly derives these demand functions.  
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4.5.5 Market-Clearing Price 
The market-clearing price is determined by equating demand with supply so that no excess demand 
exists (i.e., excess demand equals zero): 
𝐷𝐼 + 𝐷𝑈 = 𝑋 
Inserting our expression from equation (4.5.4) for 𝐷𝐼 and 𝐷𝑈 in this market-clearing condition 
yields a price of 
 
                                                               𝑝 = 𝛼𝑠 − 𝛽𝑋,                                                     (4.5.5) 
 
where 
 
𝛼 = (
𝜎𝐾
−2 + 𝜎𝑠
−2
𝜎𝐾
−2 + 𝜎𝑠−2 + 2𝜎𝑣−2
) 
 
𝛽 = (
1
𝜎𝐾
−2(1 − 𝛼−1) + 𝜎𝑠−2 + 2𝜎𝑣−2
) 
 
Recall that 𝜎𝐾
2 = 𝜎𝑠
2 + 2(
𝛽
𝛼
)
2
𝜎𝑋
2. These values for 𝛼 and 𝛽 ensure that excess demand equals zero 
for all random variable realizations, which fulfils condition (2) above for rational expectations 
equilibrium. To fulfil equilibrium condition (1) above, we imposed in our derivation of these 
coefficient values, that the pricing rule used to form expectations is the actual rule used to 
determine price. Thus, using the method of undetermined coefficients, we have verified what we 
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set out to verify: that the conjectured pricing rule in equation (4.5.2) describes a rational 
expectations equilibrium. 
This equilibrium is partially revealing, a fact taken out of the uninformed trader’s expectation. 
Specifically, the uninformed trader does not know as much in equilibrium as the informed trader, 
as shown by the distribution of posterior expectations. Recall that the variance of the informed 
trader’s posterior expectation is 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 [𝑣|𝑠] = (
1
𝜎𝑠−2 + 𝜎𝑣−2
), 
 
and the variance of the uninformed trader’s posterior expectation is 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 [𝑣|𝑝, 𝛼, 𝛽] = (
1
𝜎𝑘
−2 + 𝜎𝑣−2
) 
The only difference is the replacement of 𝜎𝑠
2 with 𝜎𝐾
2, where 𝜎𝐾
2 has a value of 𝜎𝑠
2 + 2(
𝛽
𝛼
)
2
𝜎𝑋
2. 
Because 2 (
𝛽
𝛼
)
2
𝜎𝑋
2 must be positive, 𝜎𝐾
2 must be larger than 𝜎𝑠
2, so the variance of the uninformed 
trader’s posterior expectation is larger. 
 
 
 
104 
 
  
4.5.6 Limitations of the Grossman-Stiglitz Model 
We close this description of the model by discussing some drawbacks of Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) model – and rational expectations models in general. 
4.5.6.1. The Implicit Auctioneer 
 
The Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) model is not explicit about who sets prices. Like many other rational 
expectations models, the fiction of an implicit, Walrasian auctioneer is suggested. The Walrasian 
auctioneer is the traditional way to envision how prices are actually set in rational expectations 
models. The implicit auctioneer collects the ‘preliminary orders’ (Lyons, 2001), and uses them to 
find the model’s market-clearing price. Without this narrative in the background, there is no way 
to understand how price is actually determined in real time. Strictly speaking, the model only 
requires that price clears the market and is consistent with expectations.92  
4.5.6.2. Nonstrategic Behaviour  
 
The demand function in equation (4.5.3) suggests that the informed trader takes the current price 
as given. The informed trader does not exploit the fact that his trade has a direct effect on that price 
(however, by definition, expectations are validated in equilibrium). The effect that individuals’ 
trades have on price is not negligible, but these traders behave like perfect competitors (price 
takers) nonetheless. 
 
                                                          
92 The Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) version of the model has a finite number of traders 𝑖 = 𝑖, … , 𝑛, so the assumption of perfectly 
competitive behaviour is less problematic than in the two trader case presented here (but still a bit of a stretch). One commonly 
used technique to avoid this issue is to assume that the informed and uninformed represent separate continuums of traders, so that 
no single trader has a measurable impact on price. See Lyons (2001, p 288). 
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4.5.6.3. Knowledge of Pricing Rule 
We can see from the model that the uninformed trader needs to condition his demand on the pricing 
rule – the variables 𝛼 and 𝛽. However, practically speaking, one cannot determine how the 
uninformed trader acquires such knowledge as it remains unspecified in the model. 
The drawbacks discussed above are addressed in the model that follows. Regarding the first count, 
Kyle’s (1985) model addresses the act of setting price explicitly. The second and third drawbacks 
are also largely assuaged by the Kyle model. For example, it incorporates strategic behaviour. 
Moreover, the model does not rely on a pricing rule conjecture. Instead, an explicit market maker 
is introduced; who optimises his behaviour subject to the constraints imposed by the model. This 
will become evident as the chapter proceeds.  
 
4.6 THE KYLE AUCTION MODEL 
The Kyle (1985) model and the rational expectations models are closely related. Both have an 
auction market structure, and at the centre of both is a pricing rule that is consistent with 
expectations. The key conceptual difference is that the Kyle model includes an explicit auctioneer 
(market maker) rather than an implicit one. This changes the nature of the pricing rule because the 
act of price setting is now assigned to an agent within the model (a discussion on this will follow). 
Notwithstanding the key conceptual contribution of an explicit auctioneer, the Kyle model 
generates many other novel insights – insights relative to the rational expectations model.  
Before we formally introduce the model, some of these insights merit a discussion.  
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Insights 
Three of the most important insights generated include: 
1. Market makers earn zero profits. This assumption is consistent with free entry of competing 
market makers, a condition under which the single market maker cannot exercise monopoly power. 
(This zero profit condition is important to the model and is shared by many other models within 
microstructure.) Here, market makers are simply vote counters, not analysts of fundamentals; and 
the votes they count are the order flows. 
2. Market makers are unable to differentiate between informed and uninformed orders. Informed 
traders can then use this to great advantage. 
3. Market efficiency, market liquidity and price discovery are deeply related.  
Though the model itself will enrich each of these insights, let us offer a few thoughts on insight 
(3). 
The notion that prices in financial markets reflect and convey information is axiomatic within the 
realm of finance and is enshrined in the theory of market efficiency (Fama, 1970).93 Hayek (1945) 
wrote eloquently on this function of prices in sharing information among economic participants. 
He described prices as a form of communication, enabling all decision makers to alter their 
behaviour due to the essential information contained in one measure, price. 
However, when economists speak of a capital markets being efficient, they are usually referring 
to the extent to which prices reflect available information (Alagidede & Panagiotidis, 2009). If we 
consider that asset prices are determined by the outcome of supply and demand, then in a 
                                                          
93 The concept of market efficiency emanates from Fama’s (1970) academic doctrine of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. 
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competitive market, traders are expected to rapidly assimilate any new information that is relevant 
to the determination of asset prices, and prices should adjusting accordingly (Alagidede, 2008). 
The way in which prices adjust to this new information (or discover this new information) is aptly 
named the price discovery process.  
The literature suggests that market liquidity is crucial to the price discovery process. 
Concomitantly, market liquidity can also be considered crucial for stock market efficiency (Lyons, 
2001). Accordingly, a market is liquid in the sense that almost any amount of stock can be bought 
and sold immediately, and a market is efficient in the sense that small amounts of stock can always 
be bought and sold very near the current market price, and in the case of large amounts, can be 
bought or sold over long periods of time at prices that are (on average), very near the current 
market price (Black, 1971). 
By showing the relation between liquidity, price discovery and market efficiency, Kyle’s model 
has a fascinating message. The basic idea is that in efficient markets there are forces pushing to 
keep liquidity from moving predictably over time. More precisely, Kyle is able to determine that 
predictable variation in liquidity in an efficient market should not be ‘large enough’ to generate 
excessive risk-adjusted returns.  
Although the above discussion serves well as an introductory note, we may have ‘jumped the gun’ 
somewhat by presenting preliminary results before presenting the model itself. Readers who find 
the above description more challenging should consider that this insight is thoroughly addressed 
at the end of the review below. 
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4.6.1 Model Overview 
As clarified below, the Kyle (1985) model is a natural extension of the Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) model in that it addresses the act of setting price explicitly. This is achieved by introducing 
an actual market maker to replace the hypothetical auctioneer of the rational expectations model. 
Kyle’s market maker uses order flow information to determine the market clearing price. Also, 
because the protocol that governs trading is fully specified in the Kyle model (in contrast to the 
rational expectations model) this model produces an intimate link between trading protocol and 
price determination – a hallmark of microstructure modelling.  
The second key extension made by the Kyle model relative to its rational expectations counterpart, 
is that Kyle’s model follows a more game-theoretic set-up.94 In this respect, Kyle’s equilibrium 
can be characterised as a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE).  
The aforementioned ‘Bayesian’ reference emanates from game-theoretic nomenclature and has 
been used to indicate market maker’s use of Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs (Bayes’ updating 
model is formally addressed in the overview of the model itself – below).  
Before we define the constituent elements of a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), consider the 
following: specifically, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium concept is the second of two competing 
equilibrium concepts addressed in this theoretical overview – namely; the Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) Rational Expectations Equilibrium concept and Kyle’s (1985) Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 
concept respectively.  
                                                          
94 Essentially, Kyle’s model extends the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model in two ways: (1) abandons the implicit Walrasian 
auctioneer and (2) introduces a game-theoretic set-up. 
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We expand briefly on the key conceptual differences between these two types of equilibrium 
below. This should provide the premise for the discussion to follow, where we explore Kyle’s 
specific Bayesian Nash Equilibrium model in more detail.  
Consider the following exert from Brunnermeier (2001), highlighting the conceptual difference 
between a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) and a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE): 
In a REE, all traders behave competitively, that is, they are price takers. They take the 
price correspondence, a mapping from the information sets of all traders into the price 
space as given. In a BNE, agents take the strategies of all other players, and not the 
equilibrium price correspondence, as given (p.14).  
 
Accordingly, the game-theoretic BNE concept provides a useful theoretical framework from which 
to analyse the strategic interactions that occur in a market in which traders take their price impact 
into consideration. Precisely, in the context of Kyle’s BNE, the informed trader takes into account 
the effect his orders have on the resulting price. This contrasts the preceding REE model of 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), where the informed trader does not take his price impact into 
account (we can see from equation 4.5.3 of the previous model that the informed trader takes the 
market price as given, and thus does not consider the effect that his demand has on equilibrium 
price). 
Kyle (1985) obtains a perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium by considering (1) that market-makers 
set prices based on their Bayesian interpretation of the information they obtain (expanded on 
below), and (2) that the informed trader chooses a demand function that maximises expected 
profits given his expectation of the impact of his order on the market price (this is also explicitly 
addressed with the respective notation below)   
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Kyle’s BNE is probably best explained by illustrating the steps needed to derive the corresponding 
equilibrium. It should, however, be pointed out from the outset that the work within game theory 
in general (and BNE in particular) is so extensive that in a single section, there is simply not enough 
room present these steps in detail. Moreover, given that these precepts are adequately addressed 
in later chapters (namely, by the specific models of this thesis), a more comprehensive exposition 
of the topic cannot be justified here – no additional utility can be gained by providing a more 
detailed delineation of the steps involved in the derivation of a BNE.  Instead, the primary goal of 
the proceeding discussion can be accomplished by presenting a coherent overview or roadmap that 
communicates the underlying economics of the model as effectively as possible. As noted, clarity 
on the underlying economics is crucial for understanding the later sections applications.  
For the sake of descriptive convenience, the manual to follow (Box 4.6) presents a synoptic 
overview of the steps involved in the derivation of a BNE and is based on the work of 
Brunnermeier (2001), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).  
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BOX 4.6: OVERVIEW OF THE STEPS INVOLVED IN THE DERIVATION OF A BAYESIAN NASH 
EQUILIBRIUM. SOURCE: BRUNNERMEIER (2001), FUDENBERG AND TIROLE (1991), OSBORNE 
AND RUBINSTEIN (1994). 
 
Before extending our analysis to Kyle’s (1985) seminal BNE model, we illustrates (broadly) the steps involved in the derivation of 
a BNE.  
 
BOX 4.6:  Overview of the steps involved in the derivation of a BNE 
 
Introduction: 
A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is a term used in game theory to describe an equilibrium where 
each player's strategy is optimal given the strategies of all other players. This game-theoretic 
approach allows one to model the strategic interactions that emerge between traders when 
they take their price impact into account. Here, agents take the strategies of all other players, 
and not the equilibrium price correspondence, as given.95 Concisely, a BNE is formed by a 
proﬁle of strategies of all players from which no single player wants to deviate. 
Steps in the derivation of equilibrium 
Step 1: Specify the players’ prior beliefs and conjecture a strategy profile for each player. 
More speciﬁcally, propose a whole set of proﬁles described either by a proﬁle of general 
                                                          
95 In a REE, all traders take the price correspondence as given. Brunnermeier (2001) asserts that the term price correspondence 
refers to “a mapping from the information sets of all traders into the price space” (p.14). Accordingly, a fundamental difference 
between a BNE and a REE is that in a BNE, agents take the strategies of all other players, and not the equilibrium price 
correspondence, as given. Herewith, by assuming that the strategies of all the other players are given, a player can choose his 
optimal strategy. 
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functions or by undetermined coefﬁcients.96These proﬁles also determine the joint 
probability distributions between players’ prior beliefs, their information, and other 
endogenous variables like other traders’ actions, demand, and prices.  
Step 2: Update all players’ beliefs using Bayes’ rule and the joint probability distribution, 
which depends on the proposed set of strategy proﬁles, for example the undetermined 
coefﬁcients. 
Step 3: Derive each individual player’s optimal response given the conjectured strategies of 
all other players and the market clearing conditions. 
Step 4: If the best responses of all players coincide with the conjectured strategy proﬁle, 
nobody will want to deviate. Hence, the conjectured strategy proﬁle is a BNE.  In other 
words, the BNE is a ﬁxed point in strategy proﬁles. If one focuses only on equilibria in linear 
strategies, the proposed set of strategy proﬁles can be best characterized by undetermined 
coefﬁcients. Each player’s best response depends on the coefﬁcients in the conjectured 
strategy proﬁle. The BNE is then derived by equating the conjectured coefﬁcients with the 
ones from the best response. 
 
Kyle’s specific Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is explored in more detail below.  
                                                          
96 The “method of undetermined coefficients” (sometimes referred to as the method of judicious guessing) is a systematic way to 
determine the general form/type of the particular solution, say, 𝑌(𝑡) based on the non-homogeneous term, say, 𝑔(𝑡) in a given 
equation. The basic idea is that many of the most familiar and commonly encountered functions have derivatives that vary little (in 
the form/type of function) from their parent functions. Consequently, when those functions appear in 𝑔(𝑡), we can predict the type 
of function that the solution 𝑌 would be. The steps are synoptically discussed below: Write down the (best guess) form of 𝑌, leaving 
the coefficient(s) undetermined. Then compute 𝑌’ and 𝑌’’, put them into the equation, and solve for the unknown coefficient(s). 
Note that one can expect the model itself to clarify how this idea works in practice. 
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A Comment on Notation 
Another caveat seems pertinent before we continue to Kyle’s (1985) model. As emphasised above, 
the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model falls under the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) 
framework. Conversely, Kyle (1985) utilises the more game-theoretic, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 
(BNE) set-up. Relatively speaking, these two modelling approaches differ quite considerably in 
terms of notation.  
Insofar as our review of the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model is concerned, we had to alter 
some of the models original notation in order to align it with Kyle’s. This consideration emerged 
from the fact that the remaining model(s) of this thesis build on his framework.  
For the sake of easy reference, Kyle’s explicit notation will be used throughout the remaining 
chapters of this thesis. Again, this is because our own analysis is aligned with, and builds on Kyle 
(1985). 
4.6.2 The Model  
The following ‘one-period version’97 of the Kyle’s (1985) auction model is a workhorse within the 
microstructure literature. The beauty of this model can be seen by its inherent simplicity. As a 
result, the model has become the benchmark of all microstructure models and has given rise to a 
whole strand of discourse and commentary that has tested and extended its predictions. Notably, 
the survey here introduces many of the modelling concepts utilized in our own study.  
                                                          
97 The preceding Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model also considered a single period model. 
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The model has three types of players. Particularly, an informed trader trades against a price setting 
competitive market maker, in the presence of uninformed traders.98 Here, traders trade two assets: 
a risk-free asset (bond) with zero interest rate and a risky asset (stock).99  
Kyle (1985) begins by assuming that the risky asset to be traded has an ex-post payoff of 𝑣 where 
the value is drawn according to 𝑣~𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2). As evidenced below, nature selects a true value 𝑣 
from a prior normal distribution 𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2) for the traded asset. Effectively, the ex-post liquidation 
value of the risky asset is its true/fundamental value and is a normally distributed random variable 
with initial mean 𝑝0 and variance 𝜎𝑣
2.  
Note here that Kyle assumes that all players are risk neutral. Although not ostensibly intuitive, the 
assumption of risk neutrality means that 𝑝0 also typifies the initial stock price (Chen, 2016). (We 
suggest that this insight can only be fully appreciated following a detailed exposition of the model 
itself – to follow.) 
                                                          
98 Uninformed traders are often recorded as noise traders in the literature. Noise traders are liquidity motivated, smoothing their 
inter-temporal consumption stream through portfolio adjustment. Regardless of how one chooses to define noise traders, one can 
safely assume that they trade for reasons exogenous to the given model. Bagehot (1971) provides a detailed discussion on the topic. 
99 The majority of microstructure models include a risk-free asset (e.g. a riskless bond). Because risky asset demand is independent 
of wealth, in order for each individual’s demand to be feasible, then each individual must be able to borrow and lend at the risk-
free interest rate without constraint (Lyons, 2001). However, its economic role is trivial and some models omit it from exposition. 
We include it because Kyle includes it. 
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In Kyle’s canonical version of the model, a single (risk neutral) information monopolist is the only 
one who has private information about the risky asset 𝑣, in the form of a signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒.100 
Strictly speaking, the informed trader has some uncertainty over 𝑣 (in the form of noise 𝑒). 
Nevertheless, he remains an ‘informed trader’ because he has more information on 𝑣 than the other 
traders.  
Knowledge of 𝑣 (in the form of a signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒) forms part of the informed traders private 
information, its prior distribution (mean and variance) is however, publically available (this will 
also be clarified as the model description continues). 
Noise traders are assumed to trade for purely exogenous reasons. The quantity traded by noise 
traders, denoted u, is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝑢
2: 𝑢~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
The random variables v and u are independently distributed. The quantity traded by the informed 
trader is denoted 𝑥 and the price is denoted 𝑝.  
 
 
                                                          
100 As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the primary aim of this review would have been accomplished by presenting a 
coherent framework that readers can use for navigating further sections. We stress that clarity on the underlying economics of each 
model is crucial for understanding the later sections applications. The following must then be noted: In Kyle’s original (1985) 
model, the informed trader has private information about the risky asset, 𝑣, in the form of a signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒. However, given the 
formal objective of this overview, only the simple (less general) version of Kyle’s model will be discussed. Case in point, in this 
chapters’ review of the Kyles model, it is assumed that 𝑒 the error in the informed traders signal is negligible (i.e., 𝑒 = 0). This 
assumption is made solely for the sake of analytical convenience and has no conceptual implications. With regards to its RE 
counterpart/predecessor, the rationale for this assumption is simple, and a single statement is suggestive of the narrative to follow: 
the crucial extension of the Kyle model has nothing to do with the informed investors signal, rather, Kyle’s model extends the 
rational expectations model by abandoning the implicit Walrasian auctioneer (replacing this hypothetical agent with an explicit 
market maker) and having a game-theoretic set-up. We should remark however, that in order to enhance the comprehensiveness of 
this thesis, a more general case of Kyles model i.e., where 𝑒 > 0  is presented in Appendix III at the end of this thesis.   
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4.6.2.1. Conditions for Equilibrium – Formal Definitions 
 
Formally, the Nash equilibrium studied in Kyle (1985) is defined by two functions: the informed 
traders trading strategy 𝑋(∙) , and the market maker’s pricing function 𝑃(∙). In equilibrium, these 
two functions have to satisfy two conditions; (1) a profit maximisation condition and (2) a market 
efficiency condition. In other words, an equilibrium in this model is defined as a pricing rule 
chosen by the market maker and a trading strategy chosen by the informed trader such that: the 
informed trader maximizes expected profits, given the market maker’s pricing rule; the market 
maker sets the price to earn zero expected profits,101 given the trading strategy of the informed 
trader.  
For analytical consistency, Kyle’s explicit notation is employed in the explanation below. 
Specifically, in the Kyle model, 𝑋(∙) denotes the informed traders strategy, and 𝑥, the informed 
traders trading quantity. Likewise, 𝑃(∙) denotes the market makers pricing function, and 𝑝, the 
price set by the market maker.  
We should explain here that very specific functional form assumptions underlie Kyle’s analysis. 
More precisely, by assuming that the relevant random variables are normally distributed Kyle’s 
model acquires a tractable linear structure. Indeed, under these assumptions (that 𝑢 and 𝑣 are 
independent random variables) Kyle proves that there is a linear solution for his strategic game.  
                                                          
101 It is assumed that market making is a perfectly competitive profession, so that the market maker sets the price 𝑝 such that, given 
the total order submitted, his profit at the end of the period is expected to be zero. Again, market makers are simply vote counters, 
not analysts of fundamentals; and the votes they count are the order flows. The assumption that market makers earn zero profit is 
important to the model and is shared by many other models within microstructure (Lyons 2001). Crucially, this zero profit 
assumption satisfies the market efficiency condition described above – condition (2). 
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In order to provide some contextual perspective, we expand on the topic of linear equilibria below. 
Kyle’s solution technique (the method used to solve for equilibrium) is addressed in what follows. 
Linear Equilibrium 
Regarding the existence of a linear equilibrium in the Kyle model, a single statement is suggestive 
of the narrative to follow: Kyle (1985) ostensibly permits 𝑋 to be a mixed strategy,102 but then 
suggests that mixed strategies are not optimal in the equilibrium he describes.103 Since mixed 
strategies are not optimal in equilibrium, Kyle (1985) justifies a more intuitive interpretation of  𝑋 
as a measurable function of 𝑣, such that 𝑥 = 𝑋(𝑣). Note that the technical aspects of this notation 
will be refined below - by the model itself. 
At the risk of over simplifying matters, one can safely argue that Kyle’s aforementioned 
interpretation of 𝑋,104 effectively rules out nonlinear trading strategies. Indeed, in his proof of 
Theorem 1, Kyle (1985) writes: “The quadratic objective (implied by a linear pricing rule 𝑃) makes 
linear strategies optimal even when nonlinear strategies are allowed” (p. 1319).  
Kyle’s Solution Procedure  
As noted, Kyle’s proof has been premised on the existence of a linear equilibrium. In order to 
support Kyle’s dictum of a linear solution, his model relies on a solution technique known in the 
                                                          
102 In some situations a player may want to randomise between several actions. If a player chooses which action to play randomly, 
we say that the player is using a mixed strategy, as opposed to a pure strategy. In a pure strategy the player chooses an action for 
sure, whereas in a mixed strategy, he chooses a probability distribution over the set of actions available to him or her (Pekar 2008, 
p.16). Since mixed strategies do not feature in the model we have been succinct in describing the term. For a detailed discussion 
on the topic of mixed strategies in game theory consult Rasmusen (2001). See also, Brunnermeier (2001), Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1991), Osborne and Rubenstein (1994) and Vives (2010). 
103 With regards to the discussion above, Kyle only claims to find one equilibrium, which he does, and it does not involve a mixed 
strategy. 
104 Namely; 𝑥 = 𝑋(𝑣). 
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literature as ‘conjecture and verify’ (Brunnermeier, 2001; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991; Osborne & 
Rubensteim, 1994; Vives, 2001). Simply put, Kyle ‘conjectures’ linear strategies for both the 
informed trader and the market maker and only then ‘verifies’ that these conjectures are actually 
the best response to one another’s strategies.105   
Specifically, Kyle’s standard solution method is based on conjecturing a price strategy for the 
market maker that is a linear function of aggregate order flow and a trading (demand) strategy for 
the informed trader that is a linear function of his private information and then verifying that such 
conjectures are consistent with equilibrium. Because all conjectures will be linear combinations of 
functions in which the coefficients are ‘constants to be determined’, this entire approach to finding 
particular solutions is formally called the method of undetermined coefficients.106 
The question as to whether there are linear equilibria when traders employ nonlinear strategies is 
an interesting one. On this topic, Boulatov, Kyle and Livdan (2012) have suggested that the linear 
equilibrium in the single-period trading model of Kyle (1985) is unique;107 implying that equilibria 
with a nonlinear structure cannot actually exist in the Kyle setting.  
Boulatov et al., (2012) analyse Kyle’s a one-period model where the risk-neutral informed trader 
can use arbitrary (linear or non-linear) strategies, and the market maker can use arbitrary pricing 
rules. These authors are able prove that the standard linear informed trader’s trading strategy, and 
correspondingly, the linear pricing rule, lead to the unique equilibrium in the model.  
                                                          
105 Kyle conjectures linear strategies for both the informed trader and the market maker and then verifies that such conjectures are 
consistent with equilibrium – i.e., the conjectured linear strategies form each player’s best response to the other player’s strategy. 
In Kyle’s explicit formulation, the term optimal is referenced in order to convey the best response principal. See steps 3 and 4 in 
Box 4.6, where we highlight the meaning behind best response.  
106 Less formally, it is also called the method of (educated) guess. 
107 See Boulatov, Kyle and Livdan (2012) for a lucid description of what it means for an equilibrium to be ‘unique’. 
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Such validation (of Kyle’s unique equilibrium) has significantly simplified subsequent analyses’ 
– analyses’ that utilise the Kyle’s framework. Consequently, all models based on the Kyle 
framework conjecture and verify only linear trading and pricing rules respectively. 
Kyle’s standard linear solution is mathematically rigorous and requires further analysis. Note 
however, that our model(s), to follow, conform to Kyle’s linear equilibrium condition and should 
be seen as a substitute for explicit proof here (see Chapter 5).  
4.6.2.2. Some Intuition for Kyle’s Equilibrium  
 
In Kyle’s BNE nature moves first by selecting a ‘true value’108 (v) from a prior normal 
distribution 𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2) for the traded asset, and by selecting a demand quantity u from a prior 
normal distribution 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) for the noise traders.109 
Since the noise traders’ order is exogenous, we need only to consider the optimal actions of the 
market maker and the informed trader. 
                                                          
108 In a simple model where the stock pays a one-time liquidation dividend, the true value corresponds to the (random) amount of 
the liquidation dividend. If the stock can be traded more than once, then v may represent the resale value at the next trading date. 
109 Again, the latter (noise traders) may be irrational traders acting on noise rather than information (Black, 1986) or liquidity 
traders who do not have time discretion i.e., nondiscretionary liquidity traders (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). In any case, one can 
assume that noise traders’ trade for reasons exogenous to the model. Since v and u are independent, the noise traders’ trading 
behaviour, u, contains no information regarding the true value (v) of the stock.  
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As discussed above, the single (risk neutral) informed trader is the only one who has private 
information about the risky asset 𝑣, in the form of a single signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒.110   
In the context of the model the uninformed traders and the informed trader simultaneously submit 
market orders to the market maker to be executed at a single market-clearing price 𝑝. Thus, the 
submitted orders are of two kinds: the order from the informed trader, 𝑥, and orders from the 
uninformed traders, 𝑢. (If 𝑢 is negative then the uninformed are, on balance, selling.) The informed 
trader does not observe 𝑢 before submitting his order 𝑥. (Effectively, this precludes the informed 
trader from conditioning on the market-clearing price, a stark contrast from the rational 
expectations model, where all trades are conditioned on the market clearing price.)  
For setting the price 𝑝, the market maker observes only the sum of two types of orders, 𝑥 + 𝑢. The 
term 𝑦 is used to denote the aggregate order flow 𝑥 + 𝑢. Here 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢.  
Contextually, conditional on 𝑦, the market maker determines a price, 𝑝, at which he will clear the 
entire order. That is, 
𝑝 = 𝑃(𝑦) ,       𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢 
                                                          
110 Consider the following narrative:  In Kyle’s original (1985) model, the informed trader has private information about the risky 
asset, 𝑣, in the form of a signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒. However, given the formal objective of this overview, only a simple (less general) 
version of Kyle’s model will be depicted here. More specifically, in this chapters review of the Kyle model, it is assumed that 𝑒, 
the error in the informed traders signal is negligible (i.e., 𝑒 = 0). A more general case of Kyles model i.e., where 𝑒 > 0  is presented 
in appendix III. That noted, the structure of the informed trader’s private information (e.g., whether or not the informed trader 
observes 𝑣 perfectly or with noise) is not crucial. As articulated by Rochet and Vila (1994): “Given that all traders are assumed to 
be risk-neutral it is only needed that the information structures be nested i.e., that the informed trader knows more than the market” 
(p.132).  
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The market maker’s pricing rule (the terms rule and strategy are used interchangeably throughout) 
is pinned down by the assumption that he expects to earn a profit of zero.  
This assumption (that market makers earn zero profits) is important to the model and is shared by 
many other models within microstructure.111 In Kyle maker market makers are simply vote 
counters and not analysts of fundamentals (the order flow represents the votes counted by the 
market maker)  Expected profit of zero implies that the market maker sets the equilibrium price 𝑝 
as a function of 𝑥 + 𝑢 such that  
                                                                𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑥 + 𝑢]                                                 (4.6.1) 
Price depends on this sum because the market maker does not observe 𝑥 and 𝑢 individually. As 
noted, the market maker observes only the total order flow 𝑥 + 𝑢, but not 𝑥 or 𝑢 separately.112 The 
𝑢 component of this sum is determined exogenously, simplifying inference. The complication 
comes from the 𝑥 component, which depends on the strategy of the informed trader.  
The informed trader in Kyle is both risk neutral and strategic. Strategic trading involves 
conditioning on the behavior of other agents, both the uninformed and market maker’s (a standard 
game-theoretic definition of strategic behavior). 
Specifically, the informed trader takes into account the effect of his orders on price. This contrasts 
the preceding rational expectations model (as evidenced by equation 4.5.3 above, the informed 
trader in the Grossman and Stiglitz model takes the market price as given, and thus does not 
consider the effect that his demand has on equilibrium price). 
                                                          
111 According to Kyle the perfect competition among market makers ensures that no market maker can exercise monopoly power. 
112 The total order flow 𝑥 + 𝑢 is denoted by the term 𝑦; whereby 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢.  Given that the market maker observes only 𝑦 (the 
aggregate order flow) equation (4.6.1) above can also be expressed as 𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦]. 
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Because the informed trader in the Kyle model is risk neutral he will choose a trading strategy that 
maximises his expected end-of-period profits.113 More precisely, under the assumption of risk 
neutrality, risk is not considered in the optimal behaviour of the agent as maximising expected 
profits and expected utility are equivalent (De-Jong & Rindi, 2009).114 It follows that the informed 
trader’s problem is to determine the optimal purchase (or sale) of quantity 𝑥.  
His objective function is given by 
                                                𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥
 𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] = 𝐸[(𝑣 − 𝑝)𝑥]                                            (4.6.2) 
The interaction between the market maker’s problem and the informed trader’s problem is clear 
from the last two equations (4.6.1 and 4.6.2). The market makers pricing rule depends on the 
contribution of 𝑥 to order flow, but the informed trader’s choice of 𝑥 depends on the impact orders 
have on the market maker’s price 𝑝. This problem is known as circularity and is resolved in 
equilibrium. 
4.6.2.3 Solving for Equilibrium 
 
In Box (4.6) we provide a manual on how to derive a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Thus, to derive 
Kyle’s Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, let us follow the steps highlighted above in Box (4.6). The 
first step is to propose linear equilibrium strategies for both the informed trader and the market 
maker. (As noted, Kyle focuses only on equilibria in linear strategies i.e., he conjectures linear 
                                                          
113 Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the expected utility of end-of-period profits is simply equal to expected end-of-period 
profits.  
114 With an exponential utility function, we obtain: 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸[𝑈(𝜋𝑖)] = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 [𝐸(𝜋𝑖) − (
𝐴
2
)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑖)]. Adding risk neutrality (𝐴 = 0), 
maximisation of expected utility simplifies to maximisation of expected profits. 
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strategies for both the informed trader and the market maker and then verifies that these conjectures 
are actually the best response to one another’s strategies).115   
Let the proposed linear strategy for the informed trader be 𝑋(𝑣) = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0) and for the market 
maker be 𝑃(𝑦) =  𝑝0 + 𝜆𝑦.  
We follow convention here and use 𝑋(𝑣) = 𝑥 = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0) and 𝑃(𝑦) = 𝑝 =  𝑝0 + 𝜆𝑦 to denote 
the informed trader and the market makers’ strategy/rule respectively.116 (Recall that 𝑥 denotes the 
informed trader’s traded quantity and 𝑋 is his trading strategy, likewise 𝑝 denotes the equilibrium 
price set by the market maker and 𝑃, the market maker’s pricing rule – the notation is Kyle’s).  
An equilibrium is defined to be an 𝑋(𝑣) and 𝑃(𝑦) which simultaneously satisfy 
conditions/equations (4.6.1) and (4.6.2).  
Because the coefficients 𝛽 and λ will only be determined in equilibrium, we know that Kyle relies 
on the method of undetermined coefficients to solve for equilibrium. 
The informed trader maximises his expected trading profit 𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] = 𝐸[(𝑣 − 𝑝)𝑥|𝑣], where he 
takes into account the fact that according to his beliefs, 𝑝 = 𝑝0 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢). His optimal stock 
holding is then given by 𝑥 = (
1
2𝜆
)(𝑣 − 𝑝0) 
Recall, the market maker observes the aggregate net order flow 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢. Given his beliefs about 
the informed trader’s trading strategy, 𝑋(𝑣) =  𝑥 = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0), the market maker tries to infer the 
value of the stock 𝑣 from 𝑦. We should emphasise that very specific functional form assumptions 
underlie Kyle’s analysis here.  
                                                          
115 Because all conjectures will be linear combinations of functions in which the coefficients are ‘constants to be determined’, this 
whole approach to finding particular solutions is formally called the method of undetermined coefficients. 
116 Rule and strategy are used interchangeably throughout. 
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More precisely, the appealing simplicity of Kyle's equilibrium was seen to derive from the 
assumption that 𝑣 and 𝑢 are each normally and independently distributed. Provided that the 
informed trader's order 𝑥 is linear in 𝑣, then, given 𝑣 and 𝑢 are normally distributed, the total 
market order, 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢, will be a linear combination of normals, implying that it will be normally 
distributed as well. That 𝑣 and 𝑦 are bivariate normal guarantees that the pricing rule – the 
expectation of the asset's value 𝑣 conditional upon the market order 𝑦 – will be a linear function 
of the market order. Consequently, 𝑦 is said to provide a noisy signal of 𝑣. In particular, the net 
order flow provides a signal of the asset value 𝑣, so that the market maker can use the noisy signal 
𝑦 to form their expectation of 𝑣. The resulting conditional expectation 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] will generally differ 
from their unconditional expectation 𝑝0. As the aggregate order size from noise traders’ 𝑢 is 
normally distributed and independent of 𝑣, the expected value of 𝑣 conditional on 𝑦 is provided 
by the projection theorem:117 
                                                          
117 The projection theorem is very useful for deriving the conditional mean and variance. The proof of the projection theorem can 
be found in almost any statistics book (see for example, Goldberger, 1991). Here, the projection theorem follows quite directly 
from the ordinary least squares regression rule. Consider two joint normally distributed random variables,  𝑋~𝑁(𝜇𝑥 , 𝜎𝑥
2) and 
𝑌~𝑁(𝜇𝑦 , 𝜎𝑦
2), and denote their covariance 𝜎𝑥𝑦. A property of the bivariate normal distribution is that the conditional density of 𝑌 
given 𝑋 = 𝑥 is itself normal with conditional mean:𝐸[𝑌|𝑥] = 𝜇𝑦 +
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 (𝑥 − 𝜇𝑥) = (𝜇𝑦 −
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 𝜇𝑥) +
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 𝑥, which is the predicted 
value of 𝑌 from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the equation 𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋, upon setting the explanatory variable 𝑋 =
𝑥. The slope coefficient  
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2  is precisely the OLS estimate of 𝑏. In Kyle’s case the expected value of 𝑣 conditional on 𝑦 is provided 
by the projection theorem: 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] = 𝐸(𝑣) +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣,𝑦)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
(𝑦 − 𝐸(𝑦)). 
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𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] = 𝐸(𝑣) +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝑦)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
(𝑦 − 𝐸(𝑦)) = 𝑝 
                                                      = 𝑝0 +
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2𝜎𝑣
2+ 𝜎𝑢
2  𝑦                                                  
Kyle obtains his BNE by determining the coefficients 𝛽 and 𝜆. Given the best replies, these 
equilibrium coefficients were given by 
𝛽 =
1
2𝜆
           and       𝜆 =
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑢2
 
Moreover, in equilibrium 𝜆 = 2 ( 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎𝑣
2)−1 2⁄  and 𝛽 = ( 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎𝑣
2)1 2⁄ . 
Insights  
Notice that the pricing and trading rules (𝑃 and 𝑋 respectively) depend on the same two parameters 
– the variance of the uninformed order 𝜎𝑢
2 and the variance in the payoff 𝜎𝑣
2 – a natural 
consequence of being determined jointly and is analogous to the consistency criterion that governs 
the pricing rule in the rational expectations model. Notice also that the ratio of these two 
parameters is inverted in the two rules. This is quite intuitive: When 𝜆 is high, meaning that orders 
have a high price impact, then 𝛽 is low, meaning that the informed trader trades less aggressively 
(to avoid the impact of his own trades). Here, 𝛽 fully characterises the informed trader’s trading 
intensity.  
The constituent variance parameters are also easily interpreted. When 𝜎𝑣
2 is high, the informed 
trader’s information is more likely to be substantial, ceteris paribus, inducing the market maker to 
adjust price more aggressively. When  𝜎𝑢
2 is high, the informed trader’s order is a less conspicuous 
(better camouflaged) component of the total order flow, inducing him to trade more aggressively.  
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Thus, in equilibrium, the informed investor trades more aggressively the more noise trading 
camouflages his activity. Conversely, the market maker prices more sensitively the greater the 
information asymmetry (Lyons, 2001). To clarify, at the most basic level, the informed trader is 
seen to buy in proportion to the amount by which the risky asset is undervalued or sell in proportion 
to the amount by which the risky asset is overvalued. The factor of proportionality (𝛽) – referred 
to as the trader's aggressiveness – is inversely related to the degree (𝜆)118 to which orders affect 
the transaction price. Simultaneously, this price sensitivity (𝜆) responds positively to the degree of 
the information asymmetry (𝜎𝑣
2) and in some sense positively to trading aggressiveness. 
In Kyle (1985), the market maker makes a loss on the trades with the informed trader, but recoups 
these losses on trades with the noise traders, making zero profit on average. Consequently, the 
informed traders expected profit is the liquidity traders’ expected trading costs.119 
Another interesting result of Kyle’s (1985) model is the degree to which the informed trader’s 
information is revealed by the equilibrium price. A common way to measure this is from the market 
maker’s expectation of 𝑣. Specifically, after observing price, how much more precise is the 
markets expectation? (In the model, the ‘market’ is the uninformed traders because they have no 
information other than that conveyed by price.)  
                                                          
118 Here, 𝜆 determines the price increase of an additional buy order. The reciprocal of 𝜆 can be viewed as, what Kyle (1985) refers 
to, as market depth. If 𝜆 is low, an additional order will not lead to a large price change and, thus, the market is very liquid. The 
small price impact of an additional order reflected by a low 𝜆 induces the informed trader to trade more aggressively.  
 
119 The expected profit for the informed trader in equilibrium is given by 
𝐸[(𝑣 − 𝑝)𝑥] =
1
2
(𝜎𝑣
2, 𝜎𝑢
2)
1
2 
His expected profit is increasing in 𝜎𝑣
2, since 𝜎𝑣
2 measures the informed traders informational advantage. 
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Initially the market and the market maker have an expectation that is distributed about 𝑣 with a 
variance we will denote as 𝑣𝑎𝑟0. After seeing 𝑥 + 𝑢, the market maker’s expectation is distributed 
about 𝑣 with a variance 𝑣𝑎𝑟1; whereby, 
𝑣𝑎𝑟1 =
1
2
𝑣𝑎𝑟0, 
a fact that is easy to show using Bayes’ rule for updating conditional variances.120                                                                                                                   
This is a striking result: Regardless of the realisations of 𝑣 and  𝜎𝑢
2, the updated variance is exactly 
one-half of the prior variance (𝑣𝑎𝑟1 =
1
2
𝑣𝑎𝑟0).  The informed trader’s strategy results in exactly 
one-half of his private information being revealed by the market price; that is, the new conditional 
variance is only half of the original unconditional variance. 
Concomitantly, it can be shown in Kyle that the equilibrium pricing error is distributed as 
(𝑣 − 𝑝)|𝑦~𝑁(0,
𝜎𝑣
2
2
) 
                                                          
120 The proof of the Bayes’ theorem can be found in almost any statistics book. Therefore, we use it here without derivation. To 
see its formal derivation, we refer readers to the appropriate literature (i.e., Maurer & Ralston, 2005; McCarthy, 2000; Nanda, 2002; 
Platen & Heath, 2006). Broadly, Bayes’ formulation for the determination of conditional variances of jointly distributed random 
variables can be expressed as: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌|𝑋) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌) −
[𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑌)]2
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑋)
 
For the purpose of the model, this formula can be restated as: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑣|𝑝] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑣] −
𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝑣, 𝑝]2
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑝]
 
Now, define 𝑣𝑎𝑟0 = 𝜎𝑣
2 and 𝑣𝑎𝑟1 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟[𝑣|𝑝]. It is then simple to show using the formulation above that (𝑣𝑎𝑟1 =
1
2
𝑣𝑎𝑟0). Note 
that the unique models of this thesis provide analogous (albeit more detailed) examples of the above and should be seen as a 
substitute for explicit proof here - see e.g., Chapter 5, particularly Section 5.8. 
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Thus, congruent with the results obtained above, an expected square pricing error of 0.5 𝜎𝑣
2  
implies that the market maker is able to infer half of the private information initially held by the 
informed investor. 
In summary, the variance the market attributes to the fundamental value of the asset can be 
interpreted as how much information is incorporated into price. A variance of zero has to be 
interpreted as a perfect revelation of the information through prices, the closer this variance is to 
𝑣𝑎𝑟0 (with 𝑣𝑎𝑟0 = 𝜎𝑣
2) the less informative the price is. As by observing the price set by the market 
maker, the variance halves, it can be said that half of the information is incorporated into prices. 
Notably, the smaller the conditional variance, the more informative prices are.121 
4.6.2.4. Kyle’s Model: Discussion 
 
There is extensive market microstructure literature on the topic of price formation in the presence 
of asymmetric information. Kyle’s (1985) paper is related to this literature. As referenced above, 
asymmetric information is generally modelled in the form of informed traders – agents who have 
access to information that is unavailable to other market participants. This private information 
provides them with an advantage relative to the rest of the market. In the Kyle (1985) model, an 
informed trader trades against the price setting competitive market maker, in the presence of 
uninformed traders. 
 
                                                          
121 That 𝑣𝑎𝑟1 should settle at precisely 0.5 𝑣𝑎𝑟0 is not obstensibly clear, but it certainly is appealing on aesthetic grounds (Lyons, 
2001, p.84). 
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In the static version of the Kyle’s (1985) model, the market maker sets the price after observing 
the aggregate order flow.122 The market maker sets the price equal to his best estimate, given his 
belief about the insiders trading strategy. Kyle derives a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
strategy where the informed trader's profit is increasing in his informational advantage and market 
depth. Intuitively, greater market ‘depth’123 implies that an additional order from the informed 
trader would not lead to a large change in prices, allowing the informed trader to trade more 
aggressively on his private information.  
The original Kyle (1985) paper also extends this static model to a dynamic setting; focussing on 
the profit maximising temporal decision of the informed trader.124 In the multi-period, dynamic 
version of the model, if the insider takes a larger position on the early periods, his early profits 
increase yet this comes at a cost of revealing his private information to the market.125 Here (in the 
dynamic version of the model), the optimal strategy for the informed trader is to exploit the 
informational advantage over time. In other words, Kyle’s continuous auction model suggests that 
the informed trader must consider the implications that current trades have on future opportunities. 
If the informed trader trades too much too soon, his private information will be revealed quickly, 
prices will adjust rapidly to his trades and his profit will be smaller. Instead, the informed trader 
                                                          
122 In the context of the model, before and after do not refer to real time. Rather; these terms emanate from the application of 
conditional expectations/Bayes’ rule/projection theorem, etc. 
123 Recall, 𝜆 determines the price increase of an additional buy order. The reciprocal of 𝜆 can be viewed as, what Kyle (1985) refers 
to, as market depth. If 𝜆 is low, an additional order will not lead to a large price change and, thus, the market is very liquid. The 
small price impact of an additional order reflected by a low 𝜆 induces the informed trader to trade more aggressively. 
124 Kyle (1985) solves the discrete-time and continuous-time versions of his model and proves convergence of the equilibria as the 
length of the time periods in the discrete-time model goes to zero. Thus, the discrete-time model with small time periods and the 
continuous-time model have equilibria that are approximately the same (Back, 2017, p.646). The question of how Kyle’s dynamic 
model collapses to the static model is an interesting one. However, it is also a highly complex issue that requires more than just an 
overview. McCarthy (2000) devotes an entire thesis to this topic and should be consulted for further details. 
125 It is worth noting that it is assumed here that the future profits are not discounted to their present value. 
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chooses to reveal his information gradually by hiding trades among the uninformed trades as they 
arrive. Although not apparent at the outset, this generates the constant liquidity property referenced 
in insight (3). Briefly, the informed trader wants his trades to have minimal price impact. If price 
impact is less evenly dispersed, the informed trader could earn higher profit by trading more when 
impact is low and less when it is high. This incentive to reallocate trading across time results in 
constant liquidity in equilibrium. 
Overall, Kyle‘s (1985) model has spawned a large literature of modifications, extensions, analysis, 
and applications to modelling other situations. Indeed, his model has been widely used as a basic 
framework in the market microstructure literature in finance. However, some features of the Kyle 
model limit its applicability. Following the literature (i.e., Lyons, 2001; McCarthy, 2000), we 
discuss some of these limiting features below.  
4.6.2.5. Limitations of the Kyle Model 
 
i) Private Information Acquisition is Not Specified  
We can see from the model that the informed trader needs to condition his demand on his private 
information (𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒). However, practically speaking, one cannot determine how the informed 
trader acquires such knowledge as it is not specified in the model.  
ii) A Single Informed Trader 
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Kyle (1985) develops a model in which a single informed trader with private information optimally 
exploits his monopoly power over time.126 However, Kyle’s (1985) assumption of a single 
informed trader is strong, in the sense that in actual financial markets, it is reasonable to expect 
that at least a few players will have access to private information, and will trade in the knowledge 
that they will face competition with other informed agents in the market. Thus, Kyle’s model seems 
to neglect the crucial interactions that could occur between informed agents in more complex 
settings. In addition to being less descriptive of real markets, Kyle’s supposition of a single 
informed trader may yield incomplete empirical implications involving price changes and agent 
behaviour relations (Holden & Subrahmanyam, 1992). 
4.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Fama (1970) defines a ‘strong form’ efficient market as one in which security prices fully reflect 
all available information, including both publicly and privately held information. Private 
information was broadly defined in this chapter as information that is not known by all trading 
parties. However, to add some granularity to the definition, we also discussed the two 
subcategories of private information as they appear in the literature. A review of the literature 
suggested that informed trading takes one of two forms: (i) trading on more accurate information 
or (ii) trading on information faster than other investors. We followed with a discussion on the 
various facets of each dimension. For example, along with a description of (i) private information 
accuracy, we also discussed two possible mechanisms for its formation (i.e., (a) the interpretation 
mechanism and (b) the inference mechanism of private information accuracy).  
                                                          
126 In contrast to Kyle’s (1985) assumption of a single informed trader, Back, Cao and Willard (2000), Bernhardt and Miao (2004), 
Foster and Viswanathan (1996), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), and Li (2013), all develop market microstructure models in 
which an aggregate of identical informed traders strategically exploit their common private information. The respective models 
are analysed and discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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We also noted that whilst the literature recognises the existence of a two category breakdown of 
private information, these dimensions are rarely, if ever discussed within the same theoretical 
framework. We conclude our summary here with Table 4.1. As suggested in previous chapters, 
Table 4.1 provides an important comparative summary of the theoretical literature on both 
algorithmic trading and market microstructure theory. 
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TABLE 4.1: ORGANISING THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE ON ALGORITHMIC TRADING AND 
MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE: A COMPARATIVE SUMMARY. 
 
This table organises the theoretical literature on both market microstructure and algorithmic trading according to the private 
information attributed to the informed agents in the respective models. Although numerous other examples have been 
referenced throughout this thesis, only the models that have been analysed in detail have been included herewith. 
 
 
Market Microstructure Models 
 
Author 
 
Accuracy  Advantage 
  
Speed Advantage 
Brunnermeier (2002) 
 
 
 
           ✓ 
 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)  ✓ 
 
  
Kim and Verrechia (1994) ✓ 
 
  
Kim and Verrechia (1997) ✓ 
 
  
Kyle (1985) ✓ 
 
  
Hirshleifer et al., (1994)  
Holthausen and Verrechia (1990) 
Vo (2008) 
 
                       
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 ✓ 
 
✓ 
     
 
 
Algorithmic Trader Models 
 
Author 
 
Accuracy  Advantage 
  
Speed Advantage 
Das et al., (2000) ✓ 
 
  
Cartea and Penalva (2010)   ✓ 
 Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010)   ✓ 
 Foucault et al., (2010)                 ✓ 
 Johnson (2010) ✓ 
 
  
Martinez and Rosu (2011) ✓ 
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4.8 CONCLUSION 
One of the primary challenges encountered when conducting theoretical research on the subject of 
algorithmic trading is the wide array of strategies employed by practitioners. Current theoretical 
models treat algorithmic traders as a homogenous trader group, resulting in a gap between 
theoretical discourse and empirical evidence on algorithmic trading practices. In order to address 
this, the current study introduces an organisational framework from which to conceptualise and 
synthesise the vast amount of algorithmic trading strategies. More precisely, using the principles 
of contemporary cognitive science, it is argued that the dual process paradigm – the most prevalent 
contemporary interpretation of the nature and function of human decision making – lends itself 
well to a novel taxonomy of algorithmic trading. 
This taxonomy serves primarily as a heuristic to inform a theoretical market microstructure model 
of algorithmic trading. In accordance with the literature on both cognitive science and algorithmic 
trading, this thesis espouses that there exist two distinct types of algorithmic trader; one (System 
1) having fast processing characteristics, and the other (System 2) having slower, more analytic or 
reflective processing characteristics. 
Concomitantly, the current microstructure literature suggests that a trader can be superiorly 
informed as a result of either (1) their superior speed in accessing or exploiting information, or (2) 
their superior ability to more accurately forecast future variables. To date, microstructure models 
focus on either one aspect but not both. This common modelling assumption is also evident in 
theoretical models of algorithmic trading. Theoretical papers on the topic have coalesced around 
the idea that algorithmic traders possess a comparative advantage relative to their human 
counterparts. However, the literature is yet to reach consensus as to what this advantage entails, 
nor its subsequent effects on financial market quality.  
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Notably, the key assumptions underlying the dual-process taxonomy of algorithmic trading 
suggest that two distinct informational advantages underlie algorithmic trading. It follows then, 
the possibility that System 1 algorithmic traders possess an inherent speed advantage and System 
2 algorithmic traders, an inherent accuracy advantage.127 Inevitably, the various strategies 
associated with algorithmic trading correspond to their own respective systems, and by 
implication, informational advantages. A model that incorporates both types of informational 
advantage is a challenging problem in the context of a microstructure model of trade. Models 
typically eschew this issue entirely by restricting themselves to the analysis of one type of 
information variable in isolation. This is done solely for the sake of tractability and simplicity 
(models can in principle include both variables). Thus, including both types of private information 
within a single microstructure model serves to enhance the novel contribution of this thesis. 
We suggest here that Kyle’s (1985) model provides the necessary microstructural foundations for 
our unique model of algorithmic trading. Indeed, specifying a model that captures the 
multidimensional aspects of algorithmic trader‘s within a contemporary modelling framework, 
such as Kyle’s, remains a crucial consideration of this work. A fundamental shortcoming of his 
model however, is evidenced by the supposition of only a single informed trader. In contrast to 
Kyle (1985), we propose an integrative model featuring two informed traders (which we later claim 
to be algorithmic traders). Moreover, in an attempt to incorporate the key informational 
assumptions of our formal taxonomy (to follow in Section 5.3.2); we suggest that relative to a 
group of identical informed traders, the informed traders in our model have heterogeneous 
                                                          
With respect to each other and the rest of the market. 
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informational advantages. Hence, we will allow for heterogeneity in agents (algorithmic traders) 
signal timing as well as signal quality.  
The modus operandi of the current study is detailed below:  
To prepare for the final ‘all inclusive’ dual-process theoretical model of this thesis, the present 
study will first conjecture and verify a benchmark model with only one type/system of algorithmic 
trader. More formally, a System 2 algorithmic trader will be introduced into Kyle’s (1985) static 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) model. The behavioural and informational characteristics of 
this agent emanate from the key assumptions reflected in the taxonomy. Effectively, the System 2 
algorithmic trader replaces the informed trader in Kyle’s (1985) static model.128 
The final dual-process microstructure model, presented in the concluding chapter of this thesis, 
extends the benchmark model by introducing the System 1 algorithmic trader; thereby, 
incorporating both algorithmic trader systems. Note: the benchmark model nests the Kyle (1985) 
model. In a limiting case of the benchmark model, where the System 2 algorithmic trader does not 
have access to this particular form of private information, the equilibrium reduces to the 
equilibrium of the static model of Kyle (1985). Likewise, in the final model, when the System 1 
algorithmic trader’s information is negligible, the model collapses to the benchmark model.129 
                                                          
128 The term ‘replaces’ is perhaps too strong a word, rather; one could simply view the System 2 algorithmic trader in our model 
as a modified version of Kyle’s informed trader. The difference between replace and modify is largely semantic and has no 
noteworthy implications. 
129 The above dictum should be clarified by the models themselves. Those readers who require further clarification at this stage are 
referred to Table V (in Appendix V) at the end of this thesis. Table V provides a succinct comparison of the models of this thesis, 
noting the limiting cases. However, the technical aspects of the models themselves may inhibit Table V’s applicability prior to a 
formal analysis of each model.  
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One might argue that Kyle’s (1985) model could suffice as the benchmark model. However, we 
maintain that this thesis will be greatly enriched with the inclusion of our own research specific 
benchmark model.  
4.9 SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS 
To conclude this chapter, some reflection on an important tenet of this thesis is necessary. 
Specifically, this study presents the first unified, ‘all-inclusive’130 theoretical model of algorithmic 
trading; the overall aim of which is to determine the evolving nature of financial market quality as 
a consequence of this practice. 
Indeed, it can be stated that this final integrative model is exclusive to algorithmic traders; the basic 
principles of which emanate from the key assumptions made with regards to these traders in our 
taxonomy. The models parity with algorithmic trading is justified below.  
4.9.1 Algorithmic Traders as Informed Traders: An Affirmation 
Kirilenko and Lo (2013) suggest that the growth of algorithmic trading emerged out of the desire 
to eliminate the need for limited human judgment.131 Since our cognitive abilities are relatively 
limited, algorithms have enabled markets to far exceed the cognitive bounds of humans in 
processing information (Biais and Woolley, 2011).132  
                                                          
130 The final model is all inclusive in the sense that accounts for the multitude of algorithmic trading strategies within a single 
theoretical framework. Given the inherent complexities involved, such a model is yet to be explored in the academic literature. 
Again, models typically restrict themselves to the analysis one type of information variable in isolation. That being said, we can 
confirm the possibility of a model including both types of information variables within the same framework. 
131See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1, where we discuss some of the limitations in human judgment (refer also to the respective literature, 
i.e. Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983) 
132 See e.g. Salmon and Stokes (2010), particularly the description of areas where algorithmic trading excels over human operators. 
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Specifically, an individual human operator can only incorporate a small amount of data into his or 
her decision-making process, and so investment strategies requiring the calculation of matrices 
with hundreds of thousands of variables necessarily require computer technology (McNamara, 
2016).  
Algorithms try to make sense of the mass of data generated by the market to generate a usable 
output. For example, an algorithm might analyse a listed company’s past dividends, available data 
on its debt, and market conditions, and take a position on the current value of the shares. Once the 
algorithm has calculated the value of shares, it can decide whether to buy or sell shares based on a 
pre-set strategy. The algorithm might use established valuation modelling techniques from finance 
theory, crunching large amounts of data to arrive at a more exact valuation for the security using 
the model (Narang 2013). Algorithms can also harness complex computational techniques vis-à-
vis advanced statistical analysis, artificial intelligence, machine learning, neutral networks, support 
vector machines tools, data mining as well as text mining and can transact at speeds measured 
increasingly in microseconds (1 microsecond is an international standard unit of time equal to 
1000000th of a second)133  
Because algorithms are tasked to perform complex trades using deep data and speed, they must 
possess some programmed ‘decision-making’ capacity. In other words, algorithms must be capable 
of evaluating the importance of data, attaching a value to its content, and then making a decision 
independently of human traders. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly evident that algorithmic 
traders represent a form of advanced automated ‘decision-maker’. 
                                                          
133 On average it takes approximately 300 milliseconds for a human being to blink (Wilkinson et al., 2013). 
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All things considered, it seems that humans are at a distinct disadvantage in a market dominated 
by computer algorithms. The axiom that algorithmic traders have powerful advantages over their 
human counterparts is further evidenced by the fact that computers have both a greater information 
processing capacity and a higher reaction speed relative to human beings. The literature on 
algorithmic trading (e.g. Biais et al., 2014; Cartea & Penalva, 2010; Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 2010; 
Das et al., 2001; Easley et al., 2012; Foucault et al., 2016; Gamzo, 2014; Johnson, 2010; Martinez 
& Rosu, 2011) indicate that algorithmic trader’s consistently outperform their human counterparts 
in terms of trading speed as well as in terms of predictive accuracy. 
A natural means of addressing the implications of the above is to orient it towards the following 
question: do we need to modify the conventional view of informed traders in light of the emerging 
evidence surrounding algorithmic trading? If we construe that algorithmic traders are indeed the 
most informed decision makers in the market then it is likely that the answer to this question would 
be in the affirmative. 
Herein lies our rationale for suggesting that the unique models of this thesis are exclusive to 
algorithmic traders. Consider the following narrative that explicates this proposition: 
Kyle’s (1985) model has been widely used as a basic framework in the market microstructure 
literature in finance - the model's simplicity and flexibility makes it a useful point of departure for 
many microstructure researchers. It seems only natural then that we base our own analysis on his 
framework. However, it should be noted that Kyles (1985) model emerged prior to the advent of 
algorithmic trading. Accordingly, his analysis seems to have been constrained to suppositions 
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surrounding the cognitive abilities and information processing capacities of human traders; which 
relative to algorithmic traders are extremely limited.134 
With this in mind, we felt it necessary to conjecture and verify a preparatory (benchmark) 
equilibrium model in order to reconcile Kyle’s (1985) equilibrium characterisation with our own 
unique algorithmic trading considerations. More precisely, we begin by introducing a ‘System 2’ 
algorithmic trader into a static version of Kyle (1985). Essentially, the System 2 algorithmic trader 
will replace Kyle’s (1985) informed trader. To justify that the System 2 trader is algorithmic, an 
attempt was made to align his information set with the key informational assumptions made in our 
taxonomy, delineated in the proceeding chapter. The basic tenets for differentiating between the 
System 2 algorithmic trader and the informed traders in Kyle’s model can be described concisely.  
The following discussion remains an overview and does not include notation. (Precise details 
follow in Chapter 5). 
Consider the following succinct outline: In Kyle’s original (1985) model there is some noise in the 
informed trader’s private information. However, in line with the discussion above, we would like 
the System 2 algorithmic trader to be ‘more’135 informed than the informed (human) trader in Kyle. 
In light of this objective, information was modelled in such a way so as to suggest that the System 
2 algorithmic trader could forecast the firm’s value without error (note that the model itself will 
clarify and expand in this principle – with respective notation.) Specifically, our set-up allowed 
the System 2 algorithmic trader to filter out noise from his private information.  
                                                          
134 See also, Salmon and Stokes (2010), particularly the description of areas where algorithmic trading excels over human operators. 
 
135 The term ‘more’ is in reference to the accuracy of the informed trader’s private information; whereby, the respective trader is 
able to arrive at a more exact forecast of the security. 
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This was done intentionally to account for the presumed characteristics of System 2 algorithmic 
trader’s in our taxonomy (see Section 5.2). 
The final dual-process microstructure model, presented in the concluding chapter of this thesis, 
extends the benchmark model by introducing the System 1 algorithmic trader; thereby, 
incorporating both algorithmic trader systems. Like the case with the System 2 algorithmic trader, 
the key considerations for this algorithmic trader emanate from the key assumptions made for 
System 1 algorithmic trader’s in our taxonomy. 
Note that the formal taxonomy of this thesis is supported by actual empirical evidence on 
algorithmic trading practices. An instantiation of System 1 and System 2 algorithmic trading in 
Chapter 3 serves only to enhance the validity of this taxonomy. 
To conclude, given (a) the suggestion in the literature that algorithmic traders have an 
informational edge relative to human traders and (b) that the key characteristics of the algorithmic 
traders in our model(s) emerge from a taxonomy exclusive to algorithmic traders; it is reasonable 
to suggest that the models of this thesis are exclusive to algorithmic traders.  
In the next chapter (Chapter 5), the benchmark model is formally introduced. Chapter 5 also 
presents our definitive dual-process taxonomy of algorithmic trading. The final all-inclusive 
microstructure model is detailed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A THEORETICAL DUAL-PROCESS MODEL OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING: AN 
INTRODUTION 
 
5.1 OVERVIEW 
 
There remains a huge disconnect between available theoretical models of algorithmic trading and 
recent empirical research on the practice of algorithmic trading, purporting that algorithmic trading 
is a heterogeneous phenomenon. Given that algorithmic trading has asserted itself as a dominant 
force in financial markets across the world, it seems that a model that accounts for the multifaceted 
nature of algorithmic trading has become vital to our understanding of financial market 
performance (Gomber et al., 2011). As earlier noted, this thesis will propose a theoretical model 
of algorithmic trading that will draw on the dual-process theory of cognition to inform an 
organisational taxonomy in which to conceptualise and synthesise the vast amount of algorithmic 
trading strategies. Following the literature on both cognitive science and algorithmic trading, this 
thesis espouses that there exists two distinct types of algorithmic trading; one (System 1) having 
fast, reflexive, process characteristics, and the other (System 2) having relatively slower, more 
analytic or reflective processing characteristics.136 
                                                          
136 So far we have surveyed Kyle’s (1985) Bayesian Nash Equilibrium model and the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) Rational 
Expectations Model. The Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model was natural starting point for our review in Chapter 4. Opening with 
this model also clarified how its shortcomings spurred the development of later microstructure models such a Kyle (1985). The 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) Rational Expectations model therefore served only to preface the Kyle’s model - with Kyle’s (1985) 
model providing the necessary microstructural foundations for the unique models of this thesis. The remaining focus of this thesis 
is thus aligned solely with Kyle (1985). With regards to Kyle’s (1985) Bayesian Nash Equilibrium model and the Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) Rational Expectations Model one could say that if the informed traders in these models were algorithmic, then they 
would be System 2 algorithmic traders. This proposition is further clarified by the fact that there is no speed dimension in these 
models.  
143 
 
  
Using this integrative dual process taxonomy, we will attempt to construct an overarching 
theoretical model of algorithmic trading; whereby the key characteristics of the traders reflected 
in the taxonomy will translate into key behavioural and informational assumptions of the agents 
in this model.   
From a theoretical modelling perspective, the key assumptions underlying our dual-process 
taxonomy of algorithmic trading suggests that two informational advantages underlie algorithmic 
trading. Naturally, all the various strategies associated with algorithmic trading (as seen in Section 
2.4) correspond to their own respective ‘System’ and thus, informational advantage.  
A review of Section 3.5 may prove useful for the interested reader. This serves to orientate the 
reader with the classification dimensions of our dual process construct of algorithmic trading.  
Below, we provide our final integrative taxonomy of algorithmic trading. 
5.2        THE FINAL INTERGRATIVE DUAL-PROCESS TAXONOMY OF 
ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
Following our analysis of empirical, as well as theoretical academic literature on both algorithmic 
trading and human cognition we define algorithmic trading as follows:  
 
Algorithmic trading represents computer-determined trading whereby super computers and 
complex algorithms directly interface with trading platforms at high speed, placing orders without 
immediate human intervention. It (algorithmic trading) employs cutting edge mathematical 
models, adept computational techniques and extraordinary processing power via advanced 
computer and communication systems and is capable of anticipating and interpreting market 
signals in order to implement profitable trading strategies. 
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A key assumption made with regards to our taxonomy is thus; two distinct subsets of algorithmic 
trading currently exist – that is, System 1 algorithmic trading and System 2 algorithmic trading. 
It follows that System 1 algorithmic traders have fast information processing characteristics. 
System 2 algorithmic traders have relatively slower, more analytic or reflective information 
processing characteristics. Theoretically speaking, System 1 algorithmic traders possess an 
inherent speed advantage and System 2 algorithmic traders, an inherent accuracy advantage – 
relative to both each other and the rest of the market.  
 
The following discussion considers the key assumptions made in the taxonomy; noting the 
theoretical implications for System 1 and System 2 algorithmic trader’s in our model(s) 
 
I) System 1 Algorithmic Trading 
 
 
From a theoretical perspective, our dual process categorisation of algorithmic trading implies that 
System 1 algorithmic traders possesses and inherent speed advantage - relative to the rest of the 
market. In practical terms, speed or latency refers to the time it takes to access and respond to 
market information. Accordingly, following the instantiation of the concept in Section 3.5, we will 
assume that System 1 algorithmic traders can effectively anticipate incoming market orders and 
trade rapidly to exploit normal-speed traders’ latencies. Their speed advantage is predicated on 
latency specific mechanisms e.g. colocation facilities and applies to information about incoming 
order flow and not about the fundamental value of the asset. 
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Faster speeds also imply that they can trade more frequently, have smaller inventories and shorter 
holding horizons.137 Consistent with the insight of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992), System 1 
algorithmic traders in our model, will focus on short-term order flow, becoming less informed 
about long-term fundamentals. It follows that, when establishing a position, these traders must 
have a plan to exit within a short time window. Thus, System 1’s profit is not determined by the 
difference between his entry price and the fundamental value, but by the difference between his 
entry and exit prices. (See Chapter 6 for proof of concept) 
 
 
II) System 2 Algorithmic Trading 
 
 
System 1 algorithmic trader’s speed advantage relates to information about incoming order flow. 
This is particularly pertinent given that order book information travels fast within the exchange. 
However, information on the macro-economy or firm fundamentals, which in general are larger 
and more complex than order book information, ‘travels’138 slower and is more difficult to filter 
than order book information. This is where System 2 algorithmic trader’s accuracy advantage 
comes to the fore. In practical terms, accuracy relates to the precision of a long-run, firm specific, 
forecast. It is predicated on the extent to which an agent is informed about the intrinsic worth of a 
firm. It follows, that System 2’s accuracy advantage is linked to their ability to predict key, 
fundamental, value relevant, firm specific variables in equity markets. 
                                                          
137 The short holding horizon has important implication on the fast trader’s behavior and choice of information. In the short-term, 
the resale value of a risky security is more likely driven by the order flow rather than the fundamental values. We discuss the 
implications that these assumptions have on equilibrium below. 
138 The vast scale and complex nature of this information means that it takes longer for the market to disseminate this information. 
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In our evaluation, System 2 algorithmic trading represents an information processing paradigm 
with a remarkable tolerance for noise, ambiguity and uncertainty. Its ability to derive meaning 
from vast, complicated and imprecise information means that System 2 algorithmic traders can 
detect patterns in information and identify trends that are too intricate to be noticed by humans 
alone.  
Accordingly, following the instantiation of the concept in Section 3.5, we will assume in our model 
that System 2 algorithmic traders exploit their superior ability to interpret public information in an 
attempt to make forecasts that are superior to the forecasts of other traders. In other words, these 
traders filter public fundamental information through an advanced platform (high-capability 
computer infrastructure), in order to detect private patterns from public information – patterns that 
signal a firms future performance.   
 
5.3 MODEL SPECIFICS 
 
Overall, specifying a model that harmoniously captures the multidimensional aspects of 
algorithmic traders within a contemporary microstructure modelling framework, such as Kyle’s 
(1985), remains a crucial aspect of this work. As such, our equilibrium characterization will follow 
Kyle’s (1985) Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE).  
A crucial shortcoming of his model however, is evidenced by the supposition of only a single 
informed trader. In contrast to Kyle (1985), we present a model featuring two informed traders 
(which we later claim to be algorithmic). Moreover, in an attempt to incorporate the key 
informational assumptions of our proposed taxonomy, we suggest that the informed traders have 
heterogeneous informational advantages. Hence, we will allow for heterogeneity in agents – 
algorithmic traders – signal timing as well as signal quality. (This supposition will be clarified by 
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the model itself).139 Overall we seek to determine how the strategic interplay among differentially 
informed algorithmic traders affects market quality (i.e. trading activity, prices, volume, liquidity, 
volatility and profits) over time. 
In our paper the System 1 algorithmic trader will be faster than the System 2 algorithmic trader 
but the System 2 algorithmic trader will have better information about the fundamentals. The 
difference between algorithmic traders (with respect to asymmetric/private information) is 
developed and addressed in the final model in Chapter 6. 
 
5.3.1 The Foundations of the Model 
 
Due to its position in the development of microstructure theories, Kyle’s (1985) model has 
emerged as the standard to which all microstructure models are compared. It has spawned a large 
literature of modifications, extensions, analysis, and applications to modelling other situations. 
Given that this model has been widely used as a basic framework in the market microstructure 
literature in finance, it seems only natural that our model follows Kyle (1985).  However, as earlier 
noted, Kyle’s (1985) model was designed with agent specific considerations that are not ostensibly 
relevant to our specification of algorithmic trading. With this in mind, we begin by conjecturing 
and verifying a preparatory (benchmark) equilibrium model in an attempt to reconcile Kyle’s 
(1985) equilibrium characterisation with our own research specific algorithmic trading 
considerations. See below. 
                                                          
139 Technically speaking, because Kyle’s (1985) model is aligned with the accuracy dimension of informed trading, one could 
suffice in saying that the informed trader in Kyle’s model could be algorithmic (vis-à-vis a System 2 algorithmic trader).  However, 
in the interest of verisimilitude, we remain resolute that the System 2 algorithmic trader should be better informed - have more 
accurate private information - than the (human) informed trader in Kyle (1985). Specifics provided in what proceeds. 
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5.3.2 The Benchmark Concept  
As a preparatory step for our final model, we will begin by conjecturing and verifying a benchmark 
equilibrium market microstructure model. We will construct a benchmark model that is (1) 
analogous with Kyle’s equilibrium specification and (2) includes a property of information 
processing that parsimoniously captures our specification of algorithmic trading.   
The benchmark model provides the initial link between the dual process construct of algorithmic 
trading and market microstructure and allows us to formalize our final integrative model of 
algorithmic trading. Thus in actuality, two models are presented in this thesis; the benchmark 
model and the final integrative dual process microstructure model of algorithmic trading (it could 
be argued that Kyle’s (1985) model could function as the benchmark model. However, we maintain 
that this thesis will be greatly enriched with the inclusion of our own benchmark model.) 
To prepare for the additional assumptions of our final model, this section presents a benchmark 
model with only one algorithmic trading type/system. More formally, we introduce System 2 
algorithmic trading into a static version of Kyle (1985). The System 2 algorithmic trader replaces 
the informed trader in Kyle’s (1985) static framework. As clarified below, we make an assumption 
that the System 2 algorithmic trader has access to a unique form of private information (we define, 
and provide the rationale for this particular form of private information shortly).  
It is important to note that in a limiting case of the benchmark model, where the System 2 
algorithmic trader does not have access to this particular form of private information, the 
equilibrium reduces to the equilibrium of the static model of Kyle (1985). Inexorably, the 
baseline/benchmark model nests the Kyle (1985) model. The model itself will qualify this 
suggestion. 
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The intuition for including System 2 algorithmic traders in a model before System 1 algorithmic 
traders is as follows: 
A key assumption made in our taxonomy is that System 1 algorithmic traders’ private information 
relates to incoming order flow. This means that they have no independent source of information; 
their information is dependent on the activity (orders) of other traders –including, but not limited 
to the System 2 algorithmic trader. Thus, it seems inappropriate to include System 1 algorithmic 
traders without first modelling System 2 algorithmic trading. 
 
CHAPTER 5 (Cont’d) 
 
5.4 THE BENCHMARK MODEL: AN INTRODUCTION  
 
In this section we present the first of our two microstructure models i.e., the benchmark model. 
The benchmark model includes System 2 algorithmic traders but not System 1 algorithmic traders. 
The final model, presented in Chapter 6, includes both types of algorithmic traders.  
Technically speaking, Kyle’s (1985) model is aligned with the accuracy dimension of informed 
trading. Therefore, one could argue that the informed trader in Kyle’s original (1985) model could 
be algorithmic (vis-à-vis a System 2 algorithmic trader).  
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However, in the interest of verisimilitude, we remain resolute that the System 2 algorithmic trader 
in the benchmark model should be ‘more’140 informed than the informed (human) trader in Kyle 
(1985). 
Our equilibrium characterization for the benchmark model will follow the lines of Kyle (1985). 
However we will augment his theoretical platform to allow for sequential information acquisition. 
We introduce an adjusted information structure into the static Kyle (1985) model and add a new 
type of trader who has access to unique private information. Again, this section presents the 
benchmark model with only one type/system of algorithmic trader – System 2 algorithmic trader 
in our case.  
In the particular model we investigate, one risky asset is exchanged for a riskless asset among three 
kinds of traders: a single System 2 algorithmic trader who has private, sequential observations of 
the ex-post liquidation value of the risky asset; uninformed noise traders who trade randomly; and 
market makers who set prices efficiently (in the semi-strong sense) conditional on the information 
they have about the quantities traded by others. 
 
                                                          
140 The term ‘more’ is in reference to the accuracy of the informed trader’s private information; whereby, the respective trader is 
able to arrive at a more exact valuation of the security. Specifically, in Kyle’s original (1985) model there is some noise in the 
informed trader’s private information. However, in line with the insights discussed in Chapter 4 above, information in the 
benchmark model will be modelled in such a way so as to suggest that the System 2 algorithmic trader is able to forecast the firm’s 
value without error (note that the model itself will clarify and expand in this principle – with respective notation.) Essentially, our 
set-up allows the System 2 algorithmic trader to filter out noise from his private information. This is done intentionally to account 
for the presumed characteristics of System 2 algorithmic trader’s in our taxonomy. We remind readers that our taxonomy is 
supported by actual empirical evidence on algorithmic trading practices. An instantiation of System 1 and System 2 algorithmic 
trading in Chapter 3 serves only to enhance the validity of our taxonomy. Thus, given (a) the suggestion in the literature that 
algorithmic traders have an informational edge relative to human traders and (b) that the key characteristics of the algorithmic 
traders in our model(s) emerge from a taxonomy specific to algorithmic traders; it is reasonable to suggest that the benchmark 
model to follow, is exclusive to System 2 algorithmic traders. 
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5.4.1 Benchmark Model Setup 
 
Assets and Traders         The System 2 algorithmic trader and the uninformed noise traders’ trade 
two assets: a risk free asset (bond)141 with zero interest rate and a risky asset (stock). Like Kyle 
(1985), we begin by assuming that the risky asset to be traded has an ex-post payoff of 𝑣 where 
the value is drawn according to, 
 
                                                          𝑣~𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2)                                    
 
Contextually, nature selects a true value (𝑣) from a prior normal distribution 𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2) for the 
traded asset. Effectively, the ex-post liquidation value of the risky asset is its true/fundamental 
value and is a normally distributed random variable with initial mean 𝑝0 and variance 𝜎𝑣
2. The 
assets initial distribution is public information. 
As in Kyle (1985), all players are risk neutral. The assumption of risk neutrality means that 𝑝0 also 
typifies the initial stock price - this insight can only be fully appreciated following a detailed 
exposition of the model itself (see below). 
In line with conventional Kyle type microstructure models, two types of normal (non-algorithmic) 
traders exist: (1) uninformed noise traders randomly trade normally distributed  𝑢~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2), 
shares for exogenous non-informational reasons;142 (2) market makers set the pricing function, 
                                                          
141 The majority of microstructure models include a risk-free asset (e.g., a riskless bond). Because risky asset demand is independent 
of wealth, in order for each individual’s demand to be feasible, then each individual must be able to borrow and lend at the risk-
free interest rate without constraint (Lyons, 2001). However, its economic role is trivial and some models omit it from exposition. 
We include it because Kyle (1985) includes it. 
142 Uninformed traders are often recorded as noise traders in the literature. They are liquidity motivated, smoothing their inter-
temporal consumption stream through portfolio adjustment. Their motive for trade is often referenced as a hedging motive. Like 
Kyle (1985), 𝑢 is exogenously determined (simplifying inference). See Bagehot (1971) for a detailed discussion on these topics. 
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absorb the residual order flow imbalances, and make zero expected profits.143 (The key 
assumptions regarding these two agents emanate from Kyle (1985) and are detailed extensively in 
Section 4.6) 
However, we introduce a new type of trader: System 2 algorithmic traders who receive multiple 
pieces of private information and are ultimately informed about the true value  𝑣 of the risky asset. 
The properties and structure of their information set differentiates these traders from informed 
traders in existing models. Notably, in many existing microstructure models of trading, such as 
Back (1992), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Kyle (1985), informed traders receive a 
simplified, one-shot signal of firm fundamentals.144  
As reflected in our taxonomy however, one of the defining features of a System 2 algorithmic 
trader lies in its complex, logical and deductive processing capabilities and inherent predictive 
abilities. More specifically, System 2 algorithmic traders exploit their superior ability to interpret 
‘public fundamental information’145 in an attempt to make forecasts that are superior to the 
forecasts of other traders. They filter public fundamental information through an advanced 
                                                          
143 Recall, the key conceptual difference between rational expectations models and Kyle’s (1985) model is that Kyle includes an 
explicit auctioneer (market maker) rather than an implicit one. The market makers pricing rule is pinned down by the assumption 
that he expects to earn a profit of zero. Again, market makers are simply vote counters, not analysts of fundamentals; and the votes 
they count are the order flow. The assumption that market makers earn zero profit is important to the model and is shared by many 
other models within microstructure. This zero profit assumption is consistent with free entry of competing market makers, a 
condition under which the single market maker cannot exercise monopoly power.  Essentially, the market makers determine the 
price 𝑝 at which they trade the quantity necessary to clear the market.  
144 Typically, the informed trader has private information about the risky asset 𝑣, in the form of a single signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒. The term 
𝑒 is used to represent the noise in the signal. However, for future reference, consider the following principle: The structure of the 
informed trader’s private information (e.g., whether or not the informed trader observes 𝑣 perfectely or with noise) is not crucial. 
As articulated by Rochet and Vila (1994): “Given that all traders are assumed to be risk-neutral it is only needed that the information 
structures be nested i.e., that the informed trader knows more than the market” (p.132). This principle suffices as justification for 
our ability to modify Kyle’s with our own agent specific informational considerations – detailed below. 
145 Although an observation of the risky assets final liquidating value 𝑣 would be considered private information, its distribution 
(mean and variance) is publically available. 
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platform (high-end capability computer infrastructure), in order to detect private patterns from 
public information – patterns that signal a firms future performance.  Essentially, we assume that 
System 2 algorithmic traders can derive meaning from vast, complicated and imprecise 
information.  
Common sense suggests that this type of processing requires multiple reflective and corrective 
observations. Therefore, unlike most traditional approaches, the informed agent in our model 
receives multiple informative signals, which then can then be combined and filtered to produce a 
perfect forecast of an asset’s true/fundamental value.146 Most notably perhaps, the System 2 
algorithmic trader can forecast without error. This is consistent with the reflective/effortful 
processing characteristics of System 2 algorithmic traders in our taxonomy. We model this type of 
information as a sequence of multiple signals in the spirit of what Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 
1997) define as ‘pre-announcement’ and ‘event-period’ private information. However, given that 
the material on pre-announcement and event-period private information is highly advanced, we do 
not expand on Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994, 1997) models here. The rationale for excluding these 
models in this section is provided below.  
Evidently, market microstructure models are said to fall into three clearly defined levels of 
difficulty or ‘modules’: a basic module, an intermediate module, and an advanced module 
(Cukierman, 1992, p.9). We have covered the basic and intermediate modules in the previous 
sections. Given that Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994, 1997) models can be characterized as advanced 
modules, they are treated in a separate appendix (Appendix II). This is done solely to enhance the 
fluidity of this thesis. Technical details of Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994, 1997) models are 
                                                          
146  When the trading period concludes, the risky and riskless assets are liquidated, and agents consume their holdings of each. 
Thus, the term fundamental value is often referenced as the ex-post liquidation value of the risky asset. 
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contained within Section (b) of Appendix II. That being said, the model itself (below) should serve 
to clarify this information-theoretic issue, namely, the structure of System 2’s private information.  
5.4.2 The Benchmark Model – Some Caveats 
 
The benchmark model describes an economy with two periods. However, because only one of 
these periods can be classified as a trading period, the model is not a multi-period model. 
Evidently, to provide some clarity on this statement, some major caveats merit a discussion here 
before continuing. 
It may appear, to some, that the models presented in this thesis are multi-period models. However, 
both models (i.e., the benchmark model and the final model) are in fact single-trading period 
models.  
In order to understand this caveat, one needs to first appreciate the difference between multi-period 
and single trading period models. A brief discussion on Kyle (1985c) should clarify the conceptual 
difference between multi-period and single-period models. Consider the following: 
As stated above, Kyle’s model has been widely used as a basic framework in the market 
microstructure literature in finance. Invariably, when researchers (including the present study) 
refer to the Kyle’s model, they are referencing his single-auction equilibrium model. Indeed, in 
keeping with convention, the present study has followed the literature. In actuality, there are three 
different versions of Kyle’s model:  
Kyle (1985a, 1985b, 1985c) – henceforth ‘Kyle’ - presents three models in his seminal work: 1) 
the ‘single-auction equilibrium model’; 2) the ‘sequential auction equilibrium model’ and 3) the 
‘continuous auction equilibrium model’. 
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Kyle’s ‘single-auction equilibrium model’ is a simple model of one-shot trading game. Here, a 
single risky asset is traded over the time period [0,1]. In other words, trading occurs at date 0, and 
the game ends at date 1.147  
Kyle’s second model, the ‘sequential auction equilibrium model’, is a discreet-time, multi-period 
version of the ‘single-auction equilibrium model’ – the first model. Here, there are multiple 
auctions, or rounds of trading, which take place sequentially.  
The ‘continuous auction equilibrium model’- the third model - is a continuous version of the the 
‘sequential auction equilibrium model’. In this third model trading takes place continuously rather 
than at discrete intervals.  
We do not analyse the results of these models here, rather, for the purpose of the discussion to 
follow; we simply note that Kyle’s models’ variants highlight the conceptual difference between 
multi-period and single-period trading models. Evidently, when there are multiple auctions, or 
rounds of trading, the model can be classified as a multi-period model. Conversely, when there is 
only a single auction, or trading round, the model falls under the rubric of single-period model.  
Again, the benchmark model describes a two-period economy. However, actual trading occurs 
within one of these periods. Therefore, we cannot classify the benchmark model as a multi-period 
trading model. To corroborate this suggestion, we expand on the benchmark models timeline and 
information structure below. 
 
 
                                                          
147 At the end of the game all agents consume their holdings and receive their payoffs. 
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Timeline and Information Structure         Like Kyle’s single-auction equilibrium model, there 
is only a single trading period in the benchmark model. However, to prepare for the additional 
assumptions made for System 2 algorithmic traders in our taxonomy, we adjust his timeline 
somewhat and include, what can only be described as, an additional ‘period’. This term period is 
used loosely here because what we include it is not a period, per se, but rather an extended phase 
of information processing. The intuition for this arrangement stems from the relevant theoretical 
microstructure literature (see for example, De long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990; 
Dugast & Foucault, 2016; and to some extent Kim & Verrecchia, 1997). 
We include the extended processing phase/period (henceforth, the terms extended processing 
period and extended processing phase will be used interchangeably) in our model in an attempt to 
reflect an important assumption made in our taxonomy: that is the assumption that System 2 
algorithmic trader’s precise/effortful information processing characteristics translate into an 
informational advantage. In other words, we have assumed that these traders are able to filter 
public information (through an advanced platform)148 into private, and perhaps more accurate 
signals of a firm’s fundamental value (v). Essentially, the System 2 algorithmic trader’s ability to 
derive meaning from vast, complicated and imprecise information means they are able to filter out 
much of the noise associated with fundamental information analysis. In reality however, filtering 
out noise from a signal requires multiple reflective and corrective observations. Dugast and 
Foucault (2016) provide a concise articulation of this filtration principle and state that “information 
processing filters out noise in raw information but it takes time” (p.1). Similarly, Deb, Koo and 
Liu (2014) construct a model in which informed traders can either trade early on an unverified, 
                                                          
148 This advanced platform is known as high-end capability computer infrastructure. 
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noisy signal or they can choose to wait and trade on verified information. Inexorably, Deb et al. 
(2014) imply that filtering out noise from a signal requires extended processing. 
Thus, by including an extended processing period in the benchmark model, we are attempting to 
capture the aforementioned information filtration principle; the supposition that filtering out noise 
from a signal is an extended and complex process.  
Note that in Kyle’s original (1985) formulation the informed trader receives a simplified, one-shot 
signal of firm fundamentals (i.e. 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒). However, as evidenced by the error term (𝑒) there is 
some residual noise in his signal. Naturally, Kyles (1985) model seems to ignore the information 
filtration principle.   
Below we present an overview the benchmark model’s information structure, as it pertains to the 
System 2 algorithmic trader. 
5.4.2.1 Overview of signal structure  
 
Before we formally introduce the benchmark model, we provide a basic overview of the model’s 
information structure (the structure and formation process of System 2 trader’s private 
information). Note the introductory nature of this overview precludes an in-depth discussion here. 
Precise details are provided in the next sections.  
Consider the following broad outline of the benchmark model’s information environment. 
Notably, there is only one trading round in the benchmark model. We denote this single trading 
round with the upper case letter 𝑻. In 𝑻, a single auction takes place in the interval [0.1]. More 
formally, a security is traded in a single auction in a time interval which begins at time 𝑡 =  0 and 
ends at time 𝑡 = 1.  
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The securities value at the end of trading – its fundamental value – is denoted by v which is 
assumed to be normally distributed with an initial mean 𝑝0 and variance 𝜎𝑣
2; in short 𝑣~𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2). 
In line with conventional microstructure models of trading (e.g., Kyle, 1985; Foster & 
Viswanathan, 1996; Holden & Subrahmanyam, 1992; Vayanos, 1999) the informed trader in our 
model (the System 2 algorithmic trader) is set to receive private information in the trading period 
(𝑻) in the form of a noisy signal 𝑠 about the securities end of trading value 𝑣. This signal is set to 
satisfy:  
                                                     𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠              (𝑒𝑠 represents the noise in the signal). 
(The subscript 𝑠 in 𝑒𝑠 was used to affirm that the error relates specifically to the signal 𝑠) 
This is where the extended processing period comes to the fore. 
To prepare for the assumptions made for System 2 algorithmic traders in our taxonomy, we extend 
Kyle’s (1985) timeline somewhat and introduce an extended phase of information processing. The 
extended processing phase is an information gathering period for System 2 algorithmic traders and 
there is no trading in this period. We have already alluded to this no-trade condition in the 
preceding paragraphs. That noted, we should emphasize that the rationale for this no-trade 
condition has been motivated in part by De long et al., (1990).   
In lieu of a lengthy analysis of their model, we simply note that De long et al., (1990) adopt a 
similar approach to ours by including an extended period (Period 0)149 in their model. Herewith, 
period 0 occurs immediately preceding the trading round. De long et al., (1990) provide a neat 
summary of the function of period 0. They write: 
                                                          
149 Theoretical microstructure models typically begin with period 1. 
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Period 0 is a reference period. The price is set at its initial fundamental value of 
zero, and there is no trading. Period 0 provides a benchmark against which traders 
can measure the appreciation or depreciation of stock from period 0 to period 
1…Since there is no trading in period 0, market clearing conditions are 
automatically satisfied  (p. 387). 
Dugast and Foucault (2016) provide a similar example of this no-trade condition. Specifically, 
these authors presume that in period 0, speculators can only acquire information about the asset 
and do not trade until period 1. 
With regards to the benchmark model, the System 2 algorithmic trader is granted an additional 
phase of information processing in order to account for the inherent complexities associated with 
filtering out noise from a signal (𝑠) – further details will be provided below. 
Consistent with the relevant literature (i.e., De long et al., 1990; Dugast & Foucault, 2016), the 
extended processing phase, denoted 𝑻− , occurs in the period immediately preceding the trading 
round.150 Here, through a cumulative three-step filtration process, the System 2 algorithmic trader 
produces uniquely private information about the noise (𝑒𝑠) in the forthcoming value relevant signal 
𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠 (recall, the System 2 algorithmic trader only obtains this value relevant signal in the 
trading period i.e., in period 𝑻).  
We refer to the extended periods ( 𝑻−)  private information as advanced 𝐾 information and denote 
the sum of its parts 𝐾0 (see Box 5.4 for a visual summary). We utilize parts of Kim and 
Verrecchia’s (1994, 1997) notation here. Refer to appendix II (b) for further details. A review of 
                                                          
150 The more traditional term ‘period 0’ could easily be misconstrued to imply that the model is a multi-period model. To avoid 
this, we use the term  𝑻− to denote the extended processing phase.   
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appendix II (b) may have added benefit in that may orientate the reader with some of the 
informational dimensions of our analysis to follow. 
In its totality, advanced 𝐾 information (𝐾0) communicates 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠, in short 
𝐾0 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠. 
Essentially, as evidenced by the variables 𝑠 and 𝑒𝑠, this private information concerns a future signal 
error/noise and says nothing about the fundamental value 𝑣 itself – this is also implied by the 
assumption that the System 2 trader only obtains the actual 𝑣 relevant signal (𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠) in the 
next period i.e., the trading round (𝑻).  
Crucially, advanced 𝐾 information is only useful in the trading period (𝑻), in conjunction with the 
fundamental signal itself 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠. Consequently, we do not view advanced 𝐾 information as 
actionable information until the trading period (𝑻), when it can be combined with the value 
relevant signal. We reiterate that advanced 𝐾 information (gathered in the extended processing 
phase 𝑻−), only becomes actionable information when the trading round starts (𝑻) and the 
fundamental value relevant signal (𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠) is received. In other words, 𝐾 information i.e., 
𝐾0 = 𝒔 − 𝒆𝒔 is only used in the actual trading period, in conjunction with the signal 𝑠 = 𝒗 + 𝒆𝒔.  
Once the fundamental signal (𝑠 = 𝒗 + 𝒆𝒔) is obtained, advanced 𝐾 information (𝐾0 = 𝒔 − 𝒆𝒔), 
gathered in the extended processing phase (𝑇−) can be used to correct for the error (𝒆𝒔) in the 
value relevant signal (𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝒆𝒔). 
(The aforementioned discussion remains an overview of the signal structure in the benchmark 
model. This will be expanded on and explored further in the relevant subsections that follow) 
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We discuss the extended processing phase 𝑻− (specifically the structure of advanced 𝐾 
information) in more detail below. Section 5.4.3 considers 𝑻 , the actual trading period in more 
detail. 
 
5.4.3 The Extended Processing Phase (𝑻−) 
As emphasized above, advanced 𝐾 information alone is not informative about the firms liquidating 
value 𝑣 in the extended processing phase;151 there is no trading here. Since there is no trading in 
the extended processing phase, the market clearing conditions are automatically satisfied. 
5.4.3.1. Advanced 𝐾 information  
Recall, advanced 𝐾 information is acquired through a three-step cumulative information 
processing mechanism. Before we outline these steps, consider the following important principle: 
Namely, the structure of the informed trader’s private information is not crucial. As articulated by 
Rochet and Vila (1994): “Given that all traders are assumed to be risk-neutral it is only needed 
that the information structures be nested i.e., that the informed trader knows more than the market” 
(p.132). This principle suffices as justification for our ability to modify Kyle’s model with 
advanced 𝐾 information without inducing irreconcilable dynamics. 
                                                          
151 Recall that, in its totality, advanced 𝐾 information (𝐾0) communicates 𝑠 − 𝑒. As evidenced by the variables 𝒔 and 𝒆, this private 
information concerns a future signal error/noise and says nothing about the fundamental value 𝒗 itself – this is also implied by the 
assumption that the System 2 trader only obtains the actual 𝑣 relevant signal (𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒) in the next period i.e., the trading 
round (𝑻).  
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The steps involved in the derivation of advanced 𝐾 information are outlined below.152 
1. In step one, the System 2 algorithmic trader receives a piece of advanced 𝐾 information in the 
form 𝐾2 = 𝑠 + 𝛿. The term, 𝛿 represents an idiosyncratic noise term, the type described by Kim 
& Verrecchia (1994) in Appendix II (by adding additional noise we intend to capture the principal 
that filtering information is a cumulative process that requires multiple reflective and corrective 
observations). 
2. In step two, the System 2 algorithmic trader acquires an additional piece of 𝐾 information in the 
form 𝐾1 = 𝛿 + 𝑒𝑠. 
3. Finally, in step three, the algorithmic trader combines 𝐾2 and 𝐾1; generating 𝐾0, uniquely private 
information about an error/noise in a forthcoming signal of firm value. Here 𝐾0 communicates 𝑠 −
𝑒𝑠.  In other words, collectively the 𝐾𝑠 generate private advanced extended processing period 
information in the form of  𝐾0, where, 
 
𝐾0 ≡ 𝐾2 − 𝐾1 = 𝒔 − 𝒆𝒔 
 
The structure of advanced 𝐾 information is presented below in Box 5.4.153 
                                                          
152 Our decision to structure advance 𝐾 information as a cumulative information gathering process follows, quite directly, from a 
key assumption made in cognitive science regarding System 2 cognitive processing. Particularly, in cognitive science, System 2 is 
seen as a high-level processor, abstracting information and expressing knowledge as production rules. The representations in this 
system are symbolic and unbounded, in that they are based on propositions that can be combined to form larger and more complex 
sets of propositions. (Sloman, 1996; Smolensky, 1988). Herein lies our rationale: Just as System 2 processes are able to 
‘accumulate’ and ‘combine’ bits of information to produce novel outputs, so too, System 2 algorithmic traders in our set-up acquire 
advance 𝐾 information through a cumulative process which can be combined to produce a novel output. 
153 Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997) follow a similar approach when it comes to modelling additional information. Consequently, 
we utilize parts of Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994, 1997) notation here. Refer to Appendix II (b) for further details. A review of 
appendix II (b) may have added benefit in that may orientate the reader with some of the informational dimensions of advance 𝐾 
information.  
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BOX 5.4: THE STRUCTURE OF ADVANCED K INFORMATION: OUTLINING THE STEPS INVOLVED IN 
ITS DERIVATION. 
 
Box 5.4 provides a visual representation of the structure and steps involved in the derivation of advanced 𝐾 information., We 
should emphasize again that the structure of the informed trader’s private information is not crucial. Under the assumption that 
all traders are risk neutral, it is only needed that the information structures be nested i.e., that the informed trader knows more 
than the market (Rochet & Vila, 1994). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.4 The Trading Period (𝑻) 
 
Recall, there is only one trading round in the benchmark model. 𝑇 denotes the trading round. In 
this single trading round, trading takes place after 𝑇−, in the interval [0.1]. More formally, a 
security is traded in a single auction in in a time interval which begins at 𝑡 = 0 and ends at 𝑡 = 1. 
Consistent with the literature (e.g. Kyle, 1985), we begin by assuming that the risky asset to be 
traded has an ex-post payoff of 𝑣 where the value is drawn according to 𝑣~𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2). As 
evidenced below, nature selects a true value v from a prior normal distribution 𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2) for the 
traded asset.  
 
 
(1) 𝐾2 = 𝑠 + 𝛿 
(2) 𝐾1 = 𝛿 + 𝑒𝑠 
(3) 𝐾0 ≡ 𝐾2 − 𝐾1 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠 
Box 5.4. Structure of Advanced 𝑲 
Information 
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Effectively, the ex-post liquidation value of the risky asset is its true/fundamental value and is a 
normally distributed random variable with initial mean (𝑝0)154 and variance (𝜎𝑣
2). 
Like Kyle (1985) the informed agent - the System 2 algorithmic trader in our case – receives 
private information in the form of a noisy signal about v at time 𝑡 = 0 that satisfies 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠. 
Again, this signal communicates v but with a substantial amount of noise 𝑒𝑠. (Because of 𝑒𝑠 this 
signal is only partially revealing of firm value - note again that the subscript 𝑠 in 𝑒𝑠 is used to 
affirm that the error relates specifically to the signal 𝑠.)  
This is where advanced 𝐾 information, gathered in the previous period comes to the fore. The 
advanced 𝐾 information becomes actionable information now - in the trading period. Recall, in its 
totality, advanced 𝐾 information communicates 𝒔 − 𝒆𝒔. Here, the System 2 algorithmic trader 
combines the fundamental value relevant signal 𝑠 with the advanced 𝐾 information (gathered in 
the previous period,  𝑻−) to correct for the noise in the signal; thereby forming a perfect forecast 
of 𝑣: 
(1)  𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠 
(2) 𝐾0 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠 
(3) 𝑠2 = 𝑣 
Effectively, 𝑠2 reflects the System 2 algorithmic trader’s private information in the trading round, 
in the form of a revised and perfect estimate of fundamental value v. Most notably, our assumption 
that the informed trader’s private information in equilibrium is perfect (i.e., can forecast without 
                                                          
154 Note here that that all players are risk neutral. Chen (2016) suggests that under the assumption of risk neutrality, 𝑝0 also typifies 
the initial stock price (this will become clearer shortly). 
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noise) is a stronger assumption than that made in Kyle (1985), where the informed trader has a 
weaker/less perfect signal of 𝑣 - we compare our results with Kyle’s at the end of this chapter. 
Some Intuition for the Equilibrium: 
 
 
Recall that in the trading period (time 𝑡 = 0), the System 2 algorithmic trader combines 𝑠 = 𝑣 +
𝑒𝑠 with 𝐾0 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠, to form a perfect forecast of the firm’s end of period fundamental value v. 
Once the algorithmic trader is perfectly informed about v (i.e., observes v without any noise), he 
and uninformed noise traders submit market orders to the market maker to be executed at a single 
market-clearing price 𝑝. These submitted orders are of two kinds: the order from the informed 
trader, 𝑥, and orders from the uninformed traders, 𝑢. The 𝑢 component is a normally distributed 
random variable that is independent of 𝑣, with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝑢
2. We reiterate that  𝑢 is 
determined exogenously, simplifying inference. 
The market maker sets a price 𝑝 and trades the quantity necessary to make the markets clear. The 
prices determined by the market maker are assumed to equal the expectation of the liquidation 
value of the commodity, conditional on the market maker’s information sets at the dates the prices 
are determined. Their information consists of observations of the current and past quantities traded 
by the informed and uninformed traders combined. Like Kyle (1985) we call these aggregate 
quantities the ‘order flow’. The aggregate order flow is denoted by 𝑦, where 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢 . 
Contextually, conditional on 𝑦, the market maker determines a price, 𝑝, at which he will clear the 
entire order. That is, 
𝑝 = 𝑃(𝑦) ,       𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢 
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As in Kyle (1985), the market makers pricing rule is pinned down by the assumption that he 
expects to earn a profit of zero.  
This assumption is consistent with free entry of competing market makers, a condition under which 
the single market maker cannot exercise monopoly power. Again, market makers are simply vote 
counters, not analysts of fundamentals; and the votes they count are the order flows. The 
assumption that market makers earn zero profit is important to the model and is shared by many 
other models within microstructure. Essentially, when market makers determine the price 𝑝 at 
which they trade the quantity necessary to clear the market they observe 𝑥 + 𝑢, but not 𝑥 or 𝑢 (or 
even 𝑣) separately.155 Expected profit of zero implies that the market maker sets price 𝑝 as a 
function of the sum 𝑥 + 𝑢 such that 
                                                          𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑥 + 𝑢]                                                       (5.4.1) 
We reiterate that based on the generalizations relating to System 2 algorithmic traders (which we 
have modelled explicitly above); we have suggested that the System 2 algorithmic trader observes 
𝑣 noiselessly in equilibrium – this assumption follows directly from the assumptions made in our 
final dual-process taxonomy of algorithmic trading – a taxonomy that was supported by an 
instantiation of the concept and consolidated with empirical evidence on algorithmic trading 
activities. It follows, that in the trading period, the System 2 algorithmic trader’s problem is to 
determine the optimal purchase (or sale) of quantity 𝑥.  
His objective function is given by 
                                                𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥
 𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] = 𝐸[(𝑣 − 𝑝)𝑥]                                            (5.4.2) 
                                                          
155Here 𝑥 simply denotes the System 2 algorithmic traders order, his strategy however is denoted 𝑋. 
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Our equilibrium characterisation follows Kyle (1985). Like Kyle (1985) we focus on a Bayesian 
Nash Equilibrium (BNE), where all strategies are linear in equilibrium (namely, we conjecture 
linear strategies for both the System 2 algorithmic trader and the market maker and then verify that 
these conjectures are actually the best response to one another’s strategies).156 Section 4.6.2.1 
highlights the rationale for focusing on a linear equilibrium.  
We obtain a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium by considering (1) that the informed System 2 algorithmic 
trader chooses a demand function that maximises expected profits,157 given his expectation of the 
impact of his order on the market price and (2) that market-makers set prices based on their 
Bayesian interpretation of the information they possess. Precisely, we show that there is an 
equilibrium in which the System 2 algorithmic trader’s quantity 𝑥 is a linear function of his private 
information on 𝑣, and the equilibrium asset price 𝑝 chosen by the market maker is a linear function 
of 𝑥 + 𝑢.  
Below we provide an overview of the equilibrium concept. We highlight some key assumptions 
and define the equilibrium conditions. While the overview does not provide detailed proofs (proofs 
are covered in Section 5.5), it does attempt to outline the important steps and highlight the key 
intuition. By clarifying the underlying economics as effectively as possible, the overview serves 
as a premise from which we can comprehensively analyse the benchmark model. The benchmark 
model is formally introduced in Section 5.5. 
                                                          
156 Because all conjectures will be linear combinations of functions in which the coefficients are ‘constants to be determined’, this 
whole approach to finding particular solutions is formally called the method of undetermined coefficients. 
157 The System 2 algorithmic trader is risk neutral. Thus, risk is not considered in the optimal behaviour of the agent as maximising 
expected profits and expected utility are equivalent (De-Jong & Rindi, 2009). Specifically, under the assumption of risk neutrality, 
the expected utility of end-of-period profits is simply equal to expected end-of-period profits. Consider the following proof: With 
an exponential utility function, we obtain: 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸[𝑈(𝜋𝑖)] = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 [𝐸(𝜋𝑖) − (
𝐴
2
)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑖)]. Adding risk neutrality (𝐴 = 0), 
maximisation of expected utility simplifies to maximisation of expected profits. 
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Definition 5.1 (Equilibrium conditions).        The Nash equilibrium studied in the benchmark 
model from time 𝑡 = 0 onwards is formally defined as two functions, a trading strategy 𝑋(∙) and 
a pricing rule 𝑃(∙), satisfying a profit maximisation condition and a market efficiency condition. 
(Note that 𝑥 denotes the System 2 algorithmic trader’s traded quantity and 𝑋(∙) is his trading 
strategy. Likewise, 𝑝 denotes the price set by the market maker and 𝑃(∙) the market maker’s 
pricing ‘rule’158 – the notation is Kyle’s). 
 
The profit maximisation condition states that the quantity traded by the System 2 algorithmic trader 
𝑥 = 𝑋(∙) , maximises the System 2 algorithmic trader’s expected profits, taking the pricing rule 
𝑃(∙) as given, i.e., 
𝑥 = 𝑋(𝑣) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸[𝑥(𝑣 − 𝑃(𝑦))|𝑣
𝑥
]. 
The market efficiency condition states that the market maker’s expected profits equal to zero, 
conditional on observing the order flow, and taking the System 2 algorithmic traders strategy as 
given, i.e., 
𝑝 = 𝑃(𝑦) = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑋(𝑣) + 𝑢 = 𝑦]. 
 
 
Contextually, an equilibrium is defined to be an 𝑋(𝑣) and 𝑃(𝑦) which simultaneously satisfy 
conditions/equations (5.4.1) and (5.4.2).  
Like Kyle, we rely on the method of undetermined coefficients to solve for equilibrium. Namely, 
the coefficients 𝛽 and λ will only be determined in equilibrium. 
 
                                                          
158 The terms ‘rule’ and ‘strategy’ are used interchangeably throughout.  
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In equilibrium these coefficients are given by 
                                                             𝜆∗ =
1
2
√𝜎𝑣2/𝜎𝑢
2                                                    (5.4.3)  
and, 
                                                                𝛽∗ = √𝜎𝑢2/𝜎𝑣
2                                                       (5.4.4) 
Outline of Proof: 
Our proof starts by showing that a linear trading strategy (chosen by the System 2 algorithmic 
trader) and the linear pricing rule (chosen by the market maker) are mutual best responses. The 
problem reduces to two best response equations with two unknown parameters (𝛽, 𝜆) which yield 
(5.4.3) and (5.4.4) respectively. Following an outline of the proof, properties of the equilibrium 
are discussed. 
Begin with the assertion that the market maker prices linearly. That is, 
                                                         𝑃(𝑦) = 𝑝0 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢).                                          (5.4.5) 
Given his revised and perfect information on 𝑣, the System 2 trader’s problem becomes 
                                                       𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥
 𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] = 𝐸[(𝑣 − 𝑝)𝑥]                                         (5.4.6) 
𝑠. 𝑡.      𝑝 = 𝑝0 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢). 
Inserting the constraint into the objective function yields the following quadratic objective: 
                                             𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥
 𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] = 𝐸[(𝑣 − 𝑝0)𝑥 − 𝜆𝑥
2 − 𝜆𝑥𝑢|𝑣] 
                                                               = (𝑣 − 𝑝0)𝑥 − 𝜆𝑥
2                                        (5.4.7) 
where the assumption that 𝐸(𝑢) = 0 eliminates the last term. Profit is maximised when 
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                                                     𝑋(𝑣) =
1
2𝜆
(𝑣 − 𝑝0) = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0)                           (5.4.8) 
where, 
                                                                     𝛽 =
1
2𝜆
                                                     (5.4.9) 
Plugging 𝑋(𝑣) back into the objective function yields an expected profit function for the System 
2 algorithmic trader of  
                                                              𝜋𝑆2 =
(𝑣−𝑝0)
2
4𝜆
                                                             (5.4.10) 
Evidently, 𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] =
(𝑣−𝑝0)
2
4𝜆
 characterises the System 2 algorithmic trader’s conditional profits.159 
Thus, we have shown what we have set out to show: given a pricing rule which is a linear function 
of the market order, the informed System 2 trader optimally plays a strategy which is linear in 𝑣 −
𝑝0. 
Conversely, suppose that the informed System 2 trader employs the proposed linear strategy. Then 
the market maker’s pricing rule is given by  
                                             𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] = 𝐸[𝑣|𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0) + 𝑢]                                (5.4.11) 
As per standard game theoretic nomenclature, the symbol “⃒” is used to denote “conditional upon” 
(Rasmusen, 2001). 
                                                          
159 The System 2 trader’s unconditional profits are given by 𝐸(𝜋) =
𝜎𝑣
2
4𝜆
. The difference between his unconditional profits 𝐸(𝜋) =
𝜎𝑣
2
4𝜆
  and his conditional profits 𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] =
(𝑣−𝑝
0
)2
4𝜆
  is as follows: unconditional profits increase with asset value variance, but 
conditional profits decrease with it. This is because, unconditionally, a high asset value variance makes it more likely that the 
difference between 𝑣 and 𝑝0 will be large. Conditionally, this variance does not affect the observed difference, but still affects the 
market maker's reaction to the observed order volume.  
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Like Kyle, we assume that v and u are uncorrelated and normally and independently distributed. 
(Such assumptions are typical in models based on Kyle’s framework and are made with little or 
no theoretical justification – a distribution is chosen because it ‘fits’ and /or it is tractable 
(McCarthy, 2000)).  
Nevertheless, being a linear combination of normals, y is also normal and its distribution given by 
                                                            𝑦~𝑁(0, 𝛽2, 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2)                                         (5.4.12) 
The value (𝑣) and the total market order (𝑦) are therefore bivariate normal and are positively 
correlated provided that 𝛽 is positive. Specifically, 
                                       𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝑦) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0) + 𝑢) = 𝛽𝜎𝑣
2                            (5.4.13) 
A convenient property of the bivariate normal distribution is that the expectation of 𝑣 conditional 
upon 𝑦 is linear. In particular, the net order flow provides a signal of the asset value 𝑣, so that the 
market maker can use the noisy signal 𝑦 to form their expectation of 𝑣. The resulting conditional 
expectation 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] will generally differ from their unconditional expectation 𝑝0. As the aggregate 
order size from noise traders’ 𝑢 is normally distributed and independent of 𝑣, the expected value 
of 𝑣 conditional on 𝑦 is provided by the projection theorem:160 
                                                          
160 The projection theorem is very useful for deriving the conditional mean and variance. The proof of the projection theorem can 
be found in almost any statistics book (see for example, Goldberger, 1991). Here, the projection theorem follows quite directly 
from the ordinary least squares regression rule. Consider two joint normally distributed random variables, 𝑋~𝑁(𝜇𝑥 , 𝜎𝑥
2) and 
𝑌~𝑁(𝜇𝑦 , 𝜎𝑦
2), and denote their covariance 𝜎𝑥𝑦. A property of the bivariate normal distribution is that the conditional density of 𝑌 
given 𝑋 = 𝑥 is itself normal with conditional mean:𝐸[𝑌|𝑥] = 𝜇𝑦 +
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 (𝑥 − 𝜇𝑥) = (𝜇𝑦 −
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 𝜇𝑥) +
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 𝑥, which is the predicted 
value of 𝑌 from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the equation 𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋, upon setting the explanatory variable 𝑋 =
𝑥. The slope coefficient  
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2  is precisely the OLS estimate of 𝑏. In our case the expected value of 𝑣 conditional on 𝑦 is provided 
by the projection theorem: 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] = 𝐸(𝑣) +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣,𝑦)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
(𝑦 − 𝐸(𝑦)). 
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𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] = 𝐸(𝑣) +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝑦)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
(𝑦 − 𝐸(𝑦)) 
                                                          = 𝑝0 +
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2𝜎𝑣
2+ 𝜎𝑢
2  𝑦                                                 (5.4.14) 
                                                                     = 𝑝0 + 𝜆𝑦 
 
where, 
                                                               𝜆 =
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2𝜎𝑣
2+ 𝜎𝑢
2                                                    (5.4.15) 
Hence, the market maker's best response is a linear strategy. 
The appealing simplicity of the model is seen to derive from the assumption that 𝑣 and 𝑢 are each 
normally distributed – such assumptions have become standard in Kyle type models. We follow 
convention here. Contextually, provided that the System 2 trader's order 𝑥 is linear in 𝑣, then, 
given 𝑣 and 𝑢 are normally and independently distributed, the total market order, 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢, will 
be a linear combination of normals, implying that it will be normally distributed as well. That 
𝑣 and 𝑦 are bivariate normal guarantees that the pricing rule - the expectation of the asset's value 
𝑣 conditional upon the market order 𝑦 - will be a linear function of the market order. Concurrently, 
a linear pricing rule implies that the System 2 algorithmic trader’s profit was a quadratic function 
of his order, which in turn, guarantees that his optimal order, 𝑋(𝑣), would be linear in 𝑣. 
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The equilibrium solutions for 𝜆∗ and  𝛽∗ are obtained by solving the following system of two 
equations and two unknowns: 
{
 
 𝜆 =
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2𝜎𝑣2 +  𝜎𝑢2
𝛽 =
1
2𝜆
 
 
which gives: 
{
𝜆∗ =
1
2
√𝜎𝑣2/𝜎𝑢
2
𝛽∗ = √𝜎𝑢2/𝜎𝑣
2
 
This verifies that the equilibrium values of λ and 𝛽 are those shown in equations (5.4.3) and (5.4.4) 
respectively. This concludes the overview of the benchmark model. For easy reference, we close 
our overview with a visual representation of the benchmark models timeline – Figure 5.4.  
Formal analysis of the benchmark model follows in Section 5.5. Section 5.5 also demonstrates 
exactly how the benchmark model nests the Kyle (1985) model. 
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FIGURE 5.4: TIMELINE OF THE BENCHMARK MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.    Timeline of the benchmark model with a single System 2 algorithmic trader. There are two periods in 
the benchmark model: (a) the extended processing period/phase and (b) the trading period.  T− characterises the 
extended processing period. Time T represents the trading period.  
To account for the reflective/effortful processing characteristics of System 2 algorithmic traders in our taxonomy, we 
include an additional phase of information processing in our benchmark model. The extended processing phase, 
denoted T− , occurs in the period immediately preceding the trading round. Here, through a cumulative three-step 
filtration process, the System 2 algorithmic trader produces uniquely private information in the form of advanced 𝐾 
information (Box 5.4 in Section 5.4.2, provides a visual representation of the structure and steps involved in the 
derivation of advanced 𝐾 information – notation included). In its totality, advanced 𝐾 information communicates 𝑘0 =
𝒔 − 𝒆𝒔  and concerns the noise in a forthcoming value relevant signal However, advanced  𝐾 information alone is not 
informative about the firms liquidating value 𝑣 at   T−.  It concerns a forthcoming signal error/noise and is only useful 
in conjunction with the forthcoming signal itself. Thus, there is no trading in  T− and market clearing conditions are 
automatically satisfied.   
T denotes the trading round. Recall, there is only one trading round in the benchmark model. In this single trading 
round, trading takes place in the interval [0.1]. More formally, a security is traded in a single auction in a time interval 
which begins at t = 0 and ends at t = 1. The securities value at the end of trading is denoted by 𝑣 which is assumed 
to be normally distributed with an initial mean 𝑝0 and variance 𝜎𝑣
2.  Like Kyle (1985), the informed agent - the System 
2 algorithmic trader in our case - receives private information in the form of a noisy signal about v at time t = 0 that 
satisfies 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠. This signal communicates 𝑣 but with a substantial amount of noise 𝑒𝑠 (because of 𝑒𝑠 this signal 
only partially reveals firm value.) This is where advanced 𝐾 information, gathered in the previous period/phase comes 
to the fore. Advanced 𝐾 information becomes actionable information now - in the trading period 𝑡 = 0. Recall, in its 
totality, advanced K information communicates 𝐬 − 𝒆𝒔.  
Period                       The Extended Processing Period ( 𝐓− )                               The Trading Period (𝐓) 
Event   System 2 Trader: (1) 𝐾2 = 𝑠 + 𝛿                                 System 2 Trader:  (1)  𝒔 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠           1st Trade             Final Quote 
                                           (2) 𝐾1 = 𝛿 + 𝑒𝑠                                                            (2)  𝑘0 = 𝒔 − 𝒆𝒔 
                                           (3) 𝐾0 ≡  𝐾2 − 𝐾1 = 𝒔 − 𝒆𝒔                                          (3)  𝑠2 = 𝑣 
Pricing Function                                                                                                                                      𝑃(∙)                       
Order Flow                                                                                                                                              System 2: 𝑥 
                                                                                                                                                                  Noise: 𝑢 
 
Time                             𝑇−                                                                                  𝑡 = 0                                                       𝑡 = 1 
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In the trading period (𝑇), the algorithmic trader combines the fundamental value relevant signal s with the advanced 
𝐾 information to correct for the noise in the signal; thereby forming a perfect forecast of 𝑣: 
(1)  𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠 
(2) 𝐾0 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠 
(3) 𝑠2 = 𝑣 
Effectively, s2 reflects the System 2 algorithmic trader’s private information in the trading round, in the form of a 
revised and perfect estimate of fundamental value 𝑣. After observing 𝑣, the algorithmic trader chooses to trade the 
quantity 𝑥. At the same time, noise traders choose to trade quantity 𝑢.  Market makers set a price 𝑝 and trade the 
quantity that makes markets clear. The game ends at time 1. Although the benchmark model conforms to Kyle’s 
standard set-up, our assumption that the informed traders signal is perfect is a stronger assumption than that made in 
Kyle (1985). In Kyle, the informed trader observes the fundamental value 𝑣, but with some residual noise: (𝑒). Because 
the System 2 algorithmic trader in our model has a perfect forecast of 𝑣 (we modelled explicitly the process by which 
he acquires this information above) the benchmark model exemplifies type 2 information asymmetry. An elegant 
property of the benchmark model is thus; if we nullify advanced 𝐾 information (rendering it completely useless), then 
the benchmark model collapses to Kyle’s original (1985) model. Inevitably, the benchmark model nests the Kyle 
(1985) model. The assumption that the System 2 algorithmic trader observes advanced 𝐾 information is the main 
difference with Kyle (1985). In our benchmark model, advanced 𝐾 information enables the System 2 algorithmic 
trader to form a perfect forecast of 𝑣. However, the assumption that the algorithmic trader observes 𝑣 (complete 
information) is not crucial. According to Rochet and Vila (1994, p.132), “under the assumption that all agents are risk 
neutral it is only needed that the information structures be nested i.e. that the informed trader knows more than the 
market maker”. This principle suffices as justification for our ability to modify Kyle’s model with advanced 𝐾 
information without inducing irreconcilable dynamics.  
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5.5 FORMAL BENCHMARK MODEL: PROOFS 
We consider a benchmark model with (a) two periods, (b) two assets and (c) three types of traders. 
a) There are two periods in the benchmark model: (1) the extended processing period and 
(2) the trading period/phase. 𝑇− characterises the extended processing period. Time 
𝑇 represents the trading period. In the actual trading round 𝑇, time is indexed 𝑡 = 0 and 
𝑡 = 1 . Actual trading begins at time 𝑡 = 0  as does our derivation of equilibrium.  
b)  Traders trade two assets: a risk-free asset with zero interest rate and a risky asset. The 
risky asset has an ex-post payoff of 𝑣 where the value is drawn according 
to 𝑣~𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2).  
c) Three kinds of traders exist: (1) uninformed noise traders randomly trade normally 
distributed  𝑢~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2), shares for exogenous non-informational reasons; (2) a market 
maker who sets the pricing function, absorbs the residual order flow imbalances, and 
makes zero expected profits and (3) a System 2 algorithmic trader with private, 
sequential observations of the ex-post liquidation value of the risky asset. Evidently, the 
System 2 algorithmic trader replaces the informed trader in Kyle (1985). Our results are 
contrasted with Kyle’s original model at the end of this chapter 
At   𝑇−, the extended processing period, the System 2 algorithmic trader receives advanced 𝐾 
information. In its totality, advanced 𝐾 information communicates 𝐾0 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠  and concerns the 
noise in a forthcoming value relevant signal (see Section 5.4.2, Box 5.4). However, advanced  𝐾 
information (concerning a forthcoming signal error/noise) can only be used in conjunction with 
the forthcoming signal itself. In other words, advanced  𝐾 information alone is not informative 
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about the firms liquidating value 𝑣 at    𝑇−. There is no trading in  𝑇− and market clearing 
conditions are automatically satisfied.161 
In the trading period, time 𝑇 (beginning at 𝑡 = 0) the System 2 algorithmic trader receives the 
value relevant signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠. The signal is only partially revealing of firm value because it 
contains a significant amount of noise, 𝑒𝑠. This is where advanced 𝐾 information – gathered in the 
previous period – comes to the fore. At time 𝑡 = 0  the advanced 𝐾 information can be used in 
conjunction with 𝑠, to correct for the noise in the value relevant signal. Essentially by the time 
trading commences, the System 2 algorithmic trader has a revised and perfect forecast of 𝑣 – the 
fundamental liquidating value of the asset.  
Recall, our Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is derived from time 𝑡 = 0 onwards. 
In the trading period 𝑇 (𝑡 = 0 , 𝑡 = 1)  the System 2 algorithmic trader determines what the time 
𝑡 = 1 realization of v will be (the process of how the System 2 determines this value is detailed 
above). 
We emphasise here that very specific functional form assumptions underlie our equilibrium 
analysis.  
                                                          
161We have already explained this no-trade condition in the preceding section. Particularly, Dugast and Foucault (2016) provide a 
similar example of this no-trade condition. These authors presume that in period 0, speculators can only acquire information about 
the asset and do not trade until period 1.The rationale for this no-trade condition has also been motivated in part by De long et al., 
(1990) who include an initial reference period (Period 0) in their model. Contextually, Period 0 provides a benchmark against which 
traders can measure the appreciation or depreciation of stock from period 0 to period 1. De long et al., (1990) articulate this no 
trade condition precisely and state that “since there is no trading in period 0, market clearing conditions are automatically satisfied” 
(p. 387). Conversely, in terms of notation, we have suggested that ‘period 0’ could easily be misconstrued to imply that the model 
is a multi-period model. To avoid this, we use the term  𝑻− to denote the extended processing phase in our model(s).   
 
178 
 
  
More precisely, by assuming (1) that the relevant random variables are normally and independently 
distributed and (2) that the objective function has a specific form, the benchmark model acquires 
a tractable linear structure. Indeed, under these assumptions (that 𝑢 and 𝑣 are independent random 
variables) we are able to justify that there is a linear solution for our strategic game. The formal 
equilibrium of the benchmark model is analysed below. 
5.5.1 Formal Equilibrium of the Benchmark Model 
There exists an equilibrium (𝑋, 𝑃), in which the System 2 algorithmic trader’s trading strategy 𝑋 
and the market maker’s pricing rule 𝑃 are linear functions. Here, the equilibrium P and X are 
given by: 
 
𝑋(𝑣) = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0),    𝑃(𝑦) =  𝑝0 + 𝜆𝑦,       
where  
𝛽∗ = √𝜎𝑢2/𝜎𝑣
2 
and: 
𝜆∗ =
1
2
√𝜎𝑣2/𝜎𝑢
2  
 
The proof is provided below. 
To prove that there exists a linear equilibrium for this strategic game one needs to conjecture linear 
strategies for both the System 2 algorithmic trader and the market maker and then verify that these 
conjectures were actually the best response to one another’s strategies. 
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The following caveat should be highlighted: in order to exemplify the narrative that 𝑝0 typifies 
both the prior, and the initial stock price of the traded asset, some notational modifications were 
necessary (relative to the notation used in the overview above). These modifications were done 
solely for the sake of explanatory convenience and have no theoretical implications. Consider the 
following: 
5.5.2 Computation of Equilibrium 
Conjecture a linear strategy for the System 2 algorithmic trader in the form 𝑋(𝑣) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣 and a 
linear pricing rule for the market maker in the form 𝑃(𝑦) = 𝜇 + 𝜆 (𝑦). Because the coefficients 𝛽 
and 𝜆 will only be determined in equilibrium, our analysis relies on the method of undetermined 
coefficients to solve for equilibrium. 
Also note:  
                            𝑃(𝑦) = 𝑝 = 𝜇 + 𝜆(𝑦) ,       𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢 
and 
𝑋(𝑣) = 𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣 
Accordingly, one can suffice in using equations 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 to denote the pricing and order 
submission rules respectively: 
 
                                                           𝑝 = 𝜇 + 𝜆 (𝑥 + 𝑢),                                          (5.5.1) 
 
                                                          𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣,                                                     (5.5.2) 
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Based on the ‘generalisations’162 relating to System 2 algorithmic traders (which we have modelled 
explicitly above), one can write the System 2 algorithmic trader’s profits as: 
 
                                                        𝜋𝑠2 = (𝑣 − 𝑝)𝑥                                                      (5.5.3) 
 
With (5.5.1) – (5.5.3) we find the expected profits of the System 2 algorithmic trader to be 
 
                                             𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] = 𝐸[𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢))𝑥|𝑣]                            (5.5.4) 
                                                          = ( 𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥)𝑥. 
 
Maximizing (5.5.4) to determine the optimal order size of the algorithmic trader gives the 
following first order condition: 
 
                                           𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥 − 𝜆𝑥 = 𝑣 − 𝜇 − 2𝜆𝑥 = 0.                              (5.5.5) 
 
Rearranging yields 
 
                                                               𝑥 = −
𝜇
2𝜆
+
𝑣
2𝜆
.                                           (5.5.6) 
 
Comparing coefficients with (5.5.2) we get 
 
                                                                  𝛽 =
1
2𝜆
,                                                  (5.5.7) 
                                                                   𝛼 = −
𝜇
2𝜆
= −𝜇𝛽. 
 
The second order condition for a maximum, 
                                                          
162 We have suggested that the System 2 algorithmic trader observes 𝑣 noiselessly in equilibrium – this assumption follows directly 
from the assumptions made in our final dual-process taxonomy of algorithmic trading – a taxonomy that was supported by an 
instantiation of the concept and consolidated with empirical evidence on algorithmic trading activities. 
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                                                              −2𝜆 < 0,                                                 (5.5.8) 
 
states that we only have to consider positive 𝜆. Using  𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑢 + 𝑥] we get with (5.5.1) and 
(5.5.2) and the results of the conditional mean of jointly normal random variables (i.e., the 
projection theorem):163 
                                                        𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑥 + 𝑢]                                                   (5.5.9) 
 
 = 𝐸[𝑣] +
𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝑣,𝑥+𝑢]
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑥+𝑢]
(𝑥 + 𝑢 − 𝐸[𝑥 + 𝑢]) 
 = 𝑝0 +
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2𝜎𝑣
2+ 𝜎𝑢
2 (𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝0) +
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2𝜎𝑣
2+ 𝜎𝑢
2 (𝑥 + 𝑢). 
 
By comparing coefficients with (5.5.1) we see that 
 
                                                        𝜆 =
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2𝜎𝑣
2+ 𝜎𝑢
2,                                                     (5.5.10) 
 
                                                              𝜇 = 𝑝0 − 
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2𝜎𝑣
2+ 𝜎𝑢
2 (𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝0) = 𝑝0 − 𝜆(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝0). 
 
Solving (5.5.7) and (5.5.10) we get with (5.5.8): 
                                                          
163 The projection theorem is very useful for deriving the conditional mean and variance. Here, the projection theorem follows quite 
directly from the ordinary least squares regression rule. Consider two joint normally distributed random variables, 𝑋~𝑁(𝜇𝑥 , 𝜎𝑥
2) 
and 𝑌~𝑁(𝜇𝑦 , 𝜎𝑦
2), and denote their covariance 𝜎𝑥𝑦. A property of the bivariate normal distribution is that the conditional density 
of 𝑌 given 𝑋 = 𝑥 is itself normal with conditional mean:𝐸[𝑌|𝑥] = 𝜇𝑦 +
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 (𝑥 − 𝜇𝑥) = (𝜇𝑦 −
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 𝜇𝑥) +
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 𝑥, which is the 
predicted value of 𝑌 from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the equation 𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋, upon setting the explanatory 
variable 𝑋 = 𝑥. The slope coefficient  
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2  is precisely the OLS estimate of 𝑏. In our case the expected value of 𝑣 conditional on 𝑦 
is provided by the projection theorem: 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] = 𝐸(𝑣) +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣,𝑦)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
(𝑦 − 𝐸(𝑦)). The proof of the projection theorem can be found in 
almost any statistics book (see for example, Goldberger, 1991). 
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                                                             𝛽 = √
 𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑣
2 ,                                                       (5.5.11) 
 
𝜆 =
√𝜎𝑣
2
2√ 𝜎𝑢
2
 
 
                                                                        𝜇 = 𝑝0, 
 
                                                                       𝛼 = −𝛽𝑝0. 
 
As a result we can rewrite (5.5.1) and (5.5.2) as 
 
                                                    𝑝 = 𝑝0 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢),                                               (5.5.12) 
 
                                                       𝑥 = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0).                                                      (5.5.13) 
 
This confirms that the linear equilibrium exists and is unique.164  
 
From (5.5.12) we derive 𝜆, which measures the influence an additional unit of an order has on 
price: 
 
                                                          
𝜕𝑝
𝜕(𝑥+𝑢)
= 𝜆                                                      (5.5.14) 
 
                                                          
164 See Boulatov, Kyle and Livdan (2012) for a lucid description of what it means for an equilibrium to be ‘unique’. 
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We define a market as liquid if by placing an additional order the price does not change – this is 
Kyle’s definition. Therefore 𝜆 measures the liquidity of the market, the closer it is to zero the more 
liquid the market is. Usually, 1 𝜆⁄  is taken as a measure of liquidity as by this definition a larger 
value corresponds to higher liquidity. Naturally, lambda cannot be zero. 
5.6 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
In order to compute the equilibrium solution for the benchmark model, we used a concept of 
equilibrium that embodied the strategic interaction of traders with incomplete information. More 
precisely, under the model’s assumptions, a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium was obtained by 
considering (1) that the informed System 2 algorithmic trader chooses a demand function that 
maximises expected profits,165 given his expectation of the impact of his order on the market price 
and (2) that market-makers set prices based on their Bayesian interpretation of the information 
content of the aggregate order flow. Precisely, we showed that there is an equilibrium in which the 
System 2 algorithmic trader’s quantity 𝑥 is a linear function of his private information on 𝑣, and 
the equilibrium asset price 𝑝 chosen by the market maker is a linear function of 𝑥 + 𝑢.  
As is customary (à la Kyle), we allow traders to hold conjectures on one another’s strategies. 
Contextually, in the benchmark model, the market maker conjectures that the System 2 algorithmic 
trader is using a linear strategy, satisfying 𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣. Likewise, the System 2 algorithmic trader 
conjectures that the market maker is using a price adjustment rule that is linear in aggregate order 
                                                          
165 The System 2 algorithmic trader is risk neutral. Thus, risk is not considered in the optimal behaviour of the agent as maximising 
expected profits and expected utility are equivalent (De-Jong & Rindi, 2009). Specifically, under the assumption of risk neutrality, 
the expected utility of end-of-period profits is simply equal to expected end-of-period profits. Consider the following proof: With 
an exponential utility function, we obtain: 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸[𝑈(𝜋𝑖)] = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 [𝐸(𝜋𝑖) − (
𝐴
2
)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑖)]. Adding risk neutrality (𝐴 = 0), 
maximisation of expected utility simplifies to maximisation of expected profits. 
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flow: 𝑝 = 𝜇 + 𝜆 (𝑥 + 𝑢). Notably, we were able to prove that if players hold the above mentioned 
conjectures, such conjectures are actually the best response to one another’s strategies – an 
important property of game theoretic Nash equilibria (see Box 4.6, particularly Step 3). 
In the following subsection, we analyse the benchmark equilibrium vis-à-vis each agent (i.e., from 
the perspective of the System 2 algorithmic trader and the market maker respectively).  
The following subsection may appear a bit missionary and repetitive to some readers. However, it 
provides the necessary foundation for Section 5.7, where we present a non-trivial illustrative 
example of the benchmark model. 
 
5.6.1 The System 2 Algorithmic Trader 
 
Suppose that the System 2 algorithmic trader conjectures that the market maker uses a price 
adjustment rule that is linear in aggregate order flow: 𝑝 = 𝜇 + 𝜆 (𝑦) where 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢. Also, here, 
the System 2 algorithmic trader acquires a revised and perfect estimate of the ex-post fundamental 
value 𝑣. Knowledge of 𝑣 implies that the System 2 algorithmic traders (random) profits can be 
expressed as 𝜋𝑆2 = (𝑣 − 𝑝)𝑥. Substituting in for the price conjecture 𝑝, and for aggregate order 
flow 𝑦, we get realized random profits of : 
 
𝜋𝑆2 = (𝑣 − 𝑝)𝑥 
 
= [𝑣 − (𝑦𝜆 + 𝜇)]𝑥 
= [𝑣 − ((𝑥 + 𝑢)𝜆 + 𝜇)]𝑥 
 
As seen in equation (5.5.4), conditional on his perfect information on 𝑣, the System 2 algorithmic 
traders expected profits are: 
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𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] = 𝐸[𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢))𝑥|𝑣] 
 
= ( 𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥)𝑥. 
 
As equation (5.5.5) demonstrates, the first order condition is 
𝜕𝐸(𝜋|𝑥,𝑣)
𝜕𝑥
= 𝑣 − 𝜇 − 2𝜆𝑥 = 0. The 
solution can thus be expresses as 𝑥 =
𝑣−𝜇
2𝜆
.  Concomitantly, the second order condition is 
𝜕2𝐸(𝜋|𝑥,𝑣)
𝜕𝑥2
= −2𝜆𝑥 < 0. See equation (5.5.8). The System 2 algorithmic trader maximises expected 
profits by trading this 𝑥. As intuition suggests the System 2 algorithmic trader makes more profit 
that the informed trader in Kyle (1985). As will become clear from the proof below, the lower the 
noise in the informed (S2 algorithmic trader’s) signal, the higher the profit, also the higher the S2’s 
trading intensity 𝛽; since the S2 trader would trade more aggressively due to his perfect knowledge 
about the asset value 𝑣. 
 
5.6.2 The Market Maker 
 
Suppose that the market maker conjectures that the System 2 algorithmic trader is using a strategy 
satisfying the linear 𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣. Congruent with Kyle’s intuition, the market maker knows the 
functional form of the System 2 algorithmic trader’s information and he can equate this to his 
conjecture: 
𝑣−𝜇
2𝜆
= 𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣. This holds for all 𝑣. Therefore, 𝛼 = −
𝜇
2𝜆
 and 𝛽 =
1
2𝜆
. See equation 
(5.5.7). We can then solve for 𝜆 and 𝜇.  
The market maker sets a price 𝑝 and trades the quantity that makes markets clear. As noted above, 
the market maker observes the aggregate order flow as 𝑦. The market maker knows 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢, 
but does not view either 𝑥 or 𝑢 individually. Given this information, the market maker sets an 
equilibrium market price 𝑝 that he expects to give him zero expected profits. 
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This zero profit assumption satisfies the market efficiency condition described above (that is, 
definition 5.1 (Equilibrium conditions)). Specifically, the market efficiency condition states that 
the market maker’s expected profits equal to zero,166conditional on observing the order flow, and 
taking the System 2 algorithmic traders strategy as given, i.e., 
𝑝 = 𝑃(𝑦) = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑋(𝑣) + 𝑢 = 𝑦]. 
Expected profit of zero implies that the market maker sets the equilibrium price 𝑝 as a function of 
𝑥 + 𝑢 such that: 𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦]. 167 
Provided that the informed trader's order 𝑥 is linear in 𝑣, then, given 𝑣 and 𝑢 are normally 
distributed, the total market order, 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢, will be a linear combination of normals, implying 
that it will be normally distributed as well. That 𝑣 and 𝑦 are bivariate normal guarantees that the 
pricing rule - the expectation of the asset's value 𝑣 conditional upon the market order 𝑦 - will be a 
linear function of the market order. Consequently, 𝑦 is said to provide a noisy signal of 𝑣. In 
particular, the net order flow provides a signal of the asset value 𝑣, so that the market maker can 
                                                          
166 This zero profit assumption is consistent with the free entry of competing market makers; whereby no single market maker can 
exercise monopoly power. The underlying Bertrand competition with potential rival market makers is not explicitly modelled in 
Kyle (1985). Rather Kyle (1985) suggests that the market efficiency condition could be replaced with an explicit Bertrand auction 
between at least two risk neutral bidders, each of whom observes the order flow 𝑥 + 𝑢 and nothing else. The results of this explicit 
procedure would be the market efficiency condition, in which profits of market makers are driven to zero. Since the implied 
Bertrand competition between market makers is sufficient enough reason for Kyle (1985) to presuppose a single market maker who 
expects to earn zero profits, it should also suffice for our analysis here. Notably, in our model, a single market maker assumed to 
set semi-strong informationally efficient prices that give him zero expected profits. Although modelling how market makers can 
earn the positive frictional profits necessary to attract them into the business of market making is an interesting topic, Kyle (1985) 
argues that such analysis would “take us away from the main objective of studying how price formation is influenced by the 
optimising behaviour of an informed trader in a somewhat idealized setting” (p.1318). 
167 This equation can also be expressed as 𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑥 + 𝑢]. Notice from the equations above that the market maker’s pricing 
function depends on the System 2 algorithmic trader’s demand function 𝑋(𝑣). If there were only noise traders, then net demand 
would be 𝑦 = 𝑢. The pricing function that results would reduce to 𝑃(𝑦) = 𝑝 =  𝐸[𝑣|𝑢] and the market would be infinitely deep. 
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use the noisy signal 𝑦 to form their expectation of 𝑣. The resulting conditional expectation 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] 
will generally differ from their unconditional expectation 𝑝0. As the aggregate order size from 
noise traders’ 𝑢 is normally distributed and independent of 𝑣, the expected value of 𝑣 conditional 
on 𝑦 is provided by the projection theorem. Here, the projection theorem follows quite directly 
from the ordinary least squares regression rule (See for example, Goldberger, 1991):   
Consider two joint normally distributed random variables, 𝑋~𝑁(𝜇𝑥, 𝜎𝑥
2) and 𝑌~𝑁(𝜇𝑦, 𝜎𝑦
2), and 
denote their covariance 𝜎𝑥𝑦. A property of the bivariate normal distribution is that the conditional 
density of 𝑌 given 𝑋 = 𝑥 is itself normal with conditional mean:𝐸[𝑌|𝑥] = 𝜇𝑦 +
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 (𝑥 − 𝜇𝑥) =
(𝜇𝑦 −
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 𝜇𝑥) +
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2 𝑥, which is the predicted value of 𝑌 from an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression of the equation 𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋, upon setting the explanatory variable 𝑋 = 𝑥. The slope 
coefficient  
 𝜎𝑥𝑦
𝜎𝑥
2  is precisely the OLS estimate of 𝑏. In our case the expected value of 𝑣 conditional 
on 𝑦 is provided by the projection theorem: 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] = 𝐸(𝑣) +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣,𝑦)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
(𝑦 − 𝐸(𝑦)). 
Therefore, 
                                                           𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦]                                                (5.5.9 A)                                                   
 
= 𝐸(𝑣) +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝑦). [𝑦 − 𝐸(𝑦)]
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
 
 
= 𝑝0 +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝑢 + 𝑥). [𝑦 − 𝐸(𝑢 + 𝑥)]
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢 + 𝑥)
 
 
𝑝0 +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝑢 + (𝛼 + 𝑣𝛽)). [𝑦 − 𝐸(𝑢 + (𝛼 + 𝑣𝛽))]
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢 + (𝛼 + 𝑣𝛽))
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                                                        𝑝0  +
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2.(𝑦−𝛼−𝑝0𝛽)
 𝜎𝑢
2+𝛽2𝜎𝑣
2                             (5.5.9.1 A) 
 
= (
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
 𝜎𝑢2 + 𝛽2𝜎𝑣2
)𝑦 + 𝑝0 +
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2. (−𝛼 − 𝑝0𝛽)
 𝜎𝑢2+𝛽2𝜎𝑣2
 
 
= (
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
 𝜎𝑢2 + 𝛽2𝜎𝑣2
)𝑦 +
−𝛼𝛽𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝑝0 𝜎𝑢
2
 𝜎𝑢2+𝛽2𝜎𝑣2
 
 
Thus, 𝜆 =
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2𝜎𝑣
2+ 𝜎𝑢
2, and 𝜇 =
−𝛼𝛽𝜎𝑣
2+𝑝0 𝜎𝑢
2
 𝜎𝑢
2+𝛽2𝜎𝑣
2 . See equation (5.5.10) for an analogous expression.  
We have already deduced in the overview above, in equation (5.5.7), that  𝛼 = −
𝜇
2𝜆
 and 𝛽 =
1
2𝜆
. 
Therefore, we were able to deduce in equation (5.5.11) that: 
 
𝛼 = −
√ 𝜎𝑢2  𝑝0 
√𝜎𝑣2
 
 
𝜇 = 𝑝0 
 
𝜆 =
√𝜎𝑣2
2√ 𝜎𝑢2
 
 
𝛽 =
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
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By implication we were able to express equilibrium in equation (5.5.12) and (5.5.13) as: 
 
                                                       𝑝 = 𝑝0 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢) 
 
𝑥 = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0) 
 
Equilibrium can also be expressed using the analogous equations (5.5.12 A) and (5.5.13 A) 
whereby; 
 
                                                     𝑝 = 𝑝0 + 𝜆(𝑦) = 𝑝0 +
√𝜎𝑣
2
2√ 𝜎𝑢
2
 𝑦                                  (5.5.12 A) 
 
                                                     𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣 =
√ 𝜎𝑢
2 
√ 𝜎𝑣
2 
(𝑣 −  𝑝0)                                     (5.5.13 A) 
 
5.6.3 Properties of the Solution  
The System 2 algorithmic trader’s order flow 𝑥 satisfies 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑣 −  𝑝0). If the signal 
exceeds the unconditional prior, the System 2 trader buys, and vice versa. The more uncertainty 
there is surrounding the noise traders’ order flow, the larger is the System 2 algorithmic trader’s 
trade ceteris paribus. In other words, the greater is the amount of noise trading 𝜎𝑢
2, the larger is the 
magnitude of the order submitted by the System 2 algorithmic trader for a given deviation of 𝑣 
from its unconditional mean. Hence, the System 2 algorithmic trader trades more actively the 
greater is the ‘camouflage’ provided by noise traders. More noise trading makes it more difficult 
for the market maker to extract the signal of the System 2 algorithmic trader from the noise.  
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Note that 
𝑝 = 𝑝0 + 𝜆(𝑦) 
           = 𝑝0 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢) 
                              = 𝑝0 + 𝜆[ 
1
2𝜆
(𝑣 − 𝑝0) + 𝑢] 
       =
𝑣 + 𝑝0
2
+ 𝜆𝑢. 
That is, the market maker’s market clearing price is the average of the prior price 𝑝0 and the signal 
𝑣 plus the uninformed order flow 𝑢 times the (inverse) liquidity parameter. So price is average of 
prior plus signal plus the move caused by liquidity traders as a function of the degree of liquidity. 
Profits 
From the model we see that the System 2 algorithmic trader’s realised profit is: 
 
𝜋𝑆2 = (𝑣 − 𝑝)𝑥 
 
=
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
 (𝑣 − 𝑝0)[𝑣 − (
√𝜎𝑣2
2√ 𝜎𝑢2
 𝑦 + 𝑝0)] 
 
=
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
 (𝑣 − 𝑝0)
2 −
1
2
𝑦(𝑣 − 𝑝0) 
 
=
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
 (𝑣 − 𝑝0)
2 −
1
2
𝑦(𝑥 + 𝑢)(𝑣 − 𝑝0) 
 
=
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
 (𝑣 − 𝑝0)
2 −
1
2
[
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
(𝑣 − 𝑝0) + 𝑢](𝑣 − 𝑝0) 
 
=
1
2
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
(𝑣 − 𝑝0)
2 −
1
2
𝑢(𝑣 − 𝑝0) 
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It follows that the System 2 algorithmic trader’s conditional profit is: 
 
𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] =
1
2
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
(𝑣 − 𝑝0)
2 
 
Moreover, his ex-ante ‘unconditional profit’168 is:  
 
𝐸(𝜋) =
1
2
√ 𝜎𝑢2𝜎𝑣
2 
 
 where, 
𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] =
1
2
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
(𝑣 − 𝑝0)
2 
=
(𝑣 − 𝑝0)
2
4𝜆
 
 
That is, conditional expected profit is linear in depth (1/ 𝜆) because double the depth doubles the 
System 2 algorithmic traders opportunity for profit. Notice that compared to Kyle’s original 
formulation (as seen in Appendix III) ,  𝛽 is larger, and the System 2 algorithmic trader trades more 
aggressively. At the same time, 𝜆 increases and depth decreases. As before, the market maker loses 
on trades with the informed (System 2 algorithmic trader) and gains money on trades with the 
uninformed traders. Hence, relative to Kyle, both trading profits and costs are higher in our 
                                                          
168 The System 2 trader’s unconditional profits are given by 𝐸(𝜋) =
1
2
√ 𝜎𝑢
2𝜎𝑣
2. The difference between his unconditional 
profits 𝐸(𝜋) =
1
2
√ 𝜎𝑢
2𝜎𝑣
2  and his conditional profits 𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] =
(𝑣−𝑝0)
2
4𝜆
  is as follows: unconditional profits increase with asset value 
variance, but conditional profits decrease with it. This is because, unconditionally, a high asset value variance makes it more likely 
that the difference between 𝑣 and 𝑝0 will be large. Conditionally, this variance does not affect the observed difference, but still 
affects the market maker's reaction to the observed order volume. More details are given below in the proceeding Section 5.6.4 
(interpretation of equilibrium). 
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formulation (Refer to Appendix III for detailed analysis of Kyle’s original solution). We elaborate 
further below. 
 
5.6.4 Interpretation of Equilibrium 
 
From our solution to the equilibrium order submitted by the System 2 algorithmic trader (equation 
5.5.13 A), we can see that the greater the amount (volatility) of noise trading, the greater the 
magnitude of the order submitted by the System 2 trader for a given deviation of 𝑣 from its 
unconditional mean 𝑝0. Hence, the informed System 2 algorithmic trader trades more actively on 
his private information the greater is the ‘camouflage’ provided by uninformed traders. More 
uninformed noise trading makes it more difficult for the market maker to extract information from 
noise. Also consider the following: If equation (5.5.13 A) is substituted into equation (5.5.12 A) 
one obtains  
 
                                                    𝑝 = 𝑝0 +
1
2
√ 𝜎𝑣
2
√𝜎𝑢
2
𝑢 +
1
2
(𝑣 − 𝑝0)                                         (5.6.4) 
=
1
2
(
√ 𝜎𝑣2
√𝜎𝑢2
𝑢 + 𝑝0 + 𝑣) 
Notably, one-half of the System 2 algorithmic trader’s perfect private information on 𝑣, 
(namely;  
1
2
𝑣) is reflected in the equilibrium price, so that, like Kyle (1985), the price is not fully 
revealing. (A fully revealing price would be 𝑝 = 𝑣.) This insight is qualified below. Before we 
substantiate further, a review the difference between the System 2 algorithmic trader’s conditional 
and unconditional profits is provided: 
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Using (5.5.13 A) and (5.6.4) we show now that the System 2 trader’s expected profits can be 
expressed as  
𝐸[𝜋] = 𝐸[𝑥(𝑣 − 𝑝)] = 𝐸[
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
(𝑣 − 𝑝0)
1
2
(𝑣 − 𝑝0 −
√ 𝜎𝑣2
√𝜎𝑢2
𝑢)] 
As emphasised in the overview of the model, at the beginning of the trading period 𝑇 
‘conditional’169 on knowing 𝑣 (that is after using advanced 𝐾 information to forecast 𝑣 perfectly), 
the informed System 2 trader expects profits of 
𝐸[𝜋|𝑣] =
1
2
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
(𝑣 − 𝑝0)
2 
=
(𝑣 − 𝑝0)
2
4𝜆
 
Hence, the larger is v’s deviation from 𝑝0, the larger the System 2’s expected profit. Moreover, 
unconditional on knowing 𝑣, that is prior to the start of trading, the System 2 trader expects a profit 
of 
𝐸[𝜋] =
1
2
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
𝐸[(𝑣 − 𝑝0)
2] 
1
2
√ 𝜎𝑢2𝜎𝑣
2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
169 Recall, as per standard game theoretic nomenclature, the symbol “⃒” is used to denote “conditional upon” (Rasmusen, 2001). 
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5.6.5 Information Revelation 
 
In line with convention, we use the variance of the market maker’s posterior distribution for 𝑣 to 
formally measure how much of the informed System 2 algorithmic trader’s perfect information is 
revealed through trading. 
Initially, the market maker has an expectation that is distributed about 𝑣 with a variance we will 
denote as 𝜎0
2 – this is the prior variance. However, after observing the aggregate order flow (i.e., 
= 𝑥 + 𝑢), the market maker’s expectation is distributed about 𝑣 with a variance 𝜎1
2; whereby, 
                                                                   𝜎1
2 =
1
2
𝜎0
2                                                     (5.6.5) 
The result above (equation 5.6.5) was obtained using Bayes’ rule for updating conditional 
variances.170 A succinct exposition of this result (i.e., its derivation) is provided below. 
Implications are also noted. Consider the following: 
Bayes’ formulation for the determination of conditional variances of jointly distributed random 
variables can be expressed as: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌|𝑋) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑌) −
[𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑌)]2
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑋)
 
For the purpose of the benchmark model, this formula can be restated as: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑣|𝑝] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑣] −
𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝑣, 𝑝]2
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑝]
 
Now, define 𝜎0
2 = 𝜎𝑣
2 and 
 𝜎1
2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟[𝑣|𝑝] 
                                                          
170  The proof of the Bayes’ theorem can be found in almost any statistics book. Therefore, we use it here without derivation. To 
see its formal derivation, we refer readers to the appropriate literature (i.e., Maurer & Ralston, 2005; McCarthy, 2000; Nanda, 2002; 
Platen & Heath, 2006). 
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It is then simple to show using the formulation above that (𝜎1
2 =
1
2
𝜎0
2).  
Notably, the updated variance is exactly one-half of the prior variance. This means that informed 
System 2 trader’s strategy results in exactly half of his private information being revealed by the 
market price; that is, the new conditional variance of the true value of the stock is only half of the 
original unconditional variance.171 
Interestingly, like Kyle (1985), half the informed trader’s private information has been revealed 
through trading. Perhaps more importantly however, because the System 2 algorithmic trader has 
more accurate information on v than the informed trader in Kyle (1985); the 2 algorithmic trader 
in our benchmark model effectively reveals more accurate information in the trading process than 
the informed trader in Kyle (1985). The illustrative example below should clarify this concept.   
5.7 AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF THE BENCHMARK MODEL 
 
Suppose that the unconditional value of a stock in the benchmark framework is normally 
distributed with a mean of R50 and a variance equal to 30. (We use the local South African 
currency R (Rand) to denote value here. However, the economic role of currency is trivial and (R) 
was used solely for illustrative convenience. We could have very easily used $ to denote value in 
this example)   
We begin by considering the following scenario: 
                                                          
171 The intuition for this result starts with the fact that we expect the variance of asset price conditional upon observing the order 
flow to be lower than the unconditional variance 𝜎0
2 (or 𝜎𝑣
2) because some of the informed trader’s signal should have been revealed 
through trading. One would not expect  𝜎1
2 to collapse to zero: In that case, the System 2 would make no profit, because all the 
trades would clear at the perfectly revealing price. Nor would one expect  𝜎1
2 to remain at 𝜎0
2: In that case the market maker learns 
nothing, and the informed trader could make infinite profits. 
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Suppose that in 𝑇− (the the extended processing phase/period), the System 2 algorithmic trader 
obtains and observes uniquely private information about the noise in a forthcoming, value relevant 
signal (this value relevant signal satisfies  𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠, and is set for a forthcoming period) We 
define the extended processing phase/period private information as advanced 𝐾 information 
(advanced 𝐾 information comprises of 𝐾2, 𝐾1 and 𝐾0). In its totality this information 
communicates 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠. The structure of 𝐾 information is presented above in Chapter 5, Section 
5.4.2 (see particularly, Box 5.4). As emphasized throughout, this information is about the noise in 
a forthcoming signal and is not informative about the firms liquidating value 𝑣 at phase (𝑇−).  
𝑇 denotes the trading period. Here a single auction occurs in the interval 𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡 = 1. As 
referenced above, the System 2 trader receives a value relevant signal in the form 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠 at 
time 𝑡 = 0. The signal is only partially revealing of firm value because it contains a significant 
amount of noise 𝑒𝑠. This assumption is consistent with prior microstructure models of trading (See 
e.g. Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985). 
However, in contrast to prior microstructure models of trading, the informed agent in our model is 
able to correct for the noise in this signal; forming a revised and perfect estimate of the ex-post 
fundamental value of the risky asset 𝑣. Conceptually, the information gathered by the System 2 
algorithmic trader in the previous period/phase (i.e., advanced 𝐾 information) is used to provide a 
context or interpretation to the signal received in the trading period. In other words, at time 𝑡 = 0  
the advanced 𝐾 information (gathered in the extended processing phase) can be utilised, in 
conjunction with 𝑠, to correct for the noise (𝑒𝑠) in the signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠.  (See Section 5.4.2) 
Consider the following illustration: 
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5.7.1 Equilibrium Illustration 
As previously indicated, our illustrative example considers a normally distributed stock with a 
mean of R50 and a variance equal to 30.  
In line with conventional approaches, the informed agent receives private information in the form 
a signal about the ex-post liquidating value of the stock. This signal satisfies 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠.  For 
illustrative convenience let us assume that this signal communicates 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠 ≡ 44.5.  Let us 
also assume (again, only for illustrative purposes) that 0 < 𝑒𝑠 < 1.  In the majority of 
microstructure models of trading this simplified, one-shot signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠 would be the informed 
trader’s private information. The reason is that  𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠 ≡ 44.5 (0 < 𝑒𝑠 < 1) provides a better 
estimate of the time 𝑡 = 1 realization of v than its initial mean of R50.  
However, we depart from this traditional, single-signal approach by assuming that, in addition to 
this one-shot signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠, the informed agent in our model has access to other forms of 
private information; information that can be combined and filtered into a perfect forecast of an 
assets true/fundamental value v. Indeed, consistent with the reflective/effortful processing 
characteristics of System 2 algorithmic traders in our taxonomy, we include an additional phase of 
information processing in our model. Again, the System 2 algorithmic trader is granted this 
additional phase of information processing in our model to account for the inherent complexities 
associated with filtering out noise from a signal. The extended processing phase, denoted 𝑇− , 
occurs in the period immediately preceding the trading round. Here, through a cumulative three-
step filtration process, the System 2 algorithmic trader produces uniquely private information 
about the noise (𝑒𝑠) in the forthcoming value relevant signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠. Knowledge of 𝑒𝑠 in the 
trading period means that the System 2 algorithmic trader observes v perfectly in equilibrium. In 
198 
 
  
other words, the System 2 algorithmic trader determines that the fundamental value of the stock is 
actually 𝑣 = R45 per share.  
Barring these additional assumptions, the System 2 traders signal would have simply been 𝑠 =
𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠 ≡ 44.5. 
We are now in a better position to illustrate the equilibrium of the benchmark model. Let us recap: 
 
 The securities value at the end of trading is denoted by v which is assumed to 
be normally distributed with a mean 𝑝0 (R50) and variance 𝜎𝑣
2 (30) 
 
 Give the modelling assumptions mentioned above, the System 2 algorithmic 
trader determines that the fundamental value of the stock is actually 𝑣 = (R45) per 
share.  
 
 Suppose that uninformed investor trading is random and normally distributed 
with an expected net share demand of zero  𝜎𝑢
2 equal to say, 5000.  
 
 The market maker can observe the total level of order volume 𝑥 +  𝑢 where 𝑢 
reflects noise trader transactions and 𝑥 reflects informed demand but cannot distinguish 
between 𝑥 and 𝑢. 
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What would be the System 2 algorithmic traders demand for the stock? 
 
We determine the level of the System 2 traders demand by solving for 𝑥 using the following 
equation (5.5.13 A): 
𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣 =
√ 𝜎𝑢2 
√ 𝜎𝑣2 
(𝑣 −  𝑝0) 
 
=
√5000
√30
(45 − 50) = −64.5497 
 
With 𝑝0 = (𝑅50) and 𝑣 = (𝑅45), the System 2 algorithmic trader would like to sell as many 
shares as possible in order to earn a R5 profit on each, but cannot because the market maker would 
correctly infer that his share sales convey meaningful information.  
At what level does the market maker set his price? 
 
Given the total demand that the market maker observes (𝑥 + 𝑢) = −64.5497 + 0,  we can 
calculate the level that he sets the price using the following parameters: 
 
𝛼 = −
√ 𝜎𝑢2  𝑝0 
√𝜎𝑣2
= −
√5000. 50
√30
=  −645.49 
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𝛽 =
√ 𝜎𝑢2
√𝜎𝑣2
=
√5000
√30
= 12.91 
 
𝜆 =
√𝜎𝑣2
2√ 𝜎𝑢2
=
√30
2. √5000
= 0.0387 
 
Using equation (5.5.9.1 A) here for illustrative convenience, we can determine the market maker 
sets the price as follows: 
 
   𝑝 =  𝑝0 +
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2. (𝑦 − 𝛼 − 𝑝0𝛽)
 𝜎𝑢2 + 𝛽2𝜎𝑣2
 
 
= 50 +
12.91 ∙ 30 ∙ (−64.5497 + 0 + 645.49 − 50 ∙ 12.91)
5000 + 12.912 ∙ 30
 
 
= 47.50 
 
Thus, the results of our illustrative example are consistent with and confirm the models solution. 
After a single round of trading, approximately half of the System 2 algorithmic trader’s perfect 
private information (𝑣 = 45) is revealed by the equilibrium price.  
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5.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
In this chapter we presented the benchmark model with only one type/system of algorithmic trader; 
a System 2 algorithmic trader with an inherent accuracy advantage.  
The literature confirms, somewhat ubiquitously, that algorithmic traders outperform their human 
counterparts in terms of predictive accuracy. Thus, our suggestion that the accuracy advantage is 
exclusive to algorithmic traders is a reasonable one. 
However, a crucial premise of this thesis is that algorithmic trading is not an isolated phenomenon. 
Thus, by including only a certain portion of algorithmic trading strategies (strategies that fall under 
the rubric of System 2 algorithmic trading) the benchmark model functions exclusively as an 
introductory concept.  
Although the benchmark concept builds the initial link between our dual process construct of 
algorithmic trading and market microstructure, it neglects crucial interactions underlying our dual 
process formulation. The overarching dual process microstructure model of algorithmic trading, 
presented in the following chapter, is the focus of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ALGORITHMIC TRADING, MARKET QUALITY AND INFORMATION: A 
THEORETICAL DUAL-PROCESS MODEL 
 
6.1 FOREWORD 
 
The benchmark model functions as a preparatory concept, laying the microstructural foundations 
for our final model. In this section we present the final model. The model, to follow, fulfills the 
precepts underlying our dual process decomposition of algorithmic trading.  
Essentially, our taxonomy (Section 5.2) suggests a distinction between two separate types/systems 
of algorithmic trading. This dual process approach incorporates all known algorithmic trading 
strategies within a single unified microstructure framework. Inevitably, all the various strategies 
associated with algorithmic trading (as seen in Chapter 2, Section 2.4) correspond with their own 
respective system, and by implication, informational advantage. Table 6.1 is provided here for 
illustrative purposes. 
 
TABLE 6.1: COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE DUAL-PROCESS MOEL 
 
 COMPONENT 
  
SYSTEM 1 TRADING 
  
SYSTEM 2 TRADING 
 Private Information       Speed Advantage       Accuracy Advantage 
 Strategies  Spread Capturing Algorithms 
 Rebate Trading Algorithms 
 Time Weighted Average Price 
(TWAP) Algorithms 
 Volume Weighted Average Price 
(VWAP) Algorithms 
 Implementation Shortfall 
Algorithms 
 Adaptive Execution Algorithms 
 Liquidity Detection Algorithms 
 
 Data Mining Algorithms 
 Text Mining Algorithms 
 Neural Network Algorithms 
 Support Vector Machine Algorithms 
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Our all-inclusive dual process microstructure model will look at the effects of these two 
algorithmic trading systems individually and concurrently (that is, their constituent elements and 
dynamic interactions), but within the same framework. It is hoped that this integrative model – a 
model that integrates and synthesizes the multitude of algorithmic trading strategies within a single 
workable framework – may shed light on contradictory findings, and on previously unknown 
market variables.   
6.2 THE FINAL MODEL: INTRODUCTION 
This section presents the final model with two algorithmic traders – System 1 and System 2 
algorithmic traders. Our equilibrium characterisation follows the benchmark model.  
It is important to note that the benchmark model nests the Kyle (1985) model. In a limiting case 
of the benchmark model, where the System 2 algorithmic trader does not have access to his 
particular form of private information, the equilibrium reduces to the equilibrium of the static 
model of Kyle (1985). Likewise, here, in the final model, when the System 1 algorithmic trader 
has no information, the model collapses to the benchmark model. This will be explored below. 
Like the benchmark model, the final model considers two ‘periods’ – (1) an extended processing 
period/phase and (2) a single trading period. The System 2 algorithmic trader, the market maker 
and noise traders’ have the same action timing as in the benchmark model. However, we modify 
the timeline of the benchmark model to accommodate the System 1 algorithmic trader. More 
precisely, we introduce delays in trading and quoting into the trading period of the benchmark 
model and add a new type of trader, the System 1 algorithmic trader, who is fast enough to exploit 
the short delays (the rationale for which will be clarified below). 
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Assets and Traders         Traders trade two assets: a risk free numeraire asset with zero interest 
rate and a risky asset. We begin by assuming that the risky asset to be traded in the trading period 
has an ex-post payoff of 𝑣 where the value is drawn according to 𝑣~𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2). In other words, the 
ex-post liquidation value of the risky asset is normally distributed with mean 𝑝0 and variance 𝜎𝑣
2. 
All traders are risk neutral.  
Four kinds of traders exist: (1) uninformed noise traders randomly trade normally 
distributed  𝑢~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2), assets for exogenous non-informational reasons; (2) market makers set 
the pricing function, absorb the residual order flow imbalances, and make zero expected profits; 
(3) System 2 algorithmic trader with private, sequential observations of the ex-post liquidation 
value of the risky asset; and (4) System 1 algorithmic trader who anticipates incoming market 
orders, trades rapidly and has a short holding horizon.172 
The fourth type of trader – the System 1 algorithmic trader - is relatively new here and represents 
a novel addition relative to the benchmark model. Before we formally introduce the System 1 
algorithmic trader, let us briefly recap the assumptions regarding the other three agents as they 
appear in benchmark model. A refresher on these other traders will provide the contextual 
framework for the discussion to follow. System 1 algorithmic traders are defined and discussed in 
what proceeds.  
 
 
 
                                                          
172 This is just a broad overview of the agents in our model. As such, we only note the key characteristics of System 1 algorithmic 
trader’s here. The assumptions made for the System 1 algorithmic trader are clarified by the model itself, presented in Section 6.5. 
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System 2 Algorithmic Traders 
System 2 algorithmic traders are thoroughly addressed in the benchmark model (Section 5.4). As 
System 2 algorithmic traders in the final model are identical to the System 2 algorithmic traders in 
the benchmark model, the following discussion will be brief in nature: 
Like the benchmark model, the System 2 algorithmic trader is granted an additional phase of 
information processing in the final model. The extended processing phase, denoted 𝑇− , occurs in 
the period immediately preceding the trading round.  
At   𝑇−, the extended processing period, the System 2 algorithmic trader receives advanced 𝐾 
information. In its totality, advanced 𝐾 information provides 𝐾0 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠  and concerns the noise 
in a forthcoming value relevant signal (see Section 5.4.3 Box 5.4). However, advanced  𝐾 
information (concerning a forthcoming signal error/noise) can only be used in conjunction with 
the forthcoming signal itself. In other words, advanced  𝐾 information alone is not informative 
about the firms liquidating value 𝑣 at    𝑇−.  Thus, there is no trading in  𝑇− and market clearing 
conditions are automatically satisfied. 
Trading commences at time 𝑡 = 0. Here the System 2 algorithmic trader receives the value relevant 
signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠. Again, the signal is only partially revealing of firm value because it contains a 
significant amount of noise 𝑒𝑠. This is where advanced 𝐾 information – gathered in the previous 
period – comes to the fore. In the trading period, the advanced 𝐾 information can be used in 
conjunction with 𝑠, to correct for the noise in the value relevant signal. Essentially by the time 
trading commences, the System 2 algorithmic trader has a revised and perfect estimate of 𝑣 – the 
fundamental liquidating value of the asset.  
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Again, because we have already exhausted the description of System 2 algorithmic traders in the 
benchmark model itself, we direct interested readers to Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5, where we 
delineate the precepts underlying this type of private information – advanced 𝐾 information. 
Uninformed Noise Traders 
Uninformed noise traders are present in nearly all market microstructure models of trading.173 
Noise traders trade for liquidity, tax purposes, hedging, or other reasons which are exogenous to a 
given model. In line with Kyle (1985), the benchmark model, and other extant literature on the 
topic of market microstructure, we include uninformed noise traders in the final model.  
In accordance with the benchmark model, once trading commences, uninformed noise traders 
randomly trade normally distributed  𝑢~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2), assets for exogenous non-informational 
reasons. Like both Kyle’s (1985) and the benchmark model, 𝑢 is exogenously determined 
(simplifying inference). 
Market Makers 
There is extensive market microstructure literature on the topic of price formation in the presence 
of market makers and the present study forms part of this ongoing discourse. In both Kyle (1985) 
an the benchmark model above, an informed trader (a System 2 algorithmic trader in the 
benchmark model) trades against uninformed noise traders , in the presence of a price setting 
competitive market maker.  
The market maker sets a price and trades the quantity that makes markets clear. The prices 
determined by the market maker are assumed to equal the expectation of the liquidation value of 
                                                          
173  See Bagehot (1971) for a detailed discussion on the topic of noise trading. 
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the commodity, conditional on the market maker’s information sets at the dates the prices are 
determined. Their information consists of the aggregate ‘order flow’ (Chapters 4 & 5).  
The aggregate order flow provides a signal about the liquidation value of the asset to the market 
maker. Based on this signal, the market maker revises her/his beliefs and sets price such that it 
equals the expected liquidation value given the observed order flow. The resulting equilibrium 
price change is an increasing linear function of net order flow, whose slope represents a measure 
of the market depth. Although defined inconsistently in the literature (e.g., Lyons, 2001), 
practitioners often define market depth as an orders price impact - denoted 𝜆. 
The market maker in the final model serves the same function as those of the Kyle (1985) and the 
benchmark models. Thus, for the sake of the discussions to follow, let review some of the key 
insights that emerge from the benchmark model with regards to the market maker. 
Review of the Market Maker in the Benchmark Model 
In Kyle (1985) and the benchmark model, the market makers pricing rule is pinned down by the 
assumption that he expects to earn a profit of zero. This assumption is consistent with free entry 
of competing market makers, a condition under which the single market maker cannot exercise 
monopoly power.174  
                                                          
174 Kyle (1985) suggests that the market efficiency condition could be replaced with an explicit Bertrand auction between at least 
two risk neutral bidders, each of whom observes the order flow 𝑥 + 𝑢 and nothing else. The results of this explicit procedure would 
be the market efficiency condition, in which profits of market makers are driven to zero. Since the implied Bertrand competition 
between market makers is sufficient enough reason for Kyle (1985) to presuppose a single market maker who expects to earn zero 
profits, it should also suffice for our analysis here. Notably, a single market maker assumed to set semi-strong informationally 
efficient prices that give him zero expected profits.  
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The competition between market makers drives their (conditional) expected profits down to zero. 
So, the market clearing price they arrive at is just the expected price of the asset conditional upon 
the information they possess.175  
The assumption that market makers earn zero profit is important to both the benchmark and the 
final model and is shared by many other models within microstructure. Contextually, the market 
maker makes a loss on the trades with the informed trader, but recoups this loss on trades with the 
noise traders, making zero profit on average.  
Expected profit of zero implies that the market maker sets price 𝑝 as a function of the sum 𝑥 + 𝑢 
such that 
𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑥 + 𝑢]. 
Price depends on the sum  𝑥 + 𝑢  because the market maker does not observe 𝑥 and 𝑢 individually. 
Again, the 𝑢 component of that sum is exogenous which simplifies inference.176 The complication 
emerges from the 𝑥 component, which depends on the trading strategy 𝑋 of the informed trader – 
the System 2 algorithmic trader in the benchmark model (Section 5.4 distinguishes between the 
informed traders trading strategy 𝑋 and his order 𝑥). 
                                                          
175 The underlying Bertrand competition with potential rival market makers is not explicitly modelled in Kyle (1985). However, to 
add some concreteness, we highlight Kyles intuition with the following example: Recall that in both the benchmark model and in 
Kyle (1985), the market makers receive a net order flow equal to 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢, which they can only observe in aggregate. Holding 
this information they compete on prices, offering a price function 𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦]. The underlying Bertrand competition that drives the 
market makers’ expected profit to zero can be expressed concisely, whereby; 𝐸[𝜋𝑀|𝑦] = 𝐸((𝑝(𝑦) − 𝑣)𝑦|𝑦) = 𝐸((𝑝(𝑦) −
𝐸(𝑣|𝑦))𝑦) = 0. However, we emphasise (like Kyle) that it suffices to posit a single market maker who sets prices according to a 
semi-strong efficiency condition. Specifically, because Bertrand competition and the market efficiency condition are equivalent, 
we, like Kyle, speak in terms of a single market maker. See Chapter 5, Definition 5.1, for the given market efficiency condition. 
176 Notice that if there were only noise traders, then net demand would be 𝑦 = 𝑢. The pricing function would reduce to 𝑃(𝑦) =
𝑝 =  𝐸[𝑣|𝑢] and the market would be infinitely deep. 
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An important feature of both Kyle and the benchmark model is that the informed trader trades 
strategically, meaning that he takes into account the effect of his orders on price. This involves 
conditioning on the behaviour of the other players, such as noise traders, whose trades are 
exogenous, and the market maker.  
Because the informed trader (System 2 algorithmic trader in the benchmark model) is risk neutral, 
he will choose a strategy that maximises his expected profit (this is Kyle’s inference).177 That is, 
he chooses a demand (or supply) 𝑥 that satisfies: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥
𝐸[𝜋] = 𝐸[(𝑣 −  𝑝)𝑥|𝑣] 
for each possible realisation of 𝑣. The interaction between the market makers problem and the 
informed trader’s problem is clear from the last two equations. The market makers pricing rule 
depends on the contribution of 𝑥 to order flow, but the informed System 2 algorithmic traders 
choice of 𝑥 depends on the impact orders have on the market makers price 𝑝. In equilibrium this 
circularity is resolved. See below. 
The pricing and trading rules that produce equilibrium convey the benchmark model’s essential 
lessons. Like Kyle (1985), the benchmark model focuses on a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), 
where all strategies are linear in equilibrium (namely, we conjecture linear strategies for both the 
System 2 algorithmic trader and the market maker and then verify that these conjectures are 
actually the best response to one another’s strategies). Section 4.6.2.1 (‘Kyles Solution Procedure’) 
highlights the rationale for focusing on a linear equilibrium.  
                                                          
177 Specifically, under the assumption of risk neutrality, the expected utility of end-of-period profits is simply equal to expected 
end-of-period profits. Consider the following proof: With an exponential utility function, we obtain: 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸[𝑈(𝜋𝑖)] =
𝑀𝑎𝑥 [𝐸(𝜋𝑖) − (
𝐴
2
)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑖)]. Adding risk neutrality (𝐴 = 0), maximisation of expected utility simplifies to maximisation of 
expected profits. 
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We were able to prove that a linear equilibrium exists for our strategic game such that the following 
pricing and order submission rules hold: 
            𝑝 = 𝜆 (𝑥 + 𝑢), 
𝑥 = 𝛽𝑣, 
With strictly positive parameter  𝜆 and 𝛽 which take the following form (not derived here):178 
𝛽 = ( 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎𝑣
2)1 2⁄   and 𝜆 = 1/2( 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎𝑣
2)1 2⁄ . 
Notice that the pricing rule and the trading rule depend on the same two parameters – the variance 
of the uninformed order 𝜎𝑢
2 and the variance in the payoff 𝜎𝑣
2 – a natural consequence of being 
determined jointly. Notice also that the ratio of these two parameters is inverted in the two rules. 
This is quite intuitive: when 𝜆 is high, meaning that orders have a high price impact, then 𝛽 is low, 
meaning that the informed System 2 algorithmic trader trades less aggressively (to avoid the 
impact of his own trades). Recall, 𝛽 fully characterises the System 2 algorithmic traders trading 
intensity.  The constituent variance parameters are also easily interpreted. When 𝜎𝑣
2 is high, the 
System 2 algorithmic traders information is more likely to be substantial, ceteris paribus, inducing 
the market maker to adjust price more aggressively.  
To clarify, 𝜆 determines the price increase of an additional buy order. The reciprocal of 𝜆 can be 
viewed as, what Kyle (1985) refers to, as market depth. If 𝜆 is low, an additional order will not 
lead to a large price change and, thus, the market is very liquid. The small price impact of an 
additional order reflected by a low 𝜆 induces the informed trader to trade more aggressively.  
 
                                                          
178 For formal derivation refer to equation 5.5.1.  
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New Trader – Introducing the System 1 Algorithmic Trader 
The benchmark model – presented in the previous chapter – introduces System 2 algorithmic 
traders into the static model of Kyle (1985).179 Chapter 5 clarifies the methodological procedure 
used to incorporate System 2 algorithmic traders into the static Kyle (1985) model. In the present 
chapter (Chapter 6), we extend the benchmark model and introduce a new type of trader – a System 
1 algorithmic trader. Like System 2 algorithmic traders in the benchmark case, theoretical 
considerations for these agents emanate from the key assumptions underlying our dual process 
taxonomy of algorithmic trading.180  
In Section 5.2 of Chapter 5, we detail the final integrative dual process taxonomy of algorithmic 
trading. A systematic review of Section 5.2 may prove useful for readers who require further 
granularity. However, for sake of brevity, we highlight here, only the key insights reflected in the 
taxonomy - as they apply to System 1 algorithmic traders.  
Consider the following: in the context of theoretical market microstructure finance, our dual 
process categorisation of algorithmic trading suggests that System 1 algorithmic traders possesses 
and inherent speed advantage relative to the rest of the market.  
However, a pertinent question remains: How do System 1 algorithmic traders acquire this 
advantage? 
                                                          
179 It is important to note that the benchmark model nests the Kyle (1985) model. In a limiting case of the benchmark model, where 
the System 2 algorithmic trader does not have access to his particular form of private information, the equilibrium reduces to the 
equilibrium of the static model of Kyle (1985). 
180 A key assumption made in our taxonomy is that System 1 algorithmic traders’ private information relates to incoming order 
flow. This means that they have no independent source of information; their information is dependent on the activity (orders) of 
other traders –including, but not limited to the System 2 algorithmic trader. Thus, it seems inappropriate to model System 1 
algorithmic traders without first modelling System 2 algorithmic trading. 
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In order for our model to be as rich as a description of real markets as possible, we provided an 
instantiation of System 1 algorithmic trading in Section 3.5. An instantiation refers to the creation 
of a real instance or particular realization of an abstraction or class of objects and processes 
(Gregor, 2006).  
Following, the instantiation of System 1 algorithmic trading in Section 3.5, we suggest that co-
location infrastructure subsists as the mechanism by which System 1 algorithmic traders attain 
their speed advantage.  
As the term suggests, co-location involves locating ones ‘server’181 as close as possible to the 
exchanges’ matching engine. Again, the matching engine establishes a channel of communication 
between the market and the trading algorithm. It determines how orders are processed, and thus 
controls the automation of trades. Placing one’s server adjacent to the exchanges matching engine 
significantly reduces the time it takes to access the central order book – where electronic 
information on quotes to buy and sell as well as current market prices are warehoused. It also 
decreases the time it takes to transmit trade instructions and execute matched trades. Essentially, 
placing ones server adjacent to the exchanges matching engine means that incoming order flow 
can reach System 1 algorithmic traders platform almost instantaneously. Thus, in this thesis, we 
assume that System 1 algorithmic trader’s private information relates to incoming order flow and 
not about the fundamental value of the asset. This is contrary to System 2 traders who possess 
private information about the fundamental value of the asset. 
                                                          
181. Strictly speaking, a server is a computational device which is dedicated to the running of a certain program. With regards to 
algorithmic trading, a server functions as an electronic communication device or electronic infrastructure that manages access to a 
centralised resource.  
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Strictly speaking, our assertion - that System 1 algorithmic traders utilise colocation facilities - 
provides ample grounds on which to base the assumption that their private information relates to 
incoming order flow and not about the fundamental value of the asset.  
However, additional rationale for this assumption – the assumption that advanced order flow 
information comprises System 1 algorithmic trader’s private information - is provided below in 
Section 6.2.2.2  
 
6.2.2 System 1 Algorithmic Trading  
A Focused Overview 
Here we highlight key intuitions regarding System 1 algorithmic trading. We follow immediately 
(Section 6.2.2.1 & 6.2.2.2) with a detailed description of each concept.  
Speed, Information and Holding Horizon 
1. Speed: System 1 algorithmic traders have a speed advantage over all other traders (including 
System 2 algorithmic traders, noise traders, and market makers). 
2. Information: advanced information relates to incoming order flow. 
3. Short holding horizon: liquidates position by the end of the trading round.182 
 
 
 
                                                          
182As clarified above, co-location subsists as the mechanism by which the System 1 algorithmic trader attains his/her speed 
advantage. The SEC (2014) suggests that those algorithmic traders who subscribe to co-location facilities “end the trading day in 
as close to a flat a position as possible, that is, not carrying significant positions over-night”(p.4). In congruence with this 
suggestion, we will assume that the System 1 algorithmic trader liquidates his/her inventory at the end of the trading period. 
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6.2.2.1 Discussion on Speed – (1) 
 
In many models of strategic trading, such as Foster and Viswanathan (1996), Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992), and Vayanos (1999), all traders move at the same speed: they act one per 
round. An interesting feature of System 1 algorithmic traders, however, is not just that they are 
fast but that they are faster than others. In the final model, the System 1 algorithmic trader has 
speed advantage over all other traders in various ways.  
First, the System 1 algorithmic trader is able to trade twice without latencies in the trading round, 
the System 2 algorithmic trader and noise traders’ can only trade once.  
Second, the System 1 algorithmic trader is also faster than the market maker. This is a particularly 
interesting feature of the final model and requires further clarification. 
(I) Capturing the System 1 algorithmic trader’s speed advantage over the market maker 
The market maker in the final model sets a price and trades the quantity that makes markets clear. 
Specifically, at the beginning of a trading round, the competitive market maker posts a linear 
pricing function 𝑃(∙) against which others can trade. Like both Kyle (1985) and the benchmark 
model, the slope of the pricing function – denoted by 𝜆 – represents how much the market maker 
adjusts the price in response to the net order flow. 
Interestingly, we are able to capture the System 1 algorithmic trader’s speed advantage relative to 
the market maker using the slope of the market makers pricing function. In other words, during 
the single trading round of the final model, the slope of the market makers pricing function is fixed. 
The rationale for fixing the pricing function at the beginning of the trading round is as follows: 
The System 1 algorithmic trader can trade twice without latencies in the single trading round – we 
have already alluded to, and justified this assumption.  
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In an ideal world, market makers would adjust the slope of the pricing function (𝜆) in light of this 
new information/ trade innovation (this adjustment mechanism for market makers is discussed at 
length above and does not merit further discussion here. See Chapters 4 and 5 for more detail) 
By fixing 𝜆 in the final model, the market maker cannot adjust the pricing function instantaneously. 
The pricing function 𝑃(∙) is set at time 0 and cannot be updated until the end of the trading. 
Effectively, lags in adjusting the pricing function 𝑃(∙) prevents the market maker from using all 
information to price the orders in the trading window and thus represents the market maker’s speed 
disadvantage relative to the System 1 algorithmic trader.  
6.2.2.2. Discussion on Information (2) and Holding Horizon (3) 
 
From a theoretical perspective, our dual process categorisation of algorithmic trading suggests that 
System 1 algorithmic traders possess and inherent speed advantage relative to the rest of the 
market.  
In practice, faster speeds may also imply that they can trade more frequently, have smaller 
inventories and shorter holding horizons (Froot, Scharfstein & Stein, 1992). The assumption of 
shorter holding horizons, although restrictive, is also consistent with the stylised facts of System 
1 algorithmic traders (Section 5.2).  
The short holding horizon has important implications for the System 1 algorithmic trader’s 
behaviour and choice of information. Unlike the other traders, the strategic fast System 1 
algorithmic trader incurs price impact twice in one trading round. When establishing a position, 
the System 1 trader must have a plan to exit within a short time window. His profit is not 
determined by the difference between the entry price and the fundamental value, but by the 
difference between his entry and exit prices.  
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Hence, System 1 algorithmic traders do not try to infer the long-term fundamental value of the 
risky asset but focus on predicting short-term price dynamics. 
We suggested that co-location facilities subsist as the mechanism behind this speed advantage. 
Isolating co-location infrastructure as the physical source/mechanism behind the System 1 
algorithmic trader’s speed advantage enabled us to make additional assumptions regarding System 
1 algorithmic traders. Although these assumptions are thoroughly addressed in the proceeding 
subsections, we provide a brief overview below: 
In practical terms, speed or latency refers to the time it takes to access and respond to market 
information. Locating ones server adjacent to the exchanges matching engine significantly reduces 
the time it takes to access and respond to the central order book – where electronic information on 
quotes to buy and sell are warehoused. Essentially, the reduced latency provided by colocation 
infrastructure means that those who utilise this technology can view, and react to incoming order 
flow in the context of microseconds. 
Because System 1 algorithmic trader’s speed advantage is predicated on co-location facilities, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that their private information concerns incoming order flow. 
In congruence with the suggestion made above, we will assume that the fast System 1 trader 
obtains a signal  𝐼𝑦 about the aggregate incoming order flow  𝑦 =  𝑥 +  𝑢, not about the 
fundamental value v.183  
 
 
                                                          
183 System 1 algorithmic trader’s focus on predicting short-term price dynamics (i.e., incoming order flow). Conversely, System 
2 algorithmic trader’s try to infer the long-term fundamental value of the risky asset. 
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6.3 SYSTEM 1 ALGORITHMIC TRADER: KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
The key assumptions made with regards to the System 1 algorithmic trader emanate from the 
discussion above, they are as follows: 
 In the single trading round, the System 1 algorithmic trader obtains a signal 𝐼𝑦 about the 
aggregate incoming order flow 𝑦 =  𝑥 +  𝑢.  
 They rapidly trade twice in one trading round and do not carry inventory when the trading 
round ends.  
6.4 THE FINAL MODEL: INSIGHTS  
The benchmark model - presented in the previous chapter – introduces System 2 algorithmic 
traders into the static model of Kyle (1985). System 2 algorithmic traders are introduced into an 
extended Kyle framework with an adjusted information structure – we modify the sequence and 
acquisition process of the informed trader’s private information. Interested readers are referred to 
Section 5.4, where we clarify the formal methodological procedure used to incorporate this type 
of trader into the static Kyle (1985) model.  
Although the benchmark model provides a rich description of System 2 algorithmic trading it is 
still based on the basic framework of Kyle (1985). Thus, the benchmark model serves an important 
function - it allows us to keep our analysis (i.e., the final model) tractable. We emphasise that in a 
limiting case of the benchmark model, where the System 2 algorithmic trader does not have access 
to the particular form of private information described above; the equilibrium reduces to the 
equilibrium of the static model of Kyle (1985). Inexorably, the baseline/benchmark model nests 
the Kyle (1985) model. The formal model, to follow, builds on the benchmark model and 
introduces the System 1 algorithmic trader into the benchmark model.  
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Interestingly, in the final model, when the System 1 algorithmic trader has no information, the 
equilibrium reduces to the equilibrium of the benchmark model. 
Insights 
The final model presented below generates many novel insights. Relative to both the benchmark 
model and Kyle (1985), three of the most important insights include: 
1. Timing: The System 1 algorithmic trader’s speed advantage emerges within a single trading 
round. More specifically, we introduce latencies (delays) between trades and quotes into the single 
trading period of the benchmark model. The System 1 algorithmic trader is the only trader fast 
enough to exploit these latencies. 
2. Private information: in keeping with theoretical market microstructure finance, we can 
consider both System 1 and System 2 algorithmic traders informed traders – the difference between 
these informed traders lies in the nature of their private information. Contextually, System 2 
algorithmic traders have an accuracy advantage over all other market participants. Again, this 
accuracy advantage emanates from, and concerns, a firm’s fundamentals (i.e., they are informed 
about the long-term fundamental value v of the risky share). On the other hand, System 1 
algorithmic traders have a speed advantage over the rest of the market. Crucially, their private 
information concerns incoming order flow 𝑦 , not the fundamental value v. To summarise, in the 
final model, we will assume that System 1 algorithmic traders are informed about short-term price 
dynamics (i.e., incoming order flow), and System 2 algorithmic traders; long-term fundamentals 
(i.e., the ex-post liquidating value of the risky share v) 
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3. Price discovery is deeply related to the nature of information heterogeneity between 
informed traders (algorithmic traders in our case): Our findings (with respect to 
asymmetric/private information, algorithmic trading and price discovery) are particularly profound 
and convey some of the model’s essential lessons. 
Though the model itself will enrich each of these insights, let us offer a few thoughts at this stage. 
Insight (1) emphasises that delays between trading and quoting emerge within a single trading 
round. The assumption of a single trading round is strong in the sense that it allows us to convey 
some fundamental aspects of System 1’s relative information advantage – a speed advantage. 
Consider the intuition regarding our supposition of a single trading round: 
There are multiple rounds of trading (𝑡 = 1, 2, 3 ) in multi-period models. However, we argue that 
multiple rounds of trading would ultimately be a less rich description of an agents speed advantage. 
Indeed, the term speed evokes images of short time-scales. Ergo, a single round of trading (like 
the one presented here) would be more suggestive of an agent’s ability to trade faster than others. 
In other words, we suggest that things can be properly illustrated with a single trading round. 
Consequently, in order to reflect the System 1 algorithmic traders advantage within a short time 
window, we conform to the time decomposition [0.1] – typical of single period models. However, 
we add some granularity to the timing of events within a single trading round framework. We 
introduce delays between quotes and trades within the single period and add a trader fast enough 
to exploit these short delays (again, the System 1 algorithmic trader). More specifically, the single 
trading round, which begins at t =  0 and ends at t = 1 is further decomposed into more fine sub-
intervals/instances denoted 𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 0+, 𝑡 = 1−, 𝑡 = 1, 𝑡 = 1+. See the model itself for 
further clarity. A broad visual summary of a typical trading round is provided below in Figure 6.1. 
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FIGURE 6.1: A TYPICAL TRADING ROUND 
 
Insight (2) introduces a type of private information that is not present in the benchmark model. 
Notably, in the single trading round of the final model the System 1 algorithmic trader anticipates 
the size of incoming market orders – he obtains a signal 𝐼𝑦 about the aggregate incoming order 
flow 𝑦 =  𝑥 +  𝑢.   
In the final model, the System 1 algorithmic trader will be faster than the System 2 algorithmic 
trader but the System 2 algorithmic trader will have better information about the fundamentals. To 
be more precise, System 1 algorithmic traders differ from System 2 algorithmic traders (as seen in 
the benchmark model) in two respects: (a) they have higher speeds and shorter holding horizons 
than the informed System 2 algorithmic trader and (b) the System 1 algorithmic trader has no 
independent source of information, his information concerns incoming order flow.184 
                                                          
184 Recall, incoming order flow depends on the activities of other traders, including the System 2 algorithmic trader. 
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Insight (3) - that price discovery is deeply related to the nature of information heterogeneity 
between algorithmic traders is a fascinating message. To understand this insight one needs to 
understand how the final model relates to the literature on informed trading. Existing attempts at 
characterising speculative informed trade have taken one of two basic approaches. The approach 
adopted by Kyle (1985), Back (1992), Brunnermeier (2002) and Baruch (2002) is to assume that 
(i) there is a single informed trader; and (ii) the single informed trader has either a speed advantage 
or an accuracy advantage over other agents (see e.g. Section 4.3 where we delineate the dynamics 
of each advantage). The alternative approach considers multiple informed traders. However, 
models with multiple informed traders typically limit assumptions to cases of ‘symmetrically 
informed’ informed traders – i.e., informed traders have identical private information.  
Interestingly, the two informed traders in our model have heterogeneous information advantages.  
The nature of information asymmetry between the two informed algorithmic traders in our model 
contrasts the findings of other models with multiple informed traders’ vis-à-vis the price discovery 
process. Consider the following example: 
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) posit that in financial markets, at least a few players will have 
access to private information and will trade in the knowledge that they will face competition with 
other informed agents in the market. Motivated by the above, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) 
develop a market microstructure model in which multiple, identically informed ‘informed’ traders 
strategically exploit their common private information. They show that such traders compete 
aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly. 
Evidently, the aggressive competition between informed traders translates into more private 
information being incorporated into price. Back, Cao and Willard (2000), Bernhardt and Miao 
(2004), Foster and Viswanathan (1996), and Li (2013) all confirm the assumption that informed 
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trader’s trade very intensely on their common information. In these models, an informed trader 
will increase his/her trading intensity when faced with the competition from other informed traders 
with highly positively correlated information. Again, an elevated informed trading intensity leads 
to more private information being revealed in prices i.e., prices become more informative.  
It seems that the informed trader’s trading intensity is the single most important driving force 
behind the results of each model respectively. Indeed, the informed trader’s trading intensity has 
a major effect on the price discovery process because it reflects how much the informed trader’s 
private information is revealed through the trading process.  
Essentially, when an informed trader chooses a trading intensity, he faces the trade-off of price 
impact and information decay. If an informed trader reduces trading intensity, his private 
information is traded away by competing informed traders; if an informed trader increases trading 
intensity, his price impact is higher.  
Critically, this trade-off between price impact and information decay is not reflected in our final 
model. Readers should keep in mind that this insight can only be appreciated following the formal 
presentation of the model itself. Only a summary of this insight is provided below: 
In contrast to existing models with multiple informed traders, where an informed trader will 
increase his trading intensity when faced with competition from other informed traders, the System 
2 algorithmic trader (one of the informed traders) in our final model reduces rather than increases 
his trading intensity when faced with competition from the System 1 algorithmic trader (the other 
informed trader). In other words, the System 2 algorithmic trader has no incentive to increase 
trading intensity when faced with the competition from System 1 algorithmic trader in our model.  
 
223 
 
  
The rationale is as follows: 
Firstly, the System 2 algorithmic trader cannot reduce information decay by trading more intensely 
because the System 1 algorithmic trader always anticipates the order flow – the System 1 
algorithmic trader always observes a private signal  𝐼𝑦 about the incoming order flow 𝑦 =  𝑥 +
 𝑢. Secondly, if the System 2 algorithmic trader does not trade at all, his private information is not 
traded away by the System 1 algorithmic trader because the System 1 algorithmic trader does not 
have an independent source about fundamentals. 
Why does the System 2 algorithmic trader reduce trading intensity? 
The answer lies in the nature of the System 1 algorithmic trader’s advantage over the market 
maker. Like Kyle (1985), the benchmark model, and other extant literature on market 
microstructure finance, the assumption that market makers earn zero profits is key to our analysis 
here. In the context of the benchmark model, the market maker makes losses on the trades with 
the informed System 2 algorithmic trader, but recoups these loses on trades with the noise traders 
- making zero profit on average.  
However, in the final model the market maker cannot update the pricing function fast enough to 
keep up with the System 1 algorithmic trader (i.e., the market makers pricing function is fixed in 
the single trading round). 
Because market makers cannot adjust the pricing function instantaneously, they suffer additional 
losses when trading with the System 1 algorithmic trader in the final model. To make up for the 
additional losses, market makers have to increase the slope of the pricing function ex-ante in order 
to break-even (i.e., they charge more for absorbing order flow imbalance.)  
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Effectively, the System 1 algorithmic trader extracts rent from market makers and market makers 
shift the burden to System 2 and noise traders by making liquidity more costly. In response to the 
higher cost of liquidity, the System 2 algorithmic trader reduces trading intensity.  
To summarise, unlike in existing models with multiple informed traders such as Back et al., (2000), 
Bernhardt and Miao (2004), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Li (2013), and Vayanos (1999); 
in our model, the better informed System 2 algorithmic trader (by better informed we mean that 
he/she has better information about fundamentals) always reduces his/her trading intensity in the 
presence of the fast System 1 algorithmic trader, and prices become less informative. 
 
6.5 A DUAL PROCESS MICROSTRUCTURE MODEL OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
6.5.1 Model Setup 
Below we present our final dual process microstructure model of algorithmic trading. This section 
presents the final model with two algorithmic traders – System 1 and System 2 algorithmic traders. 
In the particular model we investigate, one risky asset is exchanged for a riskless asset among four 
kinds of traders: a single System 2 algorithmic trader who has unique access to sequential private 
observations of the ex-post liquidation value of the risky asset; uninformed noise traders who trade 
randomly for exogenous non-informational reasons; a continuum of competitive market makers 
who passively absorb order flow imbalance; and a single System 1 algorithmic trader who 
anticipates incoming market orders, trades rapidly and has a short holding horizon.  
Like the benchmark model, the final model considers two ‘periods’ – (1) an extended processing 
period/phase and (2) a single trading period. The System 2 algorithmic trader, market makers and 
noise traders have the same action timing as in the benchmark model. However, we modify the 
timeline of the benchmark model to accommodate the System 1 algorithmic trader.  
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More precisely, we introduce delays in trading and quoting into the trading period; the System 1 
algorithmic trader is the only trader fast enough to exploit the short delays  
Timeline and Information Structure          This thesis presents models of one trading round. 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate the timeline of the generalized model. Like the benchmark model, 
the System 2 algorithmic trader is granted an additional phase of information processing in the 
final model. The extended processing phase, denoted 𝑇− , occurs in the period immediately 
preceding the trading round.  𝑇 denotes the single trading round. In this single trading round, 
trading takes place in the interval [0. 1+]. 
FIGURE 6.2 
                                      (𝑇− )                                                         (𝑇) 
                                                                           𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 0+, 𝑡 = 1−, 𝑡 = 1, 𝑡 = 1+ 
In the extended processing period  𝑇−  we assume that the System 2 algorithmic trader obtains and 
observes uniquely private information about noise in a forthcoming, value relevant signal (this 
value relevant signal is set for a forthcoming period 𝑇). The private information concerning a 
future signal noise and is defined as advanced 𝐾 information. In its totality this information 
communicates 𝐾0 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠. The structure of 𝐾 information was presented above in Section 5.4.3, 
Box 5.4. 
At  𝑇 we initialize trading. More formally, at time 𝑡 = 0 the trading round starts. Here, market 
makers set a publicly observable pricing function 𝑃(·,·). An order of 𝑦𝑡 shares arrives at time 𝑡 ∈
 (0,1] and is filled by the market makers at the average price of 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑃(𝑦𝑡, ℱ𝑡). 
ℱ𝑡 denotes market makers’ information by time 𝑡. To model market maker’s latency, the pricing 
function 𝑃(·,·) is fixed in time interval (0,1+). 
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At time 0 the System 2 algorithmic trader receives the signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠. This signal 
communicated firm value with noise. At this point the extended processing period private 
information, in the form 𝐾0 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠, can be utilized to correct for the noise in the signal. Thus, 
by time 0 , the System 2 algorithmic trader has perfect information about the fundamental value 
of the asset. 
At time 0+, after observing 𝑣 and the pricing function P(·,·), the System 2 algorithmic trader 
submits a market order of x shares. At the same time noise traders submit a market order of 𝑢 
shares. Both orders suffer from a short latency and will not arrive in the market until time 1. Trades 
and quote updates may take place between time 0+ and time 1. The delay is so short that no one 
other than the System 1 algorithmic trader can exploit it. 
Right after time 0+ the fast System 1 algorithmic trader observes a private signal  𝐼𝑦 about the 
incoming order flow 𝑦 =  𝑥 +  𝑢 where 𝑒𝑦~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2) denotes the normally distributed 
observation error. The quality of the signal  𝐼𝑦 is represented by 𝜌, the squared correlation between 
 𝐼𝑦  and 𝑦, i.e., 
(6.1)                                                    𝜌 ≡ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟2(𝑦, 𝐼𝑦) ∈ (0,1]                                              
 
We take information quality 𝜌 as exogenously given.185 A more informative signal  𝐼𝑦  has a higher 
𝜌. If  𝐼𝑦  reveals 𝑦 precisely, 𝜌 = 1; if  𝐼𝑦 is almost all noise, ρ → 0. Moreover, the projection 
theorem for normal random variables implies that ?́? = 𝐸[𝑦|𝐼𝑦] = 𝜌.𝐼𝑦. 
                                                          
185 A fixed ρ implies that variance of the observation error. For example, if it is know that the informed trader almost does 
not trade (σx2 → 0), the observation error is almost entirely about noise trading size u. 
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At time 1−, based on his signal  𝐼𝑦  the System 1 algorithmic trader trades 𝑧 shares. Market makers 
fill the order at the price of 𝑝1− = 𝑃(𝑧, ℱ1−).  
At time 1, System 2 trader’s order 𝑥 and the noise traders’ order 𝑢 arrive in the market. At the 
same time, the System 1 trader submits an order of −𝑧 shares to liquidate his position because he 
is not allowed to carry inventory when the trading round ends. Trades are all anonymous and 
market makers fill all orders at the same price of 𝑝1 = 𝑃(𝑥 + 𝑢 − 𝑧, ℱ1).  
Finally, at time 1+, right after time 1, market makers look back at the order flow history of the 
trading round and update the final quoted price to be 𝑝1
+. The trading round ends. 
It is common knowledge that value of the risky asset 𝑣, noise traders’ order size 𝑢, and the 
observation error 𝑒𝑦 are mutually independent. 
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Below we provide an overview of the equilibrium concept. We highlight some key assumptions 
and define the equilibrium conditions. While the overview does not provide detailed proofs, it does 
attempt to outline the important steps and highlight the key intuition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              (Equilibrium) 
Period                       The Extended Processing Period           The Trading Period           
Event                        S2: (1) 𝐾2 = 𝑠 + 𝛿                                 S2 :(1)  𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒𝑠        Initialize          1
st Trade     2nd Trade      Final Quote 
                                        (2) 𝐾1 = 𝛿 + 𝑒𝑠                                     (2) 𝐾0 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠       
                                         (3) 𝐾0 ≡ 𝐾2 − 𝐾1 = 𝑠 − 𝑒𝑠                   (3) ∴ 𝑣 
 
Price                                                                                                                              𝑝0 = 𝐸(𝑣)       𝑝1−               𝑝1               𝑝1+ = 𝐸[𝑣|𝐹1] 
 
Pricing Function                                                                                                             𝑃(∙) 
Order Flow                                                                                                                                                                  S2: 𝑥 
                                                                                                                                                                                      Noise: 𝑢 
                                                                                                                                                                     S1:𝑧          S1: −𝑧 
 
Time                          𝑇−                                                    𝑡 = 0                                           𝑡 = 1−      𝑡 = 1        𝑡 = 1+ 
FIGURE 6.3: TIMELINE OF THE FINAL MODEL 
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 Some Intuition for the Equilibrium 
Both the benchmark model and the final model - presented here - are based on Kyle (1985). Recall, 
Kyle (1985) focuses on the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), where all strategies are linear in 
equilibrium. Likewise, only a linear equilibrium is considered in the final model (i.e. we ‘conjecture and 
verify’ only linear strategies) 
Equilibrium in the final model is defined by four functions Z (·),X(·),P(·) and Q(·). They denote the 
System 1 algorithmic trader’s trade size strategy, the System 2 algorithmic trader’s trade size strategy, 
market makers’ pricing function, and the final quote function respectively. 
In equilibrium, four conditions have to be satisfied: 
1. System 1 algorithmic traders profit maximisation. 
2. System 2 algorithmic traders profit maximisation. 
3. Competitive pricing function. 
4. Informationally efficient quotes. 
Like Kyle (1985), the benchmark model, and other extant literature on the topic of market 
microstructure we conjecture that the pricing function is linear. Given that the linear pricing function, 
market makers fill the order at the average price of 
𝑝𝑡𝑗 = 𝑃 (𝑦𝑡𝑗 , ℱ𝑡𝑗) = 𝑝𝑡𝑗−1 + 𝜆
𝑆𝑦𝑡𝑗 ,           𝑗 ≥ 1 
𝜆𝑆  denotes the market depth (price impact) factor which is fixed in the trading round. Given the 
assumptions above, there is a unique equilibrium where 
 System 1 trading size:  𝑧 = 𝑍(𝐼𝑦; 𝑝0, 𝜆
𝑆) =  𝛼?́? = 𝛼𝜌𝐼𝑦 
 System 2 trading size: 𝑥 = 𝑋(𝑣; 𝑝0, 𝜆
𝑆) = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0) 
 Market order pricing: 𝑝𝑡𝑗 = 𝑃 (𝑦𝑗 , 𝑝𝑡𝑗−1) = 𝑝𝑡𝑗−1 + 𝜆
𝑆𝑦𝑗  
 Initial quote: 𝑝0 
 Final Quote: 𝑝1+ = 𝑄(𝑧, 𝑦 − 𝑧) = 𝑝0 + 𝜆
𝐿𝑦 
Under the assumption that P(·) is linear, Z(·),X(·) and Q(·) are all linear. (This follows the assumptions 
underlying linear equilibrium – discussed at length above. See Chapter 4, specifically the heading 
linear equilibrium for further clarity) 
The equilibrium is then fully characterized by the four endogenous parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜆𝑆and 𝜆𝐿  
 𝛼 is The System 1 algorithmic trader’s trading intensity 
 𝛽 is the System 2 algorithmic trader’s trading intensity. 
 𝜆𝑆  is the short-term (temporary) price impact per share of a market order on the 
transaction price 𝑝𝑡 . 
 𝜆𝐿  is the long-term (permanent) impact per share on the final quote 𝑝1+ of the aggregate 
order size 𝑥 + 𝑢. 
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The formal equilibrium of the final model is analysed below. 
6.6 FORMAL EQUILIBRIUM OF THE FINAL MODEL 
 
Definition 6.1 (Equilibrium conditions).          Based on the generalizations mentioned above, 
we assume that the System 2 algorithmic trader observes 𝑣 noiselessly in equilibrium. The fast 
System 1 trader chooses his trade size using a strategy function Z(·) and the System 2 trader 
chooses his trade size using a function 𝑋(·). Market makers commit to a pricing function P(·) and 
set the final quote using a function Q(·). The equilibrium is defined by four functions Z(·),X(·),P(·) 
and Q(·) such that the following conditions hold: 
 
1. System 2 algorithmic trader profit maximisation. Given P(·),Z(·),and the asset’s true value 
𝑣, the System 2 algorithmic trader’s profit 𝜋𝑆2 = 𝑥(𝑣 − 𝑝1) is maximised if he trades 
𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑖. 𝑒., 
(6.2)                      𝑥 =  𝑋(𝑣; 𝑍(·), 𝑃(·))  =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥    𝐸[𝜋𝑆2|𝑣, 𝑃(·), 𝑍(·)] 
                                                                              x 
where 𝑝1 is the execution price of his trade. 
 
2. System 1 algorithmic trader profit maximisation. Given 𝑃(·), 𝑋(·), and a signal about the 
incoming order flow 𝐼𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢 + 𝑒𝑦  the System 1 trader’s profit 𝜋
𝑆1 = 𝑧(𝑝1 − 𝑝1−) is 
maximised if he trades z shares at time 1− and liquidates at time 1, i.e., 
 
(6.3)                   𝑧 =  𝑍( 𝐼𝑦 ; 𝑃(·) 𝑋(·))  =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥    𝐸[𝜋
𝑆1|𝐼𝑦 , 𝑃(·), 𝑋(·)] 
                                                                          z 
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where 𝑝1 − 𝑝1− is the difference between his entry and exit prices. 
 
3. Competitive pricing function. Given 𝑋(·) and 𝑍(·), market makers choose a pricing function 
𝑃(·) such that their expected profit 𝐸[𝜋𝑀] at time 0 equals zero, i.e., 
 
(6.4)                                           0 = 𝐸[𝜋𝑀|𝑃(·), 𝑋(·), 𝑍(·)] 
 
4. Informationally efficient quotes. Market makers set quotes 𝑝0 and  𝑝1+ to be their expected 
value of 𝑣 conditional on available information ℱ0 and  ℱ1+. 
 
(6.5)                                                       𝑝0 = 𝐸[𝑣] 
 
(6.6)                            𝑝1+ = 𝐸[𝑣|ℱ1+ , 𝑋(·), 𝑍(·)] = 𝑄(ℱ1+; 𝑋(·), 𝑍(·)) 
 
Remark 6.1. Market makers’ profits in equation (6.4) is 𝜋𝑀 = 𝑧𝑝1− + (𝑥 + 𝑢 − 𝑧)𝑝1 − (𝑥 + 𝑢)𝑣  
because they trade −𝑧 shares at price 𝑝1− and −(𝑥 + 𝑢 − 𝑧) shares at price 𝑝1. 
 
Remark 6.2. Setting 𝑝1+ has no impact on equilibrium because the game ends at time 1
+  
 
Assumption 6.1 (Linear pricing function). Upon receiving the 𝑗-th market order of 𝑦𝑡𝑗  shares at 
𝑡𝑗 ∈ (0,1], market makers fill the order at the average price of 
 
(6.7)                                 𝑝𝑡𝑗 = 𝑃 (𝑦𝑡𝑗 , ℱ𝑡𝑗) = 𝑝𝑡𝑗−1 + 𝜆
𝑆𝑦𝑡𝑗 ,           𝑗 ≥ 1 
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If 𝑦𝑡𝑗  is the first arriving order (𝑗 = 1), the reference price 𝑝𝑡0 is the initial quote 𝑝0; if 𝑗 > 1,
𝑝𝑡𝑗−1  is the average price of the previous traded market order. The price impact (market depth) 
factor 𝜆𝑆 is fixed in the trading round. 
Assumption 6.1 reduces the choice of the pricing function 𝑃(·) to the choice of two parameters: 
the initial quote 𝑝0  and the price impact factor 𝜆
𝑆. As discussed above, a fixed 𝜆𝑆  captures the 
market maker’s speed disadvantage relative to the System 1 algorithmic trader. 
 
Lemma 6.1. In the final model, 𝑡0 = 0,  𝑡1 = 1
− and 𝑡2 = 1. Given Assumption 6.1, the traded 
prices are 
 
(6.8)                                                  𝑝1− = 𝑝0 + 𝜆
𝑆𝑧   
 
(6.9)                                𝑝1 = 𝑝1−  + 𝜆
𝑆(𝑥 + 𝑢 − 𝑧) = 𝑝0 + 𝜆
𝑆(𝑥 + 𝑢)   
 
It might seem that the execution price 𝑝1  for the System 2 algorithmic trader and noise traders are 
not affected by the System 1 algorithmic trader’s trading 𝑧 because the System 1 trader completely 
liquidates his position at time 1. The observation, however, is not correct because in equilibrium 
the price impact factor 𝜆𝑆 is endogenously determined by the System 1 trader’s trading intensity. 
We now examine the equilibrium in more detail.  
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Theorem 6.1 (Equilibrium of the final model). Given the linear pricing function, there is a 
unique equilibrium where 
 
(6.10)                  System 1 trading size: 𝑧 = 𝑍(𝐼𝑦; 𝑝0, 𝜆
𝑆) =  𝛼?́? = 𝛼𝜌𝐼𝑦 
(6.11)                  System 2 trading size: 𝑥 = 𝑋(𝑣; 𝑝0, 𝜆
𝑆) = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0) 
(6.12)                  Market order pricing: 𝑝𝑡𝑗 = 𝑃 (𝑦𝑗 , 𝑝𝑡𝑗−1) = 𝑝𝑡𝑗−1 + 𝜆
𝑆𝑦𝑗 
(6.13)                              Initial quote: 𝑝0 
(6.14)                              Final quote: 𝑝1+ = 𝑄(𝑧, 𝑦 − 𝑧) = 𝑝0 + 𝜆
𝐿𝑦 
 
The endogenous parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜆𝑆and 𝜆𝐿are: 
 
 (6.15)                       𝛼 =
1
2
,    𝛽 =
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
𝜃,     𝜆𝑆 =
𝜎𝑣
𝜎𝑢
 
1
2𝜃
,    𝜆𝐿 =
𝜎𝑣
𝜎𝑢
 
𝜃
1+𝜃2
 
 
Where the market quality parameter  
 
(6.16)                                           𝜃 ≡ √
1−𝜌 4⁄
1+𝜌 4⁄
  𝜖[√0.6 ,1] 
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6.7 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
The strategy functions 𝑋 (·), 𝑍(·), and 𝑄(·) are all linear if the pricing function 𝑃(·) is linear.186 
The equilibrium is then fully characterized by the four endogenous parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜆𝑆and 
𝜆𝐿 illustrated in Figure 6.4: 
The parameter 𝛼 is the System 1 algorithmic trader’s trading intensity. The System 1 trader first 
observes the signal 𝐼𝑦 of the incoming order flow 𝑦 and estimates the order flow to be ?́? = 𝜌𝐼𝑦. 
Then, the System 1 trader chooses to trade 𝑧 = 𝛼?́? shares at time 1− and −𝛼?́? at time 1. A higher 
intensity 𝛼 indicates that the System 1 trader trades more given an estimate of order flow ?́?. 
As in the benchmark model, trading intensity 𝛽 characterizes the System 2 algorithmic trader’s 
strategy in equilibrium. The conditions set in the previous analysis imply that System 2 traders 
have perfect information in equilibrium.  In other words, the System 2 algorithmic trader is able 
to combine 𝐾0 and 𝑠 (refer to Section 5.4.3 for further clarity) to form uniquely private information 
about the fundamental value of the risky asset once trading is initialized. Given his perfect 
observation of 𝑣, we can characterize System 2 activity in equilibrium as follows: The System 2 
algorithmic trader first calculates the pricing error 𝑣 − 𝑝0 using his perfect private information on 
𝑣 and the initial quote 𝑝0. He then submits a market order of  𝑥 = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0) shares. A higher 𝛽 
indicates that the System 2 trader trades more aggressively based on the same pricing error 𝑣 − 𝑝0. 
                                                          
186 In line with Kyle (1985) and BNE in general, we have assumed that the pricing function is linear. Note that in Kyle’s (1985) 
proof, a linear pricing rule implies linear strategies and vice versa. Boulatov, Kyle and Livdan (2005) prove that the linear 
equilibrium in the single-period trading model of Kyle (1985) is unique; suggesting that equilibria with a nonlinear structure cannot 
exist in Kyle’s setting. Invariably, all models following Kyle conjecture and verify only linear trading and pricing rules respectively. 
Our model is consistent with convention here. 
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The parameter 𝜆𝑆  represents the short-term (temporary) price impact per share of a market order 
on the transaction price. Transaction price responds to the order flow according to the pricing 
function ∆𝑝𝑡 = 𝜆
𝑆𝑦𝑡 . Effectively, market makers charge 𝜆
𝑆𝑦2 to execute a market order of y 
shares. Competitive market makers set 𝜆𝑆 just enough such that their revenues for executing trades 
exactly offset their loss in trading with the System 1 and System 2 algorithmic traders. A higher 
𝜆𝑆 means that it costs more to execute a market order of any given size. 
The slope 𝜆𝐿  represents the long-term (permanent) price impact per share on the final quote 𝑝1
+ of 
the aggregated order size 𝑥 + 𝑢. The difference between the closing quote 𝑝1
+ and the opening 
quote 𝑝0 equals 𝜆
𝐿(𝑥 + 𝑢). Because market makers are competitive, the quote update 𝑝1
+ − 𝑝0  is 
determined by the information content of the order flow 𝑥 + 𝑢. A higher 𝜆𝐿   indicates that the 
aggregate order flow 𝑥 + 𝑢 contains more information about the fundamental value v and thus the 
quote update 𝑝1
+ − 𝑝0 is more sensitive to 𝑥 + 𝑢. 
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FIGURE 6.4: EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES 
                  
Figure 6.4. Equilibrium strategies. ∆𝑝𝑡 = 𝜆𝑦 is the pricing function with only a System 2 algorithmic trader. When 
the System 1 algorithmic trader is present as well, market makers raise λS and lower λL. At time 0, market makers set 
𝑝0  and λ
S; at time 1−, the System 1 algorithmic trader trades 𝑧 = ?́?/2 shares at price p1− = 𝑝0 +λ
Sz; at time 1, the 
System 2 algorithmic trader trades x shares, the noise traders u shares, and the System 1 (−z) shares at the price p1 = 
p1− + λS(x + u − z) = 𝑝0  + λ
Sy; finally at time 1+, market makers set the quote to p1+ = 𝑝0  + λ
Ly. The shaded rectangle 
is the System 1 traders profit πS1. Its area is 1/4 of rectangle OABC which corresponds to market makers’ price impact 
surplus. 
 
The other three endogenous parameters 𝛽, 𝜆𝑆, and 𝜆𝐿  are determined by three exogenous 
parameters: volatility of the fundamental value 𝜎𝑣, volatility of noise trading 𝜎𝑢, and information 
quality of the System 1 algorithmic trader ρ ∈ [0,1]. The equilibrium effects of 𝜎𝑣 and 𝜎𝑢,  are 
similar to both the benchmark model and to Kyle (1985). In addition, we can set 𝜎𝑣 = 𝜎𝑢 = 1 by 
choosing certain units of currency and trade size. System 1 trader’s information quality ρ, however, 
is invariant to change of units. When the System 1 algorithmic trader has no information (ρ = 0), 
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the equilibrium reduces to the benchmark model.187 Likewise, barring System 2 algorithmic traders 
in the benchmark model, the benchmark model collapses to Kyle’s (1985).   
Overall, the models simplicity and elegance is a significant contribution to the novelty of the thesis. 
Corollary 6.1. Other things equal, when the System 1 traders information becomes more accurate 
(ρ ↑), short-term price impact increases (λS ↑), long-term price impact decreases (λL ↓), System 2 
trading intensity declines (β ↓), and the System 1 algorithmic traders intensity α is unchanged. 
In the presence of System 1 algorithmic traders, market makers raise the short-term or temporary 
price impact (λS ↑) to break-even. System 2 algorithmic traders respond by reducing trading 
intensity (β ↓). Because System 2 algorithmic trader’s order x is the only informative component 
of the order flow x + u, the aggregate order flow x + u becomes less informative (λL ↓) in the 
presence of the System 1 algorithmic trader. 
 
6.8 DUAL-PROCESS MODEL INSIGHTS 
 
In the final model, the System 1 algorithmic trader is faster than the System 2 algorithmic trader 
but the System 2 algorithmic trader has better information about the fundamentals. To be more 
precise, System 1 algorithmic traders differ from System 2 algorithmic traders (as seen in the 
benchmark model) in two respects: (a) they have higher speeds and shorter holding horizons than 
the better informed System 2 algorithmic trader and (b) the System 1 algorithmic trader has no 
independent source of information, his information concerns incoming order flow.188 
                                                          
187 When the System 1 trader has some information ρ > 0, the equilibrium differs. 
188 Recall, incoming order flow depends on the activities of other traders. 
238 
 
  
The nature of information asymmetry between the two informed algorithmic traders in our model 
contrasts the findings of other models with multiple informed traders’ vis-à-vis the price discovery 
process. Consider the following example: 
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) posit that in financial markets, at least a few players will have 
access to private information and will trade in the knowledge that they will face competition with 
other informed agents in the market. Motivated by the above, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) 
develop a market microstructure model in which multiple, identically informed ‘informed’ traders 
strategically exploit their common private information. They show that such traders compete 
aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly. 
Evidently, the aggressive competition between informed traders translates into more private 
information being incorporated into price. Back et al., (2000), Bernhardt and Miao (2004), Foster 
and Viswanathan (1996), and Li (2013) all confirm this assumption that informed traders trade 
very intensely on their common information. In these models an informed trader will increase his 
trading intensity when faced with the competition from other informed traders with highly 
positively correlated information. Again, an elevated informed trading intensity leads to more 
private information being revealed in prices i.e., prices become more informative.  
Invariably, in the models described above, when choosing a trading intensity, the informed traders 
face a trade-off between price impact and information decay. If an informed trader reduces trading 
intensity, his private information is traded away by competing informed traders; if an informed 
trader increases trading intensity, his price impact is higher.  
Critically, this trade-off between price impact and information decay is not reflected in our final 
model.  
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Indeed, in contrast to existing models with multiple informed traders where an informed trader 
will increase his trading intensity when faced with competition from other informed traders, the 
System 2 algorithmic trader (one of the informed traders) in or final model reduces rather than 
increases his trading intensity when faced with competition from the System 1 algorithmic trader 
(the other informed trader). In other words, the System 2 algorithmic trader has no incentive to 
increase trading intensity when faced with the competition from System 1 algorithmic trader in 
our model. The rationale is as follows: 
Firstly, the System 2 algorithmic trader cannot reduce information decay by trading more intensely 
because the System 1 algorithmic trader always anticipates the order flow. Secondly, if the System 
2 algorithmic trader does not trade at all, his private information is not traded away by the System 
1 algorithmic trader because the System 1 algorithmic trader does not have an independent source 
about fundamentals. 
Why does the System 2 algorithmic trader reduce trading intensity? 
The answer lies in the nature of the System 1 algorithmic trader’s advantage over the market 
maker. Like Kyle (1985), the benchmark model, and other extant literature on market 
microstructure finance, the assumption that market makers earn zero profits is key to our analysis 
here. In the context of the benchmark model, the market maker makes losses on the trades with 
the informed System 2 algorithmic trader, but recoups these losses on trades with the noise traders 
– making zero profit on average. 
However, in the final model the market maker cannot update the pricing function fast enough to 
keep up with the System 1 algorithmic trader (i.e., the market makers pricing function is fixed in 
the single trading round). 
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Because market makers cannot adjust the pricing function instantaneously, they suffer additional 
losses when trading with the System 1 algorithmic trader in the final model. To make up for the 
additional losses, market makers have to increase the slope of the pricing function ex-ante in order 
to break-even (i.e., they charge more for absorbing order flow imbalance.)  
Effectively, the System 1 algorithmic trader extracts rent from the market maker and the market 
maker shifts the burden to System 2 and noise traders by making liquidity more costly. In response 
to the higher cost of liquidity (transacting), the System 2 algorithmic trader reduces trading 
intensity.  
Therefore, unlike in existing models with multiple informed traders such as Back et al., (2000), 
Bernhardt and Miao (2004), Foster and Viswanathan (1996), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), 
Li (2013), and Vayanos (1999), in our model, the better informed System 2 algorithmic trader (by 
better informed we mean that he has better information about fundamentals) always reduces his 
trading intensity in the presence of the other informed fast System 1 algorithmic trader and prices 
become less informative. 
6.9 FINDINGS: MARKET QUALITY  
 
Other things equal, when the System 1 traders information becomes more accurate (ρ ↑), short-
term (temporary) price impact increases (λS ↑), long-term (permanent) price impact decreases (λL 
↓), System 2 trading intensity declines (β ↓), and the System 1 algorithmic traders intensity α is 
unchanged. 
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Figure 6.5 illustrates the equilibrium impact of the System 1 algorithmic trader’s information 
quality ρ. Due to the existence of System 1 algorithmic traders; market makers cannot break-even 
if they set the price 𝑝1 to equal their posterior expectation. The System 1 algorithmic trader 
intercepts 𝑧 shares of the order flow 𝑥 +  𝑢: he acquires 𝑧 shares from market makers at a 
discounted price 𝑝1− and supplies the shares back to the System 2 and noise traders at a profit. To 
make up for the loss to the System 1 trader, market makers have to charge more to absorb the same 
order imbalance. They raise the temporary price impact factor 𝜆𝑆 above the permanent price impact 
𝜆𝐿  implied by the informativeness of the order flow. Market maker’s break-even price at time 1 
thus differs from their posterior conditional expectation.  
When the signal  𝐼𝑦 is more accurate signal (ρ ↑), the System 1 trader makes more profit. Again, 
market makers raise the temporary price impact (λS ↑) more to break-even. The System 2 trader 
responds by reducing his trading intensity (β ↓). Because the System 2 trader’s order 𝑥 is the only 
informative component of the order flow 𝑥 +  𝑢, the aggregate order flow 𝑥 +  𝑢 becomes less 
informative (λL ↓). 
In the final model, the System 1 algorithmic trader can profit on a less accurate signal  𝐼𝑦  if he is 
faster than others. In addition to the ‘information rents’, market makers have to pay the ‘speed 
rents’. Because market makers are not the fastest, they protect themselves by setting a steeper 
pricing schedule. System 2 traders reduce their trading intensity faced with a higher cost of 
transacting. 
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FIGURE 6.5: EQUILIBRIUM PARAMETERS 
  
Figure 6.5. Equilibrium parameters of the final model normalized by volatility of fundamental value σv and 
volatility of noise trading σu. Theorem 6.1 implies that when the System 1 algorithmic trader’s information Iy is 
more informative (higher ρ) about the incoming order, temporary price impact per share λS  increases, permanent 
price impact per share λL decreases, System 2 trading intensity β decreases, and System 1 trading intensity α stays 
the same. 
 
6.9.1 Price Informativeness 
Interestingly, this thesis highlights an omission by empirical studies on the topic of algorithmic 
trading (specifically empirical studies that suggest algorithmic traders have a speed advantage). 
Hendershott and Riordan (2011) argue that algorithmic traders have a speed advantage over the 
rest of the market and that this speed advantage results in better price discovery.189 Other empirical 
papers conclude that faster traders make prices more informative (e.g., Boehmer, Fong, & Wu, 
2015; Brogaard, 2010; Brogaard, Hendershott, & Riordan, 2014; Carrion, 2013; Chaboud, et al., 
2009; Hendershott & Moulton, 2011). 
                                                          
189 In their view, improving the reaction times to new information implies that quotes and trading prices are also incorporating 
innovations faster. 
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Overall, the studies above have documented that information, conditional on being incorporated 
into prices, is incorporated more rapidly when traders are faster. They have interpreted this as 
evidence that speed makes prices more informative. Those studies, however, do not control for the 
effect of speed on the amount of information that ultimately becomes incorporated into prices. In 
contrast, this thesis finds that the net effect of an informed traders speed advantage is to make 
prices less informative in the long-run.  
Consider the narrative: in the final model, the fundamental value of the risky asset 𝑣 is the System 
2 algorithmic trader’s private information. If people learn more about 𝑣 by observing the trading 
process, the market is more informationally efficient. Concomitantly, price informativeness can 
be determined by the fraction of the System 2 algorithmic trader’s orders in the aggregate order 
flow. Because the System 2 algorithmic trader lowers trading intensity in response to the higher 
costs of liquidity – induced by System 1 algorithmic traders – the aggregate order flow becomes 
less informative in the presence of (fast) System 1 algorithmic traders.  
 
6.9.2 Market Liquidity 
 
In this thesis, noise traders’ trade for non-informational motives; a market is less liquid if noise 
traders expect to lose more to trade the same number of shares. Vayanos and Wang (2012) point 
out that different measures of market liquidity are designed to capture different market frictions. 
Ultimately, however, all the measures attempt to capture the impact of market friction on traders’ 
economic profits. Thus, in addition to the traditional measure λS , we also use traders’ expected 
profit to measure market liquidity.  
Recall, in the presence of System 1 algorithmic traders, market makers raise the short-term price 
impact λS so that they can still break-even. As a result, it becomes harder for the System 2 
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algorithmic trader to extract rent based on the same information. In the market microstructure 
literature, noise traders face adverse selection when they trade with an informed trader with more 
information. However, in the final model, noise traders face less adverse selection because the 
System 2 (informed) trader trades less. Nonetheless, noise traders suffer more losses to trade the 
same number of shares. Effectively, noise traders must pay information rent to the System 2 trader 
and speed rent to the System 1 trader. The reduction in information rent is not enough to cover the 
higher speed rent. Hence, the market is less liquid for the System 2 and noise traders in the presence 
of System 1 algorithmic trading.  
Based on the way they trade, it might seem that System 1 algorithmic traders improve liquidity. In 
the model, System 1 algorithmic traders ‘take liquidity’ during time (𝑡1, 1) when liquidity is cheap 
and ‘provide liquidity’ at time 1 to the System 2 and noise traders when liquidity is expensive. One 
might do a ‘reduced-form counter-factual analysis’190 and find that the price would have been 
much worse for the liquidity demanders if System 1 algorithmic traders were not trading at time 
1. In the context of the model, the conclusion is incorrect because if System 1 traders were not 
present, the temporary price impact λS would have been much lower. Effectively, liquidity 
demanders, including the System 2 and noise traders, would have been better off without System 
1 algorithmic traders. 
 
 
 
                                                          
190 In statistics and econometrics counterfactuals are used in policy evaluations (e.g. Heckman, 2008 & 2010). By a counterfactual 
we mean: What would have occurred if some observed characteristics or aspects of the processes under consideration were different 
from those prevailing at the time? 
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6.9.3 Volatility 
 
Our findings with regards to algorithmic trading and its impact on market volatility are particularly 
interesting. We find that algorithmic traders (as a whole) increase short-term price volatility but 
reduce long-term price volatility. These two predictions are both related to the nature of our 
characterisation of algorithmic trading. More formally, we define market volatility as the 
divergence of temporary price impact 𝜆𝑆 and permanent price impact 𝜆𝐿. In our final model, the 
higher short-term price volatility is caused by a higher temporary price impact 𝜆𝑆 – the result of 
System 1 algorithmic trading. Long-term volatility (for example volatility calculated with daily 
closing prices), is mainly determined by the permanent price impact 𝜆𝐿  , which is determined by 
the trading intensity of the System 2 algorithmic trader. In the final model, the System 2 trader 
trades slower when faced with a higher price impact 𝜆𝑆. Therefore in the long run, the System 2 
trader produces less information, resulting in lower daily price volatilities. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ALGORITHMIC TRADING, MARKET QUALITY AND INFORMATION: A DUAL 
PROCESS ACCOUNT – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 FINAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis presents the first ‘all-inclusive’ theoretical model of algorithmic trading (all-inclusive 
in that it accounts for the multitude of algorithmic trading strategies within a single theoretical 
framework).  
We hope to set some of the groundwork necessary for a new research agenda; one that recognizes 
that current accounts of algorithmic trading are deficient and that both the empirical and theoretical 
methods that we traditionally employed may no longer be appropriate. Interestingly, we have 
attempted to bring the tools of modern cognitive science to bear on the very core of financial 
market research. More precisely, using the principles of contemporary cognitive science, we have 
argued that the dual-process paradigm- the most prevalent contemporary interpretation of the 
nature and function of human decision making – lends itself well to a unique taxonomy of 
algorithmic trading. Our taxonomy effectively synthesises the multitude of algorithmic strategies 
within a single framework. One could argue that this taxonomy alone is a novel contribution to the 
literature. However, in this thesis, the aforementioned taxonomy serves primarily as a heuristic 
device; enabling us to confront a more complex and important issue: that is, determining the impact 
of algorithmic trading on financial market quality. More formally, our taxonomy of algorithmic 
trading serves primarily as a heuristic to inform a theoretical microstructure model; with the view 
of explaining the evolving nature of market quality as a consequence of algorithmic trading.  
247 
 
  
Given that algorithmic traders are almost certainly the fastest and the most accurately informed 
participants in the market, it seems reasonable to suggest that our taxonomy is exclusive to 
algorithmic trading. Indeed, the literature on algorithmic trading indicates that these agents 
consistently outperform their human counterparts in terms of trading speed as well as in terms of 
predictive accuracy. The prominence of this practice – accounting for a much larger proportion of 
trades relative to traditional human traders – underscores the relevance of our supposition. 
The results of our model are by no means trivial and represent an important theoretical contribution 
to the literature.  However, in order to appreciate the significance of our findings one needs to 
understand the relative impact of each System of algorithmic trading (i.e., the relative impact of 
System 1 and System 2 algorithmic trading). This is discussed below. 
7.2 AN OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 
The results of this thesis suggest that one portion of algorithmic trading strategies (those strategies 
that fall under the rubric of System 2 algorithmic trading) advance financial market quality; whilst 
another portion of algorithmic trading strategies (those strategies that fall under the rubric of 
System 1 algorithmic trading) impede financial market quality. Consider the following discussion: 
The benchmark model introduces a System 2 algorithmic trader into the static model of Kyle 
(1985). Evidently, the results of the benchmark model indicate that, relative to the informed trader 
in Kyle (1985), the System 2 algorithmic trader incorporates more accurate private information 
into prices i.e., prices become more informative in the presence of System 2 algorithmic trading. 
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In other words, System 2 algorithmic traders reveal more accurate information in the trading 
process than the informed trader in Kyle (1985).191  
The formal dual process microstructure model, presented in Chapter 6, builds on the benchmark 
model and introduces the System 1 algorithmic trader. Interestingly, relative to the benchmark 
model, our analysis indicates that System 1 algorithmic traders have a negative impact on market 
quality. Prices are ultimately less informative when System 1 algorithmic traders are present. In 
the brief time before the System 2 and noise traders’ orders arrive, System 1 algorithmic traders 
rapidly ‘front-run’ 192 these trades and bring information to the market and the intermediate prices 
are more informative. Information value of the intermediate prices, however, is quickly superseded 
by the more informative orders from the System 2 and noise traders. Ultimately, price 
informativeness is determined by the fraction of informed trader’s orders in the aggregate order 
flow. Because the informed trader lowers trading intensity in response to higher costs of liquidity, 
the aggregate order flow becomes less informative in the long-run. 
Therefore the final model of this thesis indicates that in the presence of System 1 algorithmic 
traders, market quality is unambiguously worse: prices are less (ex-post) informative and liquidity 
is more costly. 
 
 
                                                          
191 The System 2 algorithmic trader has more accurate information on v than the informed trader in Kyle (1985). For further clarity, 
refer to Section 5.7 (An illustrative example of the benchmark model). 
192  Contextually, System 1 algorithmic traders trade earlier during time (𝑡1, 1) on a noisy signal 𝐼𝑦. This practice has also been 
referred to as order anticipation in the literature. Technically speaking the term ‘front running’ applies to the illegal practice 
addressed in FINRA Rule 5270, which prohibits a broker-dealer from trading for its own account while taking advantage of 
knowledge of an imminent client block transaction. However, we use the term front running in a less formal sense in this thesis.  
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7.3 EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis suggests that algorithmic trades are informative and improve short-term intermediate 
price informativeness. Consistent with this, Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2013) find that 
the marketable orders of algorithmic traders have high predictive power about future price changes 
in less than 5 seconds. Moreover, Hendershott and Riordan (2011) find that algorithmic traders 
have an informational advantage and quickly incorporate information into prices. Zhang (2012) 
finds that algorithmic traders profit on ‘hard’ information and their profits realize quickly. 
Interestingly, however, our model also suggests that algorithmic traders can reduce information 
efficiency in the long-run.193  Differentiating between these two information efficiencies poses 
new empirical insight: 
This thesis indicates that many empirical characteristics of algorithmic trading could be interpreted 
in different ways. First, in our model, consistent with many empirical studies, algorithmic trading 
volume is high. Market liquidity, however, would be better if System 1 algorithmic traders have 
no order flow information (ρ = 0) and do not trade at all.  
Second our model is consistent with empirical studies that suggest fast traders trades (System 1 
algorithmic trades in our case) are informative. Here, System 1 algorithmic trades are informative 
because they bring some of the System 2 algorithmic trader’s information to the market slightly 
earlier. Nevertheless, the existence of System 1 algorithmic trading reduces the overall information 
                                                          
193 Contextually, System 1 algorithmic traders make intermediate prices more informative by trading earlier during time (𝑡1, 1) on 
a noisy signal 𝐼𝑦. The closing quote p1+, however, is less informative because the informed System 2 trader reduces trading 
intensity.  
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efficiency of prices. Indeed, without System 1 algorithmic trading, the System 2 algorithmic trader 
would trade more aggressively and improve the overall informativeness of prices. 
Contextually, System 1 algorithmic traders make intermediate prices more informative by trading 
earlier during time (𝑡1, 1) on a noisy signal 𝐼𝑦. The closing quote p1+, however, is less informative 
because the better informed System 2 trader reduces trading intensity.  
The above phenomenon can be described concisely using a simple metaphor: suppose a messenger 
(System 1 algorithmic trader) glances at a letter (order flow) and summarizes it to the receiver 
(market) right before delivering it. The summary (a System 1 trade) is informative but its 
information value is fleeting: the letter itself is much more informative than the summary. 
Furthermore, the sender (the informed System 2 algorithmic trader) is less likely to write clearly 
ex-ante worrying about privacy issues and ultimately the receiver (market) is less informed. 
7.4 POLICY DISCUSSION 
Where should resources go in the real world: Towards co-location or complex software for 
analysis? 
In the final model System 1 algorithmic trades are informative because they bring some of the 
System 2 algorithmic trader’s information to the market slightly earlier. Thus, those strategies that 
rely on co-location facilities i.e., System 1 algorithmic traders, seems to increase intermediate 
information efficiency.  
Nevertheless, the social value of intermediate information efficiency is questionable. Intermediate 
information efficiency could be socially valuable if (1) people can use the intermediate information 
to make a welfare enhancing economic decision and (2) the cost of delaying the decision from 
time 𝑡1 to time 1
+ is very high.  
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Both conditions are unlikely to be true when holding horizons are at the microsecond level. It is 
hard to imagine a case when other agents must use 𝑝1− to make economic meaningful decisions. 
Even if the information is crucial, they could wait until time 1+  and use a more informative price 
𝑝1
+. After all, System 1 algorithmic trading is profitable because other traders cannot react fast 
enough in the time window [1−, 1+]. 
Regardless of one’s desired balance of liquidity and price informativeness, when System 1 
algorithmic traders have a more informative signal ρ, market quality is unambiguously worse: 
prices are less (ex-post) informative and liquidity is more costly. The only possible social value is 
a more informative intermediate price which quickly becomes obsolete. Considering its short life, 
it hardly improves social welfare. 
In conclusion, when considering a potential policy about algorithmic trading, policy makers should 
focus System 1 trader’s information precision ρ.194 A policy that reduces ρ is going to improve ex-
post price informativeness and market liquidity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
194 System 1 algorithmic trader’s would not trade at all if they have no order flow information (ρ = 0). 
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APPENDIX I 
Introduction 
Appendix I evaluates existing empirical research on the infrastructural aspects of algorithmic 
trading in order to determine the extent to which empirical research supports our dual process 
supposition of algorithmic trading. However, readers are advised to note the following: 
Algorithmic trading infrastructure and financial market regulation are not mutually exclusive 
constructs. Inexorably, the regulatory environment that prefaced (and enabled) algorithmic trading 
merits some discussion before an investigation on the infrastructural aspects of algorithmic trading 
(vis-à-vis co-location and high-end capability computer infrastructure) can be justified. 
The discussion to follow provides some historical context to the practice of algorithmic trading by 
detailing the economic conditions that led to the advent of the practice. The regulatory environment 
that prefaced algorithmic trading is defined and discussed below - we highlight some key structural 
(i.e., regulatory) changes that fostered the development of algorithmic trading. Co-location and 
high-end capability computer infrastructure are addressed explicitly in subsections (A) and (B) of 
this appendix. 
Historical Overview of the Changing Trading Environment 
 
The history of the stock markets in the United States stretches back to 1792, when stock trading 
was said to have been organized under a buttonwood tree on Wall Street. The infamous 
‘Buttonwood Agreement’ was signed by twenty-four brokers and specified the conditions for 
trading. Accordingly, brokers would be allowed to trade only amongst themselves; with a 
minimum commission rate of 0.25%.  
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These two features of trading on what became the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) formed the 
cornerstone of the trading system that persisted until the twenty-first century.  
Banner (1998) chronicles the NYSE’s growth from its Buttonwood beginnings to what became 
the centre of the American economy. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (henceforth, the 
Exchange Act) the NYSE became a ‘predictable’195 system for buying and selling equity in public 
companies. Trading was traditionally limited to ‘broker-dealers’196 holding seats on the exchange, 
who traded in the context of specialist system. McNamara (2016) outlines the role of the specialist 
system in the stock market. Briefly, a specialist in a company’s stock was obligated to support 
trading when liquidity dried up (see also, Wolfson & Russo, 1970).197 Thus, in addition to broker-
dealers who were allowed to trade on behalf of their clients, specialists supported trading in NYSE-
listed stocks. And while specialists could see the orders in the ‘order book’, and thus had 
knowledge of where the market was headed, ‘front-running’ was strictly prohibited. Technically 
speaking, the term front-running applies to the illegal practice addressed in FINRA Rule 5270, 
which forbids a specialist from trading for its own account while taking advantage of knowledge 
of an imminent transaction. As noted by Geisst (2012): “specialists were in a privileged position 
to see prices before executing for the public and would often act for themselves before filling an 
order from the public being executed through a broker”(p.207). 
                                                          
195 To paraphrase Loy and Chi (2014): “The original conception of federal securities laws ushered in an unprecedented era of 
financial stability” (p.669). 
196 Contextually, a broker buys or sells a stock on behalf of a third-party, typically an institutional investor. Dealers, also known as 
market-makers, ensure trading by purchasing at the bid price and selling at the ask price. 
197 A specialist has to manage the trading and quote process and has to guarantee the provision of liquidity, when necessary, by 
taking the other side of the market. Essentially, a specialist acts as either a broker or dealer but only for a specific list of stocks that 
he or she is responsible for 
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In contemporary financial markets, front-running is prosecuted as a violation of Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act (see e.g. Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, 2015). However, it is important to 
recognise that the legal restrictions surrounding front-running apply only to specialists and/or 
broker-dealers who trade on behalf of clients or customers (algorithmic traders do not fall under 
the specialists and/or broker-dealers rubric, and are thus not subject to Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act prohibiting front running. This regulatory doctrine has important implications on 
the legality of algorithmic trading and is addressed explicitly in the discussion to follow.)198  
The classic twentieth century form of the exchange was for the most part an ‘open outcry system’. 
In the open outcry auction system, trading occurred at the post on the floor of the exchange where 
a specialist was located, with brokers shouting bids or offers to one another.  
By the 1960s, the volume of traded shares was overwhelming the traditional paper systems that 
brokers, dealers, and specialists on the trading floor used. This ‘paperwork crisis’ put significant 
pressure on floor traders and seriously affected operations on the NYSE.                                                                         
This crisis led to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)199 recommending changes to the 
industry in 1963.  
In response to the SEC’s call to reform, the National Association of Securities Dealers created the 
NASDAQ in 1968. The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ) represented a fundamentally new mode of equity trading both in its use of technology 
                                                          
198 With respect to algorithmic trading – the central topic of this thesis - some caveats are in order. As suggested in the narrative to 
follow, algorithmic traders are proprietary enterprises. Unlike specialists and/or broker-dealers, algorithmic traders do not act on 
behalf of clients or customers. They are thus exempt from the legal restrictions mandated by Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.  
199 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created by Congress in 1934 by the Securities Exchange Act. Since then, 
it has acted as the regulator of the stock exchanges and the companies that list on them. Over time, the SEC and Wall Street have 
evolved together, influencing each other in the process. 
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and its format.200 It provided its members with a way to trade stocks that would have difficulty 
meeting the NYSE listing requirements.201 It also incorporated the use of computer technology, 
and so was the precursor to today’s electronic trading systems. Orders were displayed 
electronically on the NASDAQ trading system. Brokers put up quotes to buy or sell stocks on an 
electronic bulletin board, and waited for counterparties to accept them. However, by offering an 
alternate market for trading, the introduction of the NASDAQ had some unintended consequences 
- alas, the lack of a centralised trading venue meant that trading became more fragmented.  
In an attempt to reconcile the fragmented state of financial markets, the SEC passed the Regulation 
of the National Market System (more commonly known as Reg NMS). This legislature mandated 
the interconnectedness of various markets for stocks. Given the elementary role played by Reg 
NMS in the progression, and now dominance of algorithmic trading, some discussion on this 
regulatory framework is warranted.  
Regulation National Market System 
Foreseeing the problems of fragmented securities markets, Congress authorized the SEC to use its 
authority to facilitate the establishment of a National Market System (NMS) for securities. 
Regulation National Market System (henceforth, Reg NMS) has its genesis in Section 11A of the 
Exchange Act and came into effect in 2007. Reg NMS is “premised on promoting fair competition 
among individual markets, while at the same time assuring that all of these markets are linked 
                                                          
200 The NASDAQ was the first financial market to incorporate computers in the trading process (Korsmo, 1971). 
201 These stocks were in most part issued by smaller start-ups; often technology ventures. See generally; 
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/NYSE_Initial_Listing_Standards_Summary.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2015). 
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together, through facilities and rules, in a unified system that promotes interaction among the 
orders of buyers and sellers in a particular NMS stock” (McNamara, 2016, p.84).  
Under Reg NMS, trading on the many exchanges in the United States would be conducted through 
the mechanism of a single price, known as the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO).202 
As allude to in Chapter 2, Section 2.3, Regulation NMS consists of Exchange Act Rules 600-612. 
The key provisions of Reg NMS were promulgated in 2005, and include: Rule 611 (the Order 
Protection Rule), Rule 610 (the Access Rule), Rule 612 (the Sub-Penny Rule), and amendments 
to Rules 601 and 603 (the Market Data Rules).  
Rule 611 (the Order Protection Rule) is at the cornerstone of Regulation NMS. This rule was 
established to maintain and enforce written policies and procedures that prevent ‘trade-throughs’, 
or trades on one market at a price inferior to one available on another market. In this way, orders 
are protected from being executed at a price inferior to the NBBO. 
Rule 610 (the Access Rule) prohibits trading centres from unfairly discriminating against non-
members.203 Specifically, the Access Rule provides for uniform access to quotes on the various 
trading venues by restricting the price charged for a quote to $0.003 per share. 
Rule 612 (the Sub-Penny Rule) was designed to limit the ability of a market participant to gain 
execution priority over a competing ‘limit order’204 by stepping ahead by an economically 
                                                          
202 The National Best Bid and Offer - NBBO - is the nationwide best available bid or ask price for a security and is determined 
using consolidated data from U.S. marketplaces. To paraphrase McNamara (2016): “The national best bid and national best offer 
means, with respect to quotations for an NMS security, the best bid and best offer for such security that are calculated and 
disseminated on a current and continuing basis by a plan processor pursuant to an effective national market system plan” (p.85). 
203 Technically speaking, non-members access quotations through an exchange member or subscriber. 
204 A limit order is a standing order to purchase or sell a certain amount of a given security at a given price.  
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insignificant amount. More precisely, Rule 612 restricts the use of limit orders that afford an agent 
with undue execution priority. In the pre-Reg NMS environment, traders would often use 
minuscule increments to jump ahead of standing limit orders. A trader could, for example, jump 
ahead of a bid for a given stock at $20.55, by bidding, say, $20.551.  
The Sub-Penny Rule (Rule 612) thus prohibits quotes in prices less than $0.01 for securities valued 
at more than $1.00, and in prices less than $0.0001 for stocks valued at less than $1.00. 
Finally, Rules 601 and 603 (Market Data Rules) form the regulatory backdrop for the information 
systems (SIPs) that disseminate the NBBO and other information to market participants. 
According to Oesterle (2005), Securities Information Processors (SIPs) play a fundamental role in 
the National Market System and are responsible for providing each NMS security with ‘core 
data’.205 The literature regularly refers to core data as: the data required by Reg NMS to be 
submitted by a national securities exchange to a SIP (Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, 2015; 
McNamara, 2016; Oesterle, 2005).  
Under Reg NMS, any and all information dissemination systems that ‘qualify’206 as Securities 
Information Processors (SIPs) will be subject to Rules 601 and 603. Concomitantly, Market Data 
                                                          
205 Accordingly, core data encompasses (1) last sale reports ;( 2) the current highest bid and lowest offer for the security; and (3) 
the NBBO (Oesterle, 2005; Coffee, 2014; Fox et al., 2015; McNamara, 2016). 
206 See U.S.C. § 78c (a)(22)(A) (2014), for a characteristic based description of Securities Information Processors (SIP’s). 
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Rules (Rules 601 and 603) provide for the contemporary version of the ‘consolidated tape’,207 and 
serve the crucial function of disseminating a single NBBO for all exchange-listed stocks.   
Note that Reg NMS in its entirety, including, but not limited to Exchange Act Rules 600-612, have 
all helped open the door for the practice algorithmic trading. However, it should be noted that 
Market Data Rules - specifically, Rules 603 (a) (1) and 603 (a) (2) – have become increasingly 
relevant in the current algorithmic trading environment. According to McNamara (2016), an 
important distinction needs to be made between Market Data Rules 603 (a) (1) and 603 (a) (2).  
As suggested by McNamara (2016), the legal nuances between these respective Market Data 
Rules, although relatively subtle, have an important bearing on the practice of algorithmic trading. 
However, a critical evaluation of these legal protocols is beyond the scope of this thesis; rather a 
precise delineation of Rules 603 (a) (1) and 603 (a) (2) should suffice for purpose of the discussion 
to follow. 
Specifically, Rule 603(a) (1) requires that any ‘exclusive processor’ 208 distributing information, 
with respect to quotations in an NMS stock to a securities information processor (SIP), shall do so 
on terms that are fair and reasonable. Fox et al., (2015) posit that this requirement is meant to allow 
                                                          
207 The SEC (2012) defines the consolidated tape as an electronic system that reports the latest price and volume data on sales of 
exchange-listed stocks (See for example, https://www.sec.gov/answers/consolt.htm). There are currently four consolidated 
information dissemination systems inheriting the role of the consolidated tape in the U.S: The Consolidated Quotation System, the 
Consolidated Tape System, the NASDAQ System, and the OPRA System (see e.g., McNamara, 2016). However, a critical 
evaluation of the various consolidated information dissemination systems is beyond the scope of this research. Refer to Oesterle 
(2005) for a detailed discussion on the topic. 
 
208 The term “exclusive processor” means any securities information processor or self-regulatory organization which, directly or 
indirectly, engages on an exclusive basis on behalf of any national securities exchange which engages on an exclusive basis on its 
own behalf, in collecting, processing, or preparing for distribution or publication any information with respect to (i) transactions or 
quotations on or effected or made by means of any facility of such exchange or (ii) quotations distributed or published by means 
of any electronic system operated or controlled by such association (U.S.C. § 78c(a)(22)(B), 2014 - defining “exclusive processor”). 
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a SIP to gather the relevant data it requires. Conversely, Rule 603(a) (2) allows for exchanges to 
disseminate information concerning quotes and transactions to other market participants on terms 
that are not unreasonably discriminatory. Contextually, Rule 603(a) (2) implies a less stringent 
standard than the one applicable to the requirement in 603(a) (1) - that an ‘exclusive processor’ 
shall provide such information to a SIP.  
This stance has acquired far more relevance with the advent of algorithmic trading and the 
marketing of private data feeds to algorithmic trading firms. Exchanges’ actively disseminate 
machine readable data to algorithmic traders. Notably, this activity - disseminating data to 
algorithmic traders - falls under Rule 603 (a)(2), not Rule 603 (a)(1). This important regulatory 
detail is explored in what follows; vis-à-vis co-location and high-end capability computer 
infrastructure.  
An Overview of Algorithmic Trading Infrastructure 
Although not ostensibly intuitive,209  exchanges regularly engage in ‘for-profit’ activities; namely, 
they sell their own financial products. Co-location and high-end capability computing 
arrangements provide just some the more notable examples of these income generating 
activities.210  
Co-location is a tangible manifestation of algorithmic trading. It refers to the exchanges’ practice 
of renting space in the facilities that house their computer servers to traders who believe they can 
benefit from this proximity (McNamara, 2016). Co-location is explicitly defined and discussed in 
                                                          
209 Exchanges are more commonly viewed as serving a single function of enabling trade. 
210 For example, the most recent 10K available of Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., the present operator of the NYSE, reports that 
data services revenue (which includes the fees charged for co-location facilities) amounted to $631 million in 2014, or 14.9% of 
total revenues of $4.221 billion. See Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 2014 Annual Report (Form 10-K). 
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the proceeding subsection of this appendix, Section A. Here we focus briefly on the data 
facilitating this practice. Specifically, one way in which exchanges’ facilitate co-location is by 
offering direct data feeds to ‘algorithmic traders’211 who wish to co-locate. 
The use of direct data feeds is permitted under the regulatory provisions of the SEC; provided that 
the said exchange disseminate such data to their algorithmic trader clients simultaneously with the 
provision of such data to the SIP.  
Under this arrangement, data is released directly to a client (co-located firm) at precisely the same 
time that it is sent to the SIP. Notably, the inherent delays in transmission and processing by the 
SIP means that a direct data feeds are often a few milliseconds ahead of the SIP. The literature is 
congruent with this suggestion. In fact, Yoon (2010) asserts that direct data feeds are on average 
five to ten milliseconds faster than the NBBO disseminated by the SIP. 
The question of the timing of the release of such data came up during the promulgation of 
Regulation NMS. However, the SEC has determined that the simultaneous release of market data 
to algorithmic traders and the SIP is consistent with the requirement of Rule 603(a) that 
information be released on terms that are “fair and reasonable” and “not unreasonably 
discriminatory.”  
High-end capability computing is another tangible manifestation of algorithmic trading. High-end 
capability infrastructure is explicitly defined and discussed in the proceeding subsection of this 
appendix, Section B. In line with the focus above, we highlight only the data facilitating this 
practice.  
                                                          
211 While co-location facilities are completely voluntary and available to all traders on a non-discriminatory basis, the technical 
details of the practice - rooted in a computer driven system - limits their use to computer driven agents (i.e., algorithmic traders). 
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Notably, one way in which exchanges’ are seen to facilitate this practice is by offering enriched 
data feeds to algorithmic traders who rely on high-end capability infrastructure. The proprietary, 
‘enriched’ data feeds offered by the exchanges provide a greater breadth of information than those 
relying solely on the NBBO disseminated by the SIP can obtain. Whereas the NBBO disseminated 
by the SIP offers only traditional order book data, enriched data feeds will offer a variety of 
different forms (defined below) of textual, as well as numerical, information. (Leinweber, 2009). 
Like in the case with direct data feeds, enriched data feeds engender questions of legality under 
Reg NMS. However, the SEC has also determined that the release of such market data by 
exchanges is consistent with the requirement of Rule 603(a) (2) - defined above. 
Overall, the discussion above confirms the aforementioned nexus between Reg NMS and 
algorithmic trading. However, the discussion above serves only as a premise for the narrative to 
follow where algorithmic trading can be analysed vis-à-vis co-location and high-end capability 
computer infrastructure. 
Empirical Support the Dual Process Proposition – Algorithmic Trading Infrastructure 
A)  Co-location Infrastructure 
 
All algorithmic trading is strategic because its goal is generally to maximize a particular strategy 
against a market’s matching engine (O’Hara, 2014). Effectively, the matching engine determines 
how orders are processed, and thus controls the automation of trades. This is where infrastructure 
comes to the fore as it establishes a channel of communication between the market – the matching 
engine – and the trading algorithm. To clarify, the ability to conduct algorithmic trading is 
predicated on infrastructure. As a prerequisite, algorithmic traders rely on either, co-location 
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infrastructure or high-end capability infrastructure (See, for e.g., Johnson, 2010; Gomber et al., 
2011; Kissell, 2013; Frino, Mollica & Webb, 2014 and O’Hara, 2014). 
The success of many algorithmic trading strategies – highlighted above – is dependent on co-
location infrastructure. Essentially, co-location infrastructure allows firms to co-locate their 
servers next to the exchanges’. In other words, many exchanges now offer co-location services to 
specific algorithmic traders, allowing them to place their servers as close to the exchanges 
matching engine as possible.  
Placing ones server adjacent to the exchanges matching engine means that real-time market 
information can reach the algorithmic traders platform almost instantaneously. It therefore, 
significantly reduces the time it takes to access the central order book – where electronic 
information on quotes to buy and sell as well as current market prices are warehoused. It also 
decreases the time it takes to transmit trade instructions and execute matched trades. In exchange 
for a fee, those who subscribe to co-location services get the infrastructure from the exchange 
itself. The package includes everything from the actual connection to the matching engine, to 
server cages, electricity, maintenance, and safety installations. Effectively, co-located firms are 
able to cut their latency in the access to news about order flow and also their order submission to 
the matching engine.  
As co-location services are a material aspect of the operation of many of the algorithmic trading 
strategies, we argue that several of the algorithmic trading strategies, highlighted above, are simply 
predicated on an inherent speed/latency ‘advantage’212- the time it takes to access and respond to 
                                                          
212 Relevant to other market participants – those who do not use co-location. They exploit their very quick access to public 
information in an attempt to analyze the news and trade before everyone else - effectively turning public information into private 
information. 
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market information. This is supported by a plethora of other researchers, including Johnson (2010), 
Gomber et al. (2011), Kissell  (2013), Frino, Mollica and Webb (2014) and O’Hara (2014). 
Remarkably, the current round-trip latency in the case of co-location is estimated to be less than 
10 microseconds. According to O’Hara (2014), an ability to process market data (such as prices 
and order book information) before everyone else effectively allows these traders to turn public 
information into private information signals. To paraphrase O’Hara (2014): “an algorithmic 
trader’s access to public information signals seconds (or even milliseconds) before they are seen 
by other traders…effectively turns public information into private information” (p.20). It follows 
that, even though the various strategies and algorithms can appear to be genuinely diverse, many 
of these strategies simply rely on high speed access to markets, i.e. the usage of co-location 
services. 
Succinctly, many of the algorithmic trading strategies highlighted above - are simply latency 
dependent strategies. More precisely, latency, or the speed factor, is a crucial component in many 
of algorithmic trading strategies. In fact, ‘evidence’213 suggest that the typical strategies that 
employ co-location infrastructure operate in the ‘microsecond’214 environment - where 1 
microsecond is roughly 300000 times the speed of an average blink of an eye.215 Arguably, this 
ultra-fast, special class of strategies exploits their very quick access to public information in an 
attempt to analyse the news and trade before everyone else - effectively turning public information 
into private information. (O’Hara 2014). 
                                                          
213 The SEC (2010) notes that: “the speed of trading has increased to the point that the fastest traders now measure their latencies 
in microseconds” (page 3605). 
214 Where 1 microsecond is an SI unit (International System) of time equal to 1000000th of a second.  
215 It takes on average 300 milliseconds to blink (Wilkinson et al., 2013). 
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B) High-End Capability Computing Infrastructure 
 
As prior noted, co-location infrastructure may be useful for trading on order book news as it travels 
fast within the exchange. However, information on the macro-economy or firm fundamentals, 
which in general are larger and more complex than order book information, travels slower and is 
exponentially more complex to interpret than order book information. Therefore, it requires more 
time, other algorithms and infrastructure. This is where high-end capability computing 
infrastructure comes to the fore.  
As the amount, complexity, and rate of generation of market data increase exponentially, high-end 
capability computing infrastructure is becoming an increasingly relevant tool for algorithmic 
traders.216 
Indeed, those strategies that do not necessitate co-location facilities are almost certainly conducted 
via high-end capability computing infrastructure.  
High-end capability computing infrastructure generally prioritises capability computing over 
capacity computing. Typically capability computing serves as a lever to pry new insight from a 
mass of big data or complicated mathematical formula. As such, capability computing is not 
measured in terms of floating point operations per second or number of processors. Rather, from 
a researcher’s perspective, high-end capability computing is measured by its inherent complex, 
analytical, logical and deductive reasoning capabilities.  
                                                          
216 Indeed, large data is a fact of today's world and data-intensive processing is fast becoming a necessity, not merely a luxury or 
curiosity. 
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More importantly, high-end capability computing infrastructure functions to exploit information 
beyond the traditional order book data. This includes news, ‘pre-news’217 and other forms of 
‘textual’218, as well as numerical information. (Leinweber, 2009). Indeed, major news providers 
have started offering algorithmic traders access to electronically processable news feeds - 
providing high-capability computer infrastructure users with valuable numerical and textual 
information.  
According to Johnson (2010), high-end capability computing infrastructure offers the potential to 
improve predictions for key market variables, “This is because they can incorporate a much wider 
range of factors in their forecast models. They may also be able to cope with today’s more 
(complex)219 marketplaces” (p.489). 
                                                          
217 Pre-news information comes from financial news articles, expert recommendations and even social media. By leveraging high-
end capability computing infrastructure algorithmic traders can apply advanced forecasting techniques – such time series analytics, 
machine learning, neural networks, support vector machines tools, as well as text mining – in order to extract actionable information 
from these pre-news feeds. Interestingly, evidence indicates that many algorithmic traders – those that leverage high-end capability 
computing infrastructure – are able to verify and exploit previously unheard forms of information (such as investor sentiment) from 
sources like twitter – a social media website (Groß-Klußmann & Hautsch 2011). 
218 Nowadays, a huge amount of valuable information related to the financial market is in textual format and available on the web. 
However, there is a limit to the amount of information a human trader can analyze. By leveraging high-end capability computing 
infrastructure algorithmic trades can apply advanced forecasting techniques – such time series analytics, machine learning, neural 
networks, support vector machines tools, as well as text mining – in order to extract actionable information from textual news feeds 
(Shah, 2007). 
219 Market integration/expansion has undeniably facilitated an increased level of market complexity. However, high end capability 
computing has created new possibilities that no human trader could ever offer, such as assimilating and integrating vast quantities 
of data and making multiple accurate trading decisions across multiple venues. Johnson (2010) states that “algorithmic traders are 
able to cope with today’s more complex marketplaces, where trading is fragmented between multiple venues.”(p.489)  Moreover, 
their ability process vast, complicated and imprecise data means that they are able to detect patterns and identify trends that are too 
intricate to be noticed by humans alone (Gamzo 2014). Accordingly, their access to multiple markets allow them to search through 
trillions of observations and identify elaborate patterns in market activity – this then allows them to implement profitable trading 
strategies without any direct human intervention. 
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Overall, those strategies that are performed on high-capability computer infrastructure exploit their 
superior ability to interpret public information in an attempt to make forecasts that are superior to 
the forecasts of other traders. In other words, these traders filter public information through an 
advanced platform (high-capability computer infrastructure), in order to detect private patterns 
from public information – patterns that signal a firms future performance.   
More precisely, high-end capability computing infrastructure is a crucial aspect of the operation 
of many of the algorithmic trading strategies, therefore, it seems natural to assume that several 
algorithmic trading strategies – those not reliant on colocation infrastructure- are simply predicated 
on an ability to make forecasts that are superior – in terms of accuracy – to those of other traders. 
Indeed, Qin (2012) advocates that high-end capability computer infrastructure has fundamentally 
influenced the accuracy of forecasting. However, it is important to note that this type of forecasting 
– based on high end capability computing – is especially intensive, thus, it takes relatively longer 
to accomplish than other less effortful techniques.220 
Following key academic and regulatory literature on the subject of algorithmic trading, we indicate 
below which of the noted strategies rely on co-location infrastructure and which rely on high-end 
capability infrastructure. 
Functional Organization of Algorithmic Trading Strategies: A Comparative Summary  
 
1. Strategies that rely on co-location infrastructure  
 Spread Capturing Algorithms 
 Rebate Trading Algorithms 
                                                          
220 Such as those strategies based on co-location infrastructure. 
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 Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) Algorithms 
 Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) Algorithms 
 Implementation Shortfall Algorithms 
 Adaptive Execution Algorithms 
 Liquidity Detection Algorithms 
                     2. Strategies that rely on high-end capability computer infrastructure 
 Data\Text Mining Algorithms 
 Neural Network Algorithms 
 Support Vector Machine Algorithms 
We close this appendix with Table I - a comparative summary of the dual process construct. 
Table I: A Comparative Summary 
 
COMPONENT 
  
SYSTEM 1 ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
  
SYSTEM 2 ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
Theoretical Relationship System 1 Cognitive Processing System 2 Cognitive Processing 
Behavioral  Reflexive/Fast (Speed Advantage) Reflective/Slower (Accuracy Advantage) 
Functional/ Infrastructural Co-location High-End Capability Computing 
Practical  Order Book Information Fundamental Information 
 Organizational  Spread Capturing Algorithms 
 Rebate Trading Algorithms 
 Time Weighted Average Price 
(TWAP) Algorithms 
 Volume Weighted Average 
Price (VWAP) Algorithms 
 Implementation Shortfall 
Algorithms 
 Adaptive Execution 
Algorithms 
 Liquidity Detection Algorithms 
 
 Data Mining Algorithms 
 Text Mining Algorithms 
 Neural Network Algorithms 
 Support Vector Machine 
Algorithms 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Private Information: The Dimensions of Private Information Accuracy 
As discussed in Chapter 4, two related mechanisms are referenced in the literature to explain the 
accuracy phenomenon. The first position holds that, although agents observe the same public 
information, they interpret this public information differently. This idea was first introduced over 
a century ago by Bachelier (1900) and later developed by Holthausen and Verrechia (1990). The 
second proposition argues that agent’s use public announcement to infer new private information 
from the public information itself (e.g., Kim & Verrecchia, 1994, 1997). These mechanisms are 
defined as the interpretation mechanism (a) and the inference mechanism (b) of private information 
accuracy respectively. 
 
a) The Interpretation Mechanism of Private Information Accuracy 
 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990)  
 
It is well established in the literature that trading on financial markets is strongly influenced by 
public firm-specific, macroeconomic and other related information flows. Markets react 
sensitively to this so called ‘news’ which is announced on a recurrent and intermittent basis. 
However evidence in the accounting literature also seems to suggest that these information flows 
(e.g., accounting earnings) are interpreted heterogeneously by investors. What is relevant is not 
that each investor sees the same earnings per share figure, for example, but that investors reach 
varying conclusions about the revised value of the firm after information releases / earnings 
announcements (Morse et al., 1987). In keeping with this focus, Holthausen and Verrechia (1990) 
present a partially revealing rational expectations model of competitive trading in order to identify 
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the effects such information releases on investor decision making. Put succinctly, they focus on 
the effects heterogeneous interpretations of public information releases have on market prices and 
volumes. 
To facilitate discussion, Holthausen and Verrechia (1990) introduce a rational model of trade in 
which many agents exchange a single risky asset and a single riskless asset over one period. At the 
start of the period, agents have homogeneous expectations with respect to the value of the risky 
asset. Exchange is motivated by agents receiving information about the liquidating value of the 
risky asset. Information is modelled specifically to assess the extent to which heterogeneous 
interpretations of a public information release result in price and volume reactions. We elaborate 
briefly on the particular form of information addressed in the model before discussing its key 
insights. 
Holthausen and Verrechia’s (1990) theoretical market is comprised of a continuum of informed 
and optimally motivated agents, each indexed by 𝛼𝜖[0,1]. At the beginning of the period, market 
participants are endowed with risky and riskless assets. The aggregate supply of risky assets is 
unknown, and uncertainty about the effect of its behaviour on prices represents the noise in the 
economy. Within the single period two events occur. First, each agent receives a signal about the 
liquidating value of the risky asset. Second, agents exchange assets on the basis of their 
information. This exchange of assets implies an equilibrium price 𝑝 for the risky asset. When the 
period concludes, the risky and riskless assets are liquidated, and agents and traders consume their 
holdings of each. The risky and riskless assets pay off in the economy's single consumption good. 
The risky asset has a normal distribution and is represented by the random variable 𝑣.The riskless 
asset is a numeraire commodity, one unit of which returns one unit of the single consumption good 
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when assets are liquidated, independent of when the riskless asset is acquired (i.e., discounting is 
ignored). 
In order to capture the universal elements of the variety of rational expectations trading models, 
Holthausen and Verrecchia’s (1990) rational expectations model was designed to be as basic and 
generic as possible. Given that rational models of trade are well established in the literature, we 
note only the unique elements of their model that differ from traditional modelling techniques. 
Specifically, the nature and distribution of information as well as the heterogeneity underlying 
agent specific interpretations of these informational variables is what sets this model apart from 
its contemporary counterparts. Thus, a precise description of informational variables specific to 
the model will suffice for the purpose of this section.  
Information Sets in Holthausen and Verrecchia’s (1990) Setup 
The notation 𝑣  represents the liquidating dividend of the risky asset and, thus, represents the risky 
asset’s true, economic cash flow. The parameter 𝜎𝑣
2 can be thought of as the variance of that cash 
flow. At the beginning of the period, agents believe that 𝑣 is normally distributed. Moreover, 
during the period each agent receives an information signal and interprets what the information 
signal implies about the liquidating value 𝑣, such that each investor's interpretation of the signal is 
given by: 
𝐴 = 𝑣 + 𝑒 + 𝛿 
Where, 𝛿 is an idiosyncratic noise term that has a normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance 𝑠, and 𝑒 is a common noise term that is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
𝑛. The random variables 𝑣, 𝑒 and 𝛿 are each independent from one another. Furthermore, the 
idiosyncratic noise terms 𝛿 are independent across agents : that is 𝐸[𝛿𝛼 ∙ 𝛿𝑘] = 0 for all 𝛼 = 𝑘. 
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By modelling information with both common and idiosyncratic noise terms,221 Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1990) facilitate a discussion regarding the formation process of private information. 
Moreover, the model effectively demonstrates that agents can be differentially informed following 
a commonly-observed signal. Indeed, the literature suggests that while investors all observe the 
same reported earnings, their interpretations of those earnings for the value of the firm need not be 
homogeneous. In such an environment, each agent observes the same public signal (e.g., an 
earnings announcement) but each agent's interpretation of what the signal implies about the value 
of the liquidating dividend varies because of the agent-specific noise term (idiosyncratic noise 
term). With respect to an earnings announcement, this is akin to all agents observing the same 
reported earnings per share figure, and then determining the implication of the reported earnings 
for the value of the firm. What is relevant is not the earnings number per se, but the implications 
of the earnings release for the value of the firm. 
Another dimension of information accuracy provided in the literature explicates the role of an 
agent’s ability to infer new private information from public information.  
This inference proposition implies that some agents utilise information gathered in anticipation of 
public announcement in order to infer new private (and possibly more accurate) information from 
the announcement itself.  
 
 
 
                                                          
221 Indjejikian (1988), Lundholm (1988), and Pfleiderer (1984), among others, also model information with both a common and 
idiosyncratic component of noise. 
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b) The Inference Mechanism of Private Information Accuracy 
 
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) 
 
Recall, Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) model private information by assuming that an earnings 
announcement provides each agent with a single signal 𝐴 = 𝑣 + 𝑒 + 𝛿. An alternative way to 
model private information with regards to information accuracy is provided below. This alternative 
modelling methodology explicates the role of an agent’s ability to infer new private information 
from public information itself. In other words the inference mechanism of private information 
accuracy suggests that agents are able to utilise information gathered in anticipation of public 
announcement in order to infer new private, and perhaps more accurate information from the 
information release. Although closely related to the differential interpretation principal, the 
inference principal suggests that the process of gathering private information is a cumulative 
process. Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) rational expectations model is introduced below. 
Their paper suggests that information releases provide information that allows certain traders to 
make judgments about a firm’s performance that are superior to the judgments of other traders. 
Their characterisation of information releases is sufficiently broad to include earnings 
announcements, management and analysts’ forecasts, 10-K filings, and other summaries of 
detailed financial accounting statistics. For convenience, however, throughout the remainder of 
the paper, they imagine these disclosures to be specifically earnings announcements. 
In their model some market participants process earnings announcements into private, and possibly 
diverse, information about a firm’s performance at some cost (e.g., time and effort). This private 
information can be thought of as informed judgments or opinions. Market participants who provide 
informed judgments are those traders willing to bear the cost for engaging in this activity. The 
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ability of information processors to produce superior assessments of a firm’s performance on the 
basis of an earnings announcement provides them with a comparative information advantage 
relative to other market participants. Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) model set-up is as follows: 
There are four types of risk-neutral agents: a market maker, potential information processors, L 
nondiscretionary liquidity traders, and T ∙ M discretionary liquidity traders. There are 𝑇 periods, 
where 𝑠 = 1,2, … , 𝑇. There is one risky asset, which they call the firm, and riskless bonds. One 
bond pays off one unit of consumption good in period T. The firm generates cash flow of 𝑣𝑠 in 
period 𝑠. Each 𝑣𝑠 is an independent, normally distributed random variable with mean zero and 
variance 𝛼𝑠. 
The liquidating value of the firm, denoted by 𝑣, is a random variable defined by 
 
𝑣 =∑𝑣𝑠
𝑇
𝑆=1
 
At the end of period 𝑠, the realization of 𝑣𝑠, becomes common knowledge. Institutionally, this 
arrangement can be thought of as one in which the firm earns revenue by completing a series of T 
independent contracts.222 As each contract is completed, the cash flow generated by that contract 
becomes known (by the firm reporting this information or otherwise). In this context, a period is 
not a fixed length of time or a cycle over which a firm must report, but rather the length of time it 
takes to complete a contract. Before the 𝑡th contract is completed, at time 𝜏, say, the firm publicly 
                                                          
222 E.g., the firm builds customized homes under contract, one at a time. 
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discloses a signal, 𝐴, that contains information about the firm’s (anticipated) cash flow for period 
𝑡. The signal is of the form of 
 
𝐴 = 𝑣𝑡 + 𝛿 
 
Where 𝛿 is a normally distributed variable with mean zero and variance 𝑑. The variance of 𝑣𝑡 is 
𝛼𝑡. 𝛼 ≡ 𝛼𝑡 is defined solely for notational convenience. Institutionally, 𝐴 can be thought of as an 
earnings announcement that imperfectly communicates, or forecasts, a cash flow whose realization 
ultimately becomes known. In anticipation of 𝐴 at time 𝜏, those with the ability to process 
announcements decide whether or not to do so at a fixed cost 𝐶 and become information 
processors. The number of information processors at date 𝑠 is denoted by 𝑁𝑠 and is determined 
endogeneously. Simultaneous with the dissemination of 𝐴, an information processor 𝑖 observes (at 
a cost 𝐶) 
𝐾𝑖 = 𝛿 + 𝑒𝑖, 
Where 𝑒𝑖 is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 𝑒 for all 𝑖. Note that 𝐾𝑖 alone is not 
an informative signal about the firm’s liquidating value  𝑣, since both  𝛿 and 𝑒𝑖, are independent of 
𝑣. Combined with the announced signal 𝐴 = 𝑣𝑡 + 𝛿, however, 𝐾𝑖  generates a signal 𝐴 − 𝐾𝑖 =
𝑣𝑡−𝑒𝑖, and this provides information about the firm’s performance. Institutionally, 𝐾𝑖  can be 
thought of as the information a trader gleans about the random error in financial reports by studying 
the firm. For example, in the case of an earnings announcement characterized by = 𝑣𝑡 + 𝛿 , the 
random error 𝛿  represents the discrepancy between cash flow in period 𝑡 (𝑣𝑡)  and the forecast of 
that cash flow implicit in current accounting profits (𝑣𝑡 + 𝛿). This discrepancy arises, perhaps, 
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from the failure of accounting profits to recognize unrealized gains, use consistent accounting 
procedures, or avoid questionable levels of capitalization. By studying data issued by the firm (at 
some cost C), traders who process public disclosures are better prepared to translate current 
accounting profit figures into superior assessments of the firm’s cash flow realization. For 
convenience we assume that the market maker observes only 𝐴, consistent with the notion that 
specialists do no fundamental analysis.  
Overall, Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) rational expectations model shows that earnings 
announcements stimulate informed judgments. These informed judgments, in turn, create or 
exacerbate information asymmetries between traders and market makers. As a consequence the 
market becomes less liquid when there is more disclosure. 
Discussion 
Regarding the dimensions of private information accuracy, two notions currently exist to explain 
the mechanisms behind how some traders come to be superiorly informed. The first is to assume 
that agents are capable of interpreting public information differently; and as a consequence some 
have more accurate information than others.  Another explanation for this information superiority 
- in terms of accuracy - explicates the role of an agent’s ability to infer new private information 
from public information. Unfortunately rational models of trade generally restrict themselves to 
the analysis one type of information variable in isolation. However, one exception is Kim and 
Verrecchia (1997), who are able to combine both variables in a unified manner. In fact, Kim and 
Verrecchia (1997) produce a rational trading model that incorporates both, the differential 
interpretation proposition, and the new inference proposition - more precisely defined by Kim and 
Verrecchia (1997) as pre-announcement information and event-period information respectively.  
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In their paper pre-announcement private information refers to the information that investors 
actively gather prior to a news release. Conversely, event-period information denotes the new 
information arising from the interaction between information contained in the public 
announcement and private information gathered prior to the announcement, which becomes useful 
only in conjunction with the announcement itself.  
Kim and Verrecchias (1997) model is defined broadly below. However, the focus here is on the 
informational aspects of their model. Indeed, the methodology used by Kim and Verrecchia 
(1997),  in order to model information has prescriptive relevance to our own model – however, our 
model will not have a rational expectations equilibrium as it is an extension of Kyle’s (1985) model 
(Kim and Verrecchia’s overall findings are inconsequential here; they are applicable only to 
rational models of trade) . Therefore, the discussion to follow is restricted to the manner in which 
private information evolves and the way it is structured in their model in order to highlight its key 
intuition; insights that may lend themselves well to our own unique model. 
 
Kim and Verrecchia (1997) 
 
Kim and Verrecchia (1997) begin by taking the rational expectations trading model suggested in 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991), which is based on the existence of pre-announcement private 
information, and adapt it to include event-period private information of the type suggested in Kim 
and Verrecchia (1994). There are three points in time, time 1, 2 and 3, and two assets in the 
economy, a risky asset (firm) and a riskless bond. One unit of riskless bond pays off one unit of 
consumption good at time 3 when consumption occurs. One unit of risky asset pays off 𝑣 units of 
consumption good at time 3. The random variable 𝑣 is assumed to be normally distributed with 
mean ?̅? and precision (i.e., the reciprocal of variance) ℎ. There is a countably infinite number of 
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informed investors in the economy with constant but differing risk aversion and also a countably 
infinite number of liquidity traders. That is, investor 𝑖′𝑠 utility function can be written as a negative 
exponential utility function, 𝑉𝑖(𝑊𝑖) = −exp (−
𝑊𝑖
𝑟𝑖
)), where 𝑊𝑖 is his wealth at time 3 and 𝑟𝑖 ,is his 
risk tolerance (𝑟𝑖 is allowed to differ across investors). 
In the model, time 1 characterizes the pre-announcement period. Four events occur during the pre-
announcement period. First, investor 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2,3, …, is endowed with 𝐸𝑖 riskless bonds and zero 
risky asset. Second, investor 𝑖 observes a private assessment of firm value, 𝑆1𝑖 = 𝑣 + 𝑒1𝑖, where 
𝑒1𝑖 is independently and normally distributed with mean zero and precision 𝑍1𝑖. The 𝑍1𝑖’s may 
differ across investors. Third, investor 𝑖 obtains and observes private information about the error 
in a forthcoming public announcement, which we assume to be an earnings announcement. This 
information is represented by 𝐾𝑖 = 𝜂 − 𝑒2𝑖, where the forthcoming earnings announcement is 𝐴 =
𝑣 + 𝜂. As discussed below, 𝐾𝑖 = 𝜂 − 𝑒2𝑖 is used only at time 2 (in the event-period) in conjunction 
with earnings, 𝐴 = 𝑣 + 𝜂. Thus, investors actions and equilibrium are unaffected by whether 𝐾𝑖  is 
assumed to be observed at times 1 or 2. Note that 𝜂 and the 𝑒2𝑖’s are all independently and normally 
distributed with mean zero and precisions 𝑛 and 𝑠2𝑖’s, respectively. The 𝑠2𝑖’s may also differ across 
investors. Fourth, the market opens and investors and liquidity traders buy and sell securities at 
competitive market prices. The aggregate gross demand for the risky asset by liquidity traders at 
time 1, denoted by 𝑥1, is a random variable normally distributed with mean zero and precision 𝑡1. 
Time 2 characterizes the event-period. During the event-period there is a public earnings 
announcement. As mentioned above, the earnings announcement communicates firm value with 
noise, that is 𝐴 = 𝑣 + 𝜂. Here, the market reopens and investors and liquidity traders exchange 
securities a second time. The aggregate gross demand for the risky asset by liquidity traders at time 
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2, denoted by 𝑥2, is a random variable that is independently and normally distributed with mean 
zero and precision 𝑡2. Finally, at time 3 the risky payoff 𝑣 is realized and investors consume their 
wealth. 
Their model incorporates pre-announcement and event-period private information as follows. The 
𝑆𝑖’s provide private information about firm value at time 1, in the pre-announcement period. This 
is information investors can use to revise their portfolios in the pre-announcement period in 
anticipation of a forthcoming public announcement in period 2.  
With regard to event-period private information, the 𝐾𝑖’s alone are not informative about the firms 
liquidating value 𝑣. Thus, the  𝐾𝑖’s cannot be used at time 1, in the pre-announcement period. 
However, once earnings are announced and 𝐴 is known, the 𝐾𝑖’s generate private information 
about firm value in the form of  𝑆2𝑖 ≡ 𝐴 − 𝐾𝑖 = 𝑣 + 𝑒2𝑖. This information, in turn, is used by 
investor 𝑖 to assess firm value. Institutionally, 𝐾𝑖 can be thought of as the information an investor 
gleans by studying the error in a firms financial reports, where the error arises from the application 
of random, liberal, or conservative accrual-based accounting practices and estimates.  
Notably, earning announcements do not simply relay numerical data, they contain valuable text as 
well. In fact, the text contained in these financial statements is crucial when it comes to interpreting 
the data. Sometimes footnotes will even change the meaning of the numbers. The discretionary 
nature of income recognition inherent in the U.S. generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) 
often results in a degree of management manipulation – where the text included in the footnotes 
of financial statements is frequently the only indication of these activities (White, 2011). Two of 
the most noticeable trends follow under the guise of either income smoothing or big bath 
accounting. Empirical evidence indicates that management can and do engage in such behavior 
(Bartov 1993; Moses, 1987; Ronen & Sadan, 1981). With income smoothing, many firms reduce 
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earnings in ‘good years’ and inflate earnings in ‘bad years’ in order to present stable earnings.223 
With big bath accounting, the hypothesis suggests that, unlike income smoothing, management 
will report additional losses in bad years in the hope that by taking on all available losses at one 
time, they will clear the decks once and for all. Crucially, this activity implies that future reported 
profits will rise. 
Thus, in the context of Kim and Verrecchia’s (1997) model, when earnings are announced the 𝐾𝑖’s 
can then be used to partially correct for the error in an earnings report. 
Insight 
Intuitively, advanced agents would trade in the wake of an earnings announcement not just because 
of the information contained in the announcement itself, but also because their private event-period 
information leads them to interpret the reported amounts differently than others who lack this 
information. In fact, event-period private information is often defined as “uniquely privately 
inferred information about future earnings.” (Barron, Harris & Stanford, 2005. p.404)  
According to Kim and Verrecchia (1997):  
“All anticipated events or announcements motivate pre-announcement private information 
gathering. In addition, event-period private information is used in all announcements to provide 
a context or interpretation to the disclosure. Consequently, event-period information also seems a 
pervasive feature of disclosure” (p. 396).  
                                                          
223 Concerning the earning reduction aspect of income smoothing, some firms will defer gains and recognize losses in these so 
called good years. While in an attempt to inflate earnings in bad years, some firms attempt to recognize gains and defer losses. 
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Essentially, a public release of information triggers agents with diverse processing capabilities, the 
ability to generate new idiosyncratic and perhaps more accurate information from the public 
announcement itself. 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Chapter 4 closed with a survey of Kyle’s (1985) Bayesian Nash equilibrium auction model.  
Regarding this model, the following caveat should be noted here: In Kyle’s original (1985) 
formulation, the informed trader has private information about the risky asset, 𝑣, in the form of a 
signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒. However, in our review of the Kyle model, it was assumed that 𝑒 the error in the 
informed traders signal was negligible (i.e., 𝑒 = 0). The assumption that 𝑒 = 0 has become 
somewhat of a conventional assumption in the literature (Foster & Viswanathan, 1996; Holden & 
Subrahmanyam, 1992; Vayanos, 1999). We follow the literature in this regard. This common 
approach is based on the following rationale: the structure of the informed trader’s private 
information (e.g., whether or not the informed trader observes v perfectly or with noise) is not 
crucial.  As articulated by Rochet and Vila (1994): “Given that all traders are assumed to be risk-
neutral it is only needed that the information structures be nested i.e., that the informed trader 
knows more than the market” (p.132).  
That being said, the more general case of Kyle’s (1985) model i.e., where 𝑒 > 0 is presented here. 
This exercise, although non fundamental, is attempted solely to enhance the comprehensiveness 
of this thesis. 
Imperfect signal 
Consider an asset with payoff 𝑣~𝑁(𝑝0, 𝜎𝑣
2). The quantity traded by uninformed traders is denoted 
by 𝑢~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2). Assume that the informed trader observes a signal 𝑠 = 𝑣 + 𝑒, where 𝑒~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2). 
Conditioning on 𝑠 the informed trader maximizes his expected profit by choosing 𝑥. Assume that 
𝑣, 𝑢 and 𝑒 are independent of each other. There is a competitive risk-neutral market maker, who 
sets the asset price as 𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] based on the batch order 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑢. 
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Proposition C1. There exists an equilibrium (𝑋, 𝑃), in which the informed trader’s trading 
strategy 𝑋 and the market maker’s pricing rule 𝑃 are linear functions of 𝑠 and 𝑦 respectively: 
 
                                            𝑋(𝑠) = 𝛽(𝑠 − 𝑝0),                                               (C1) 
                                           𝑃(𝑦) =  𝑝0 + 𝜆𝑦,                                                  (C2) 
where  
                                                 𝛽 =
 𝜎𝑢
2
√ 𝜎𝑣
2+𝜎𝑒
2
                                                     (C3) 
and: 
                                                𝜆 =
𝜎𝑣
2
2𝜎𝑢√ 𝜎𝑣
2+𝜎𝑒
2
                                                 (C4) 
 
Proof:   Let  𝜋 =  [𝑣 −  𝑝(𝑦)] 𝑥.  Following the conjectured linear (C1 and C2) and conditioning 
on the signal 𝑠, the informed trader will choose a market order size 𝑥 that will maximize his 
expected profit  
𝐸(𝜋|𝑠)   =   𝐸[(𝑣 −  𝑝0 −  𝜆𝑦) 𝑥|𝑠] 
 
                                                      =   𝑥 𝐸(𝑣 –  𝑝0|𝑠)–  𝑥 𝜆 𝐸(𝑥 +  𝑢|𝑠) 
 
                                                      =   𝑥 𝐸(𝑣 −  𝑝0|𝑠)  −  𝜆 𝑥
2,                         (C5) 
where the projection theorem implies 
𝐸(𝑣 −  𝑝0|𝑠)  =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣 − 𝑝0, 𝑠)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑠)
(𝑠 − 𝐸𝑠) 
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              =
𝜎𝑣
2
𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑒2
(𝑠 − 𝑝0) 
                                             = 𝜑(𝑠 − 𝑝0),                                    (C6) 
with 
                                            𝜑 =
𝜎𝑣
2
𝜎𝑣
2+𝜎𝑒
2                                        (C7) 
Notice that 𝜑 = 𝜎𝑣
2 (𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑒
2⁄ ) < 1 is the weight attached to the signal in forming expectations. 
Maximizing 𝐸(𝜋|𝑠) with respect to 𝑥 leads to −2𝜆𝑥 +  𝐸(𝑣 −  𝑝0|𝑠)  = 0, hence 
 
          𝑥 = 𝛽(𝑣 − 𝑝0),        with            𝛽 =
𝜑
2𝜆
                        (C8) 
Finally, the market maker sets prices such that the semi-strong efficiency condition (zero profit 
condition) obtains: 
𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑣|𝑦] = 𝑝0 + 𝜆𝑦           
The net flow of orders that the market maker receives is denoted 𝑦. The solution is then: 
𝜆 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝑦)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
 
=
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝛽 (𝑣 −  𝑝0 +  𝑒) +  𝑢)
𝑣𝑎𝑦(𝑦)
 
=
𝛽𝜎𝑣
2
𝛽2(𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑒2) + 𝜎𝑢2
 
It is now straightforward to compute the equilibrium strategies that characterise the original 
model (i.e., where 𝑒 > 0): 
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                                 𝛽 =
 𝜎𝑢
2
√ 𝜎𝑣
2+𝜎𝑒
2
=
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
√𝜑                                         (C9) 
                                 𝜆 =
𝜎𝑣
2
2𝜎𝑢√ 𝜎𝑣
2+𝜎𝑒
2
=
𝜎𝑣
2𝜎𝑢
√𝜑                                  (C10) 
Note that 1/𝜎𝑒
2 indicates the precision of the informed trader’s signal. Invariably, as the precision 
of the signal 1/𝜎𝑒
2 increases, 𝜑 is closer to 1; 𝛽 increases and the informed trader trades more 
aggressively.  
It is now fairly easy to compute the degree to which the informed trader’s private information is 
revealed by the equilibrium price, which is defined as the inverse of the conditional variance of 
the true value v, given the price p. From Bayes’ rule and the projection theorem we know that: 
                          𝑣𝑎𝑟[𝑣|𝑝] = 𝑣𝑎𝑟[𝑣] −
𝑐𝑜𝑣[𝑣,𝑝]2
𝑣𝑎𝑟[𝑝]
                          (C11) 
It immediately follows that: 
                                 𝑣𝑎𝑟[𝑣|𝑝] = 𝜎𝑣
2(1 −
1
2
𝜑)                           (C12) 
Notice that with perfect information, 𝜑 = 1, we are left with 0.5 𝜎𝑣
2 , implying that the market 
maker is able to infer half of the private information initially held by the informed investor.  
The elegance of the results obtained above emanates, not only from the fact that they confirm 
Kyle’s original formulation, but that they also validate the equilibrium derived in our own study. 
This concludes Appendix III.  
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APPENDIX IV 
Academic Definitions: Algorithmic Trading 
Authors Title Def. Algorithmic Trading 
Brownlees, Cipollini and Gallo (2011) Intra-daily Volume Modeling and 
Prediction for Algorithmic Trading 
The last few years have witnessed a 
widespread development of automated order 
execution systems, typically known in the 
financial industry as algorithmic (or algo) 
trading. Such algorithms aim at enhancing 
order execution by strategically submitting 
orders: computer-based pattern recognition 
allows for instantaneous information 
processing and for subsequent action taken 
with limited (if any) human judgment and 
intervention. 
 
Chaboud, Chiquoine and Vega (2009) Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic 
Trading in the Foreign Exchange 
Market 
[…] algorithmic trading, where computer 
algorithms directly manage the trading process 
at high frequency. In algorithmic trading (AT), 
computers directly interface with trading 
platforms, placing orders without immediate 
human intervention. The computers observe 
market data and possibly other information at 
very high frequency, and, based on a built-in 
algorithm, send back trading instructions, 
often within milliseconds. A variety of 
algorithms are used: for example, some look 
for arbitrage opportunities, including small 
discrepancies in the exchange rates between 
three currencies; some seek optimal execution 
of large orders at the minimum cost; and some 
seek to implement longer-term trading 
strategies in search of profits. Among the most 
recent developments in algorithmic trading, 
some algorithms now automaticallyread and 
interpret economic data releases, generating 
trading orders before economists have begun 
to read the first line. 
 
Domowitz and Yegerman (2006) The Cost of Algorithmic Trading: 
A First Look at Comparative 
Performance 
Like Grossman [2005], we generally define 
algorithmic trading as the automated, 
computer-based execution of equity orders via 
direct market-access channels, usually with 
the goal of meeting a particular benchmark. 
 
Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2009) Does Algorithmic Trading Improve 
Liquidity? 
Many market participants now employ AT, 
commonly defined as the use of computer 
algorithms to automatically make certain 
trading decisions, submit orders, and manage 
those orders after submission. 
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Jarnecic and Snape (2010) An analysis of trades by high 
frequency participants on the 
London Stock Exchange 
Algorithmic trading is the use of computer 
algorithms to execute human generated, 
pre-designated trading decisions. 
Prix, Loistl and Huetl (2007) Algorithmic Trading Patterns in 
Xetra Orders 
Computerized trading controlled by 
algorithms. 
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Regulatory Definitions: Algorithmic Trading 
Regulator Document Def. Algorithmic Trading 
AFM (2010) 
Authority For the Financial 
Markets 
High frequency trading: The application of 
advanced trading technology in the European 
marketplace. 
Algorithm trading is the collective term for 
all strategies whereby orders are given 
according to a pre-programmed set of rules 
(algorithms). 
ASIC (2010a) 
Australian Securities & 
Investment Commission 
REPORT 215: Australian equity market 
structure. 
We have characterized it in this report as 
electronic trading whose parameters are 
determined by strict adherence to a 
predetermined set of rules aimed at delivering 
specific execution outcomes. These 
parameters may include any one or more of 
volume, price, instrument, market, type, 
timing and news. 
 
 
CESR (2010a) Committee of 
European Securities 
Regulators 
CALL FOR EVIDENCE 
Micro-structural issues of the 
European equity markets. 
Algorithmic trading or black-box trading, [is] 
based on the use of computer programs for 
entering orders with the computer algorithm 
deciding on individual parameters of the 
order such as the timing, price, or quantity of 
the order. 
 
European Commission (2010) Public consultation: Review of 
the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) 
Automated trading also known as algorithmic 
trading can be defined as the use of computer 
programs to enter trading orders where the 
computer algorithm decides on aspects of 
execution of the order such as the timing, 
quantity and price of the order. This form of 
trading is used by an increasingly wide range 
of market users. 
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APPENDIX V 
 
TABLE V. Kyle, Benchmark and Final Model: A Comparison 
Table V (presented on the next page) provides a succinct comparison of the models of this thesis, 
noting the limiting cases.1  
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